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Some leading behavioural geneticists propose the design of education around universal 
DNA testing. Their research and advocacy, referred to here as edugenics, revolves around 
the study of human genetic material in order to predict individual learning predispositions. 
This has attracted high-level UK government interest. The historical lineage of such 
scholarship runs from the first half of the 20th century when intelligence theory, genetics 
and eugenics were closely linked; through an apparent epistemological division between 
scientists and non-scientists; to later 20th century and early 21st century scientific ambiguity 
around issues such as race.  
 
This thesis takes a long historical view. Its perspective is liberal but it employs both critical 
theory and critical race theory to help expose assumptions about race veiled in the 
edugenics literature. It explores themes of scientism, authorial gamesmanship and media 
amplification. Two devices employed by some geneticists to evade the charge of scientific 
racism are explored. It is suggested that the primary intended application of edugenics may 
be as a technology of embryo selection, where related products appear close to market. 
These devices, it is argued, do not of themselves invalidate edugenics research, but they do 
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The term “edugenics”, which I use in the title of this thesis and throughout the text, has 
been coined by me for the purpose of this thesis; it has no literary precedent as far as I 
know.  My purpose is not to create a substantive new scholarly prism of some sort, but to 
provide a tacit label for coalescing and possibly transitory trends within behavioural 
genetics, education and embryo selection scholarship. As I describe in more detail below, 
my intention is to invoke caution in approaching the research I describe by linking it to the 
eugenics which I believe serves as one of its intellectual and scientific antecedents.   
 
I argue in the thesis that some scholars use terms for the area of study in question, 
including educational genomics and educational genetics, which at first rush appear 
specific and unloaded but on closer inspection appear to me to be devices at least in part 
designed to avoid some of the difficult ethical questions raised by their research. This trend 
is related, I argue below, to a tendency amongst some scientific bodies and authors to 
employ a particular idea of eugenics as a means of separating genetics into ‘old’ and 
‘new’, and thereby reducing the ethical risk implicit within the field of genetics research 
today.  
 
My view, which I explore only at the margins of this thesis, is there is more utility in 
recognising the broadly eugenic nature of proposals made by some geneticists today in 
order to appraise them fairly, rather than evading key questions through re-definition. In 
this way, my call for caution by recognising the eugenic implications of some behavioural 
genetics research is not of itself a criticism of those scholars or fields; nor is it intended to 
suggest that a proposal may not be of worth because it may have eugenic implications. The 
intention is to make discourse around the subject more transparent by exposing the 
underlying imperatives involved in the nomenclature.  
 
I chose the subject of this thesis having read into the work of Professor Robert Plomin, a 
leading behavioural geneticist of Kings College, London. Plomin is routinely listed as one 
of the world’s most eminent psychologists of both this century and last. He is the world’s 
best-known advocate for the use of personal genetic information in the delivery of 
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education. A leading UK government figure has described Plomin as the world leader in 
his field (Cummings, 2019).   
 
Plomin and members of his much-published and cited laboratory argue that formal 
education should be structured around the results of early DNA testing combined with 
regular IQ testing. In this way, they say, education can and should be personalised around 
individual learning predispositions.  
 
Behavioural genetic research at the molecular level, as conducted by Plomin and others 
around the world, is said to move beyond discourse about the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the traditional study of twins for trait variation and correlation. It does this 
by analysing sub-gene material in DNA databases fast-growing in the wake of the mapping 
of the human genome, using now equally fast-growing computational power. In this way, 
researchers say they have been able to greatly expand observable correlations and 
variation, and to grow understanding of how specific genetic material interacts with each 
other and with the environment to produce phenotypic traits in individuals.  
 
While much genetic research at present is concerned with possible innovations in the field 
of Health, edugenics researchers such as Plomin et al say their behavioural genetics 
research has the potential for application to social policy, notably education.  Other 
behavioural geneticists are focussed upon different possible social policy applications, 
such as crime prevention.  
 
As my reading progressed, I found a number of features of such literature striking. For 
example, edugenics literature claims to reflect the singular application of empirical 
scientific method but routinely extends into non-scientific commentary. Here, its apparent 
failure to apply appropriate epistemologies seems to lead it into direct conflict with 
contemporary societal norms around issues such race and determinism. This led me to 
select race as a focus for my thesis. 
 
On the face of it, genetics research is sometimes felt to have produced few useful 
applications since what is usually described as the mapping of the human genome at the 
beginning of this century. But much steady work has been conducted in laboratories across 
the world and today innovative gene-editing technologies such as CRISPR (clustered 
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regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats) appear to provide near-immediate scope to 
intervene in the genetic make-up of humans; to create extraordinary new health therapies 
in respect of individuals and potentially their descendants too. 
 
Researchers working in fields of health typically express considerable awareness that while 
they are solving technical and scientific challenges, the societies they live and work in 
must take decisions around whether each emerging technological possibility will enhance 
the way we live or may instead do harm. And regardless of how far policymakers go in 
integrating these new technologies into public spending assumptions there will naturally be 
limits. Therapies which intervene in particular cancers in living people, say, are likely to 
have different ethical and practical implications from those which may prevent the future 
occurrence of less serious chronic health conditions.  
 
While the notion of what counts as a human enhancement, rather than treatment, is a 
nebulous one, it is certain that all relevant public expenditure regimes will involve thick 
red lines. Curing and preventing cancers is one thing, making people more physically 
attractive quite another. Access to some therapies seem likely to be dependent upon 
personal wealth much in the way that cosmetic dentistry and plastic surgery have been for 
many years.  Societies must judge whether, or to what extent, to seek to regulate scope for 
tiered access to therapies and technologies in this way.  
 
Moreover, the contemporary trend towards the use of artificial intelligence and vast 
computational power to spot claimed patterns and trends within the human genome seems 
to imply a requirement for society, and perhaps more immediately research funding bodies, 
to scrutinise the direction of travel of such research. This might include interrogating 
values implicit within algorithms or within the processes used by scholars to create new 
scientific categories. 
 
For example, scholars in the United States recently produced a paper for publication 
entitled; “A Deep Neural Network Model to Predict Criminality Using Image 
Processing”.  The paper uses facial recognition technology to identify a person’s 
predisposition to crime through genotypic and phenotypic traits. Its proposed application 
was crime prevention.  
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The publisher, Springer, withdrew the paper following a campaign by scholars concerned 
about the racial assumptions and implications of the paper (Beard et al, 2020). The 
scholars pointed out the preponderance of recent such work in spite of earlier broad 
scholarly agreement about the unexamined racial risk implied by the assumptions implicit 
within computational models (Fussell, 2020).  
 
How could public officials responsible for law enforcement apply such predictive 
information were it available? It could surely only be by treating people differently, for 
example by creating new categories of possible offender, on the basis of their genetic 
make-up?  
 
The paper included (BBC, 2020a);  
 
“"Identifying the criminality of [a] person from their facial image will enable a significant 
advantage for law-enforcement agencies and other intelligence agencies to prevent crime 
from occurring." 
 
The authors, perhaps because it is not their forte, did not show interest in how their 
proposal would likely have profound effects on societies (imagine the authorities using 
extensive surveillance capabilities to keep a closer eye on you than others, or perhaps 
being required to avoid certain jobs or activities because of your genetic profile).  And yet 
by arguing for application of their research to public policy they went beyond an 
exploration of the science, their scholarship domain, and entered into advocacy.  
 
Such advocacy, unburdened by any references to public policy or political science 
literature, manifestly lies outside the authors’ scholarly competence. Yet when such ideas 
are amplified through mass media this distinction is often lost. Scientists in this way 
sometimes present themselves as fearlessly pointing out the science when in fact they are 
making value judgements about how society should be. How society should be, in these 
terms, often involves the adoption in policy of their own research. This stretching of 
scientific scholarship beyond its natural elasticity is, in my view, an invalid move.  
 
At a fairly early stage of my reading, I found this move present within the work of Plomin 
et al and others in the field of studying heritable human traits for educational purposes; a 
field I call edugenics for the purposes of this thesis. At one level, it is perfectly natural to 
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throw your own research at the public wall in the hope that some of it will stick by way of 
a useful application.  
 
A clear dysfunction appears to exist, however, where scientists argue that some social 
application or other is inevitable, or where they seek to use claimed scientific method alone 
to contest scholarly objections to the policy application of their research. Here, a number 
of fallacies are often in play. An authority fallacy where apparently scholarly propositions 
are not supported by appropriate scholarship, for example. Or a contradiction fallacy where 
an assumption which hangs as the fruit of one epistemology is employed invalidly to prove 
an argument made in the context of a different one: For example, where a social construct 
is defined or refuted on the basis of claimed scientific evidence alone. 
 
The economist Freidrich Hayek (1942,1943, 1944) popularised the notion of scientism as 
the erroneous application of scientific method to non-scientific fields of scholarship. This 
seems evident within edugenics. And perhaps as the flip-side of its advocacy, another 
striking feature of edugenics scholarship is its evasiveness.  The purpose here seems to be 
to mask the social risk implied by the application of the claimed science as policy. Again, 
this seems an invalid move where the mass media is again often recruited to press home an 
argument which amounts to a claim for the pre-eminence of one interpretation of scientific 
method over other epistemologies.   
 
Indeed, much of this evasiveness extends from another striking feature of edugenics 
scholarship, which is that the theory contains scholarly assumptions which are at the same 
time highly contentious in social terms yet reflect assumptions made across wider fields of 
study. Sometimes, it seems, concealed risk for edugenics is actually concealed risk within 
psychology and genetics as a whole. In this thesis, I use the socially constructed notion of 
race in humans to illustrate this point.  
 
One assumption present within edugenics theory is that racial inequality, including in 
education, can in part be explained by the claim that on average black people have lower 
IQs than white.  To many people, this is a straightforwardly racist assumption. Yet 
although it is contested, it is not an unorthodox one amongst psychologists and geneticists; 
nor in respect of the intelligence theory integral to edugenics scholarship.  
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What I refer to in this thesis as Scientific Racism 2.0 reflects a wider attempt by some 
geneticists to create a new and dominant public narrative around their trade.  Such 
geneticists recognise the racial harm done by geneticists in the 20th century and seek to 
protect 21st century genetics from the charge of scientific racism. They do this, however, 
not by accepting the risk of scientism which appears to lay its heart. Instead, they couch 
race and racism in biological terms while veiling the ambiguity on the subjects still-extant 
within the field of genetics. This links closely to edugenics scholarship which has for a 
generation dealt with its racial ambiguity by simply ignoring the subject of race. Scientific 
racism 2.0 provides a new and more sophisticated way of dealing with the problem of 
scientific racism by claiming the unique right to name and define it.  
 
Analysis of this problem in respect of edugenics assumptions yields what I call below the 
Plomin Dilemma. Namely, if the theory underpinning edugenics is correct then racial 
variation in IQ would in the application lead to a system of general education structured 
broadly along racial lines. And if it is incorrect, this suggests the presence of a fundamental 
theoretical flaw which would render it invalid as the basis of public policy.  
 
A final striking feature of edugenics scholarship is that it invariably contains little or no 
reference to the literature of education. So while the scholarship of the science appears 
impressive, the scholarship behind its actual proposals for action are often simplistic and 
lacking in scholarly justification.  
 
For example, broad and unevidenced statements claiming that improved support to 
children with learning difficulties will become possible though early DNA testing show no 
evidence of any understanding of how that area of education works at present. Other 
proposals are said to have no necessary policy implications, yet without reference to social 
policy literature or to how this conclusion has been reached.  Assumptions about likely 
financial costs are even sometimes made, but devoid of any reference to where they come 
from.  
 
The juxtapositioning of what appears strong scientific method with fallacies and ignorance 
about actual educational applications seems, at face value, a significant weakness in the 
literature of edugenics. However, I argue below that in fact it seems highly unlikely that 
scholars of Plomin’s calibre miss this. Instead, these weak arguments may simply represent 
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a kind of authorial gamesmanship; a feint designed to draw the eye away from the more 
likely purpose of the research.  
 
Edugenics appears to be essentially a dual, or multi, purpose technology.  The science of 
CRISPR is, if you will, the surgeon’s knife which does the cutting. Edugenics, which seeks 
to understand which genetic material does what, may one day tell the surgeon where to cut. 
Even so, engineering for human traits such as cognitive abilities, if ever possible at all, 
seem a very long way off as the sub-gene material which affects such traits are very widely 
dispersed. Meanwhile, public discourse around genetic engineering in general is, and 
seems likely to continue to be, robust.  
 
Embryo selection, however, is another matter. At present, people undergoing In vitro 
fertilisation (IVF) select embryos for implantation with very little or even no knowledge of 
the difference between them. Some embryologists are developing ways of making a 
meaningful distinction. Rather than knowing the exact mechanism by which genetic 
features link to human traits, required for genetic engineering, probabilistic predictions 
based upon the presence of particular patterns within their DNA would for some represent 
a tremendous advance on the status quo. This, and not education, may be the true applied 
purpose of edugenics.  
 
For example, geneticists have noted that tall people share particular genetic markers. 
Where such markers are present, a person is likely to be taller than most other people 
subjected to the same environmental conditions. The genetic markers are, on a 
probabilistic basis, highly predictive of height. Edugenics scholars, and other psychologists 
and geneticists, argue that this predictive validity applies to human cognition.  Intelligence 
quotient (IQ), they say, correlates to many life outcomes. Edugenics is essentially about 
identifying which combinations of genetic markers predict higher IQ and related traits 
which help learning. If embryologists are able to offer prospective parents a prediction, 
with some degree of probabilistic accuracy, of which embryo will most likely produce the 
human with the highest IQ, it seems likely that many parents will wish to use that 
information to choose their IVF embryo/s for implantation.   
 
Of course, the edugenics scholars may very well be wrong with their science. Their case is 
rooted in the socially predictive validity of IQ. This is often described as the hereditarian 
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view and is highly contested by scholars who argue that the correlations they ascribe to 
genotype are in fact a function of environment. Moreover, as all scholars stress, there is a 
world of difference between population averages and predictions at the individual level. 
Yet whether their contested science is correct or not, edugenic proposals are at present 
receiving considerable public traction and their ethical implications are considerable.  
 
Notably, as this thesis argues, while edugenics scholars argue that their primary interest is 
in educational applications, their arguments appear peculiarly thin in this respect; while the 
social risk implied by their proposals appears high. This is does not seem naturally fertile 
ground for policymakers. Instead, it seems more likely that their true purpose may be the 
creation a new technology of embryo selection.  
 
If this is the case, the scientism lies not in the feint in respect of education, but in the 
attempt by edugenics scholars to apply claimed scientific method alone to the profound 
social question of embryo selection which requires both scientific method and non-
scientific epistemologies to answer. 
 
To conclude this introduction, I expose three of my own axioms and value judgements. 
These do not affect the logic of the thesis, but they do play into my approach and the 
thesis’ structure.  
 
First, there is much discussion about race and racism below. I explore these issues from 
intellectual and structural perspectives and at no point imply any racism on the part of 
scholars. Personal allegations, particularly against some intelligence theorists, are rife 
amongst some geneticists and are almost always unhelpful in respect of understanding the 
scientific claims.  
 
Second, when gauging human progress as a whole, I place progress on racial equality 
above economic prowess and technological innovation. These notions are not mutually 
exclusive, but I emphatically reject the pre-eminence often given to the latter two in public 
discourse; without progress on racial equality there is in my view no progress at all.  
 
Third, I do not criticise per se the idea of new technologies of embryo selection. IVF 
doctors will soon know vastly more about which embryos have a better chance of having 
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particular traits. In these circumstances, a blanket ban on informing parents about 
cognition and other probabilities may be politically and ethically undesirable. It may be 
wiser to engage in constructive discourse around future technological possibilities, while 
employing the language of eugenics in order to expose attendant but presently sometimes 
veiled ethical and social risk. 
 
1.2 Methodology, selection and limitations 
 
This thesis is about the unexplored and uninterrogated non-science aspects of edugenics. 
Edugenics is a means of referring very specifically to the area of behavioural genetics 
examined by this thesis and not an aggrandising attempt to create a new generalisable 
perspective. It consists of the published literature of behavioural geneticists inquiring into, 
and advocating, the use of personal genetic data in education. The broad methodology of 
the thesis is critical literature analysis. The reader is invited to follow a historical narrative 
and to see the subject through the prism of historical scientism and racism in order to 
illuminate unexplored social risk within contemporary edugenics. 
 
The thesis begins by describing edugenics through an exploration of key texts. It places 
edugenics into the context of its intellectual and historical lineage and shows how it 
extends from the same broad milieu as eugenics old and new. This historical approach is 
taken to show both the purpose of eugenics and the modus operandum of pre-World War 2 
geneticists. It is also designed to show how the phenomenon described as scientific racism 
is integral to the theory edugenics rests upon.   
 
The next stage explores the methods, or perspectives, which will be taken to analyse 
edugenics. The literature of Critical Theory (CT) flags and informs the broad approach, 
while it also shares historic time and place with that of eugenics. The literature of Critical 
Race Theory (CRT) also shares later historic time and place, and it provides the 
perspective applied in the next stage.  
 
One of a number of unexplored and evaded risks within edugenics research is selected, that 
of race, to serve as an example of a wider structural weakness. This section employs a 
critical approach informed by CRT. The approach red-lines Marxist criticisms of the 
philosopher Jurgen Habermas for reasons of relevance and length. CT and CRT are 
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nothing if not practical and this is perhaps their defining distinction from postmodernism. 
Epistemological confusions, scientism and the amplification of tactical arguments through 
mass media are considered.  
 
The conclusion makes inferences and draws arguments from the literature above. It 
suggests that the primary purpose of edugenics is most likely to facilitate highly predictive 
embryo selection. If scientifically valid, some useful function with medically diagnosed 
learning challenges may arguably not be ruled out; this would come with attendant ethical 
risk, however. The thesis draws tacit conclusions and makes points for further study about 
wider scholarship within fields relevant to edugenics. And it criticises some geneticists on 
the basis of Habermas’ notion of strategic communication.  
 
This critical approach to the literature was selected because the intention is to expose risk 
and intention within an important field of scientific literature; to illustrate the importance 
of selecting appropriate epistemologies in non-science research; to show scientism in 
action and to exemplify such wider phenomena as how scientists sometimes work through 
the media to create a public narrative around their trade.  
 
There was scope for a different approach to the notion of scientific racism. Had the thesis 
been longer, it would have been possible to test conceptions of scientific racism through 
qualitative research. This would have been a useful addition but was not practicable given 
the shape and length of the thesis. An additional reason for rejecting qualitative research 
methods was what the author felt was a challenging context for achieving the appropriate 
ethical clearance given the subject of race.   
 
Literature which critiques the scientific scholarship of edugenics is mentioned but not at 
length. The purpose of this thesis is not of itself to adjudicate between scientific theories 
since there is much literature on this subject at present, but to explore one and thereby 
show its evasions, gamesmanship and likely purpose.  
 
Historical antecedent is important to this thesis. Hayek’s warning about scientism came at 
a time when geneticists supported old eugenics virtually to a man (they seem all to have 
been men); when a majority of doctors in Germany had joined the Nazi party and scientists 
had built a genocide machine; when politically disengaged leading physicists had sought to 
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provide the same political regime with a nuclear weapon; and when a quarter of a million 
people were about to be vapourised by science’s latest miracle. In each case, scientists 
retrospectively claimed they were shocked about how their science had been applied. 
Geneticists who had almost universally supported eugenics suddenly discovered that 
eugenics had in fact been both a monstrosity and a terrible misunderstanding of genetics.  
 
The thesis is less deep in its references than perhaps ideal. A longer thesis would do the 
literature more justice. The breadth of this thesis was necessary to show the cyclical nature 
of the problems which serve as the backdrop to edugenics, and to place aspects of science 
into the necessary longer historical narrative.  
 
The thesis is shaped to provide considerable historical narrative and of course this could be 
taken as bias. It is hoped that the latter is avoided, but the thesis does seek to be practical in 
the spirit of CT and CRT. The author’s broad perspective, however, is a liberal one. 
 
1.3 Gulf Conflict: scientific and non-scientific scholarship 
 
This thesis explores the application of behavioural genetics scholarship to education. In 
doing so it criticises scientism, or the inappropriate employment of scientific method 
where other epistemologies apply. To this end, it identifies where theories put forward by 
some scholars extend beyond the constraints set by their own scientific methodology, and 
where there are faults of omission or reasoning.  In addition, it shows where a theory may 
reasonably be considered orthodox, if contested, amongst scholars within the relevant 
field.  
 
Some geneticists are criticised for an invalid attempt to sweep some socially difficult 
scientific assumptions contained within psychology and genetics under the carpet in order 
to protect their own field of scholarship.  These arguments are often strikingly binary; a 
thing is said to be real if it extends from scientific method and simply an opinion if it is 
not.  
 
It is argued that such reductions are often based on a misunderstanding of epistemology. At 
other times, they are based upon an incomplete and over-confident expression of a claimed 
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gulf between scientific and non-scientific scholarship. This gulf was expressed in CP 
Snow’s 1959 lecture and book The Two Cultures (Snow, 2012; Jones, 2009).  
 
In an ironic nod to near-timeless confusion around this subject, The Guardian Newspaper’s 
famous motto; “Comment is free, but facts are sacred”, is often (Hume, 2012, p106; Mui 
Hoong, 2014) misattributed to Snow. In fact these words were delivered by former 
Guardian editor CP Scott in 1921, when Snow was 16 years old. Scott was talking about 
something else altogether.  
 
Scholars employing scientific method today seek to establish empirical facts ostensibly 
through observation and inductive reasoning. There are process rules which govern the 
conduct of scientific research. It is carried out within a theoretical framework which itself 
is part of a larger, some scholars say time-dependent, orthodoxy. By continuously testing 
these orthodoxies, researchers seek to knock out anomalies; in this way they refine theories 
and fill out empirical knowledge in their field as they go.  
 
Sometimes, this knowledge is referred to as facts, as opposed to opinion. Hence, one 
presumes, the confusion around the two similarly-named authors above. Researchers often 
avoid this step because it can introduce unnecessary and unhelpful ambiguity into their 
work. Some scientists today, notably edugenics scholars, are influenced by the logical 
positivism of Vienna Circle scholars such as Rudolph Carnap (Kitchener, 2004), insofar as 
they require rule-based philosophical tools to reason validly from their observations. Their 
understanding of the relationship between their results, their own subjective ideas and 
other epistemologies varies. On the whole, scientists prefer to keep to the science although 
sometimes, as with edugenics, they express views on other fields of scholarship. There is 
naturally risk involved in the latter. The Nobel Prize winning scientist EO Wilson 
unintentionally provides a fine example of this risk.   
 
In an article entitled; “The Biological Basis of Morality” (Wilson, 1998), drawing on ideas 
expressed at more length by him in a popular book the following year (Wilson, 1999), EO 
Wilson applies his world-leading scientific scholarship around ants to ethics, morality, 
philosophy and religion. His thesis is that philosophers throughout history who have 
emphasised the transcendental did so because they did not know enough about biology. 
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Had they done so, they would have accepted that morality and ethics arise as a function of 
genetics and epigenetics.  
 
It is, one might say, a bold argument. The article was published in The Atlantic magazine 
and not in a peer reviewed journal.  
 
In a tract dedicated to skewering the transcendental, Wilson begins by channelling Cave’s; 
“I don’t believe in an interventionist God”, published the previous year (Cave, 1997). 
Wilson says that he believes in God but this does not run counter to his anti-transcendental 
thesis. Science, he says, will in due course prove God’s existence. And He will be proven 
to be non-interventionist. God is the creator alone, Wilson says, because science takes over 
with the messy business of the real world. Although Wilson briefly mentions Aquinas’ 
Summa Theologaie, he does not discuss the possibility that Aquinas’ argument from 
design, within that compendium, has traditionally be interpreted as contributing to an 
established theological argument that God is indeed interventionist.  Notably, Wilson does 
not explain why science will likely prove the existence of God but will also prove that the 
deity did not intelligently design the genetic and epigenetic phenomena and all that flows 
from it. This seems philosophically and even theologically unsatisfactory.  
 
Wilson then moves briefly on to Hume’s ‘is-ought problem’, the notion that a moral 
‘ought’ may not be derived from a scientific ‘is’. He does so in a short order which would 
certainly have saved Searle (1969), Pigden (2010) and many other scholars down through 
the years a lot of time they never got back. 
 
“We do not have to put moral reasoning in a special category and muse transcendental 
premises, because the posing of the naturalistic fallacy is itself a fallacy. For if ought is 
not is, what is? To translate is into ought makes sense if we attend to the objective meaning 
of ethical precepts. There are very unlikely to be ethereal messages awaiting revelation. 
Or independent truths vibrating in a nonmaterial dimension of the mind. They are more 
likely to be products of the brain and culture” (p.37).   
 
In the most elementary of ways, the posing of the ‘is-ought’ problem is manifestly not a 
fallacy as Wilson argues. A simple answer to; “if ought is not is, what is?”, is “anything we 
choose. That’s precisely Hume’s point”. Indeed, Wilson’s whole passage here is a fallacy 
in which he seeks to prove the superiority of his epistemology over another by an appeal to 
the rules of his own epistemology. He compounds this weakness throughout the article by 
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arguing that the work of philosophers from Kant to Rawls was fatally flawed by their 
failure to provide scientific evidence for their arguments.  
 
Throughout the article, Wilson picks up and dismisses philosophical arguments of 
historical profundity in quick time. It is an extraordinary piece of writing for a Nobel 
laureate. He is of course entitled to argue for genetic determinism and this would be 
consistent with the broad sociobiological philosophy he helped originate. But at root, his 
argument that genetics create moral instincts which leave us without the ability to choose 
is pure polemic. It is really insufficiently coherent to stand even as a hypothesis. As a side-
issue, it is incompatible with his broad thesis that only good things will come from proving 
scientifically what is morally right and wrong.  
 
Wilson points out that transcendental thinking has led to some bad outcomes, but does not 
mention the rape, killing and torture which is certainly present naturally, and presumably 
genetically determined, throughout the animal kingdom. His conception of morality 
essentially negates the notion of morality as we know it. It does not even account for 
scientific scholarship, such as in the field of quantum theory, which would surely have 
great difficulty with the supreme degree of prediction he believes genetics provides.  
 
Wilson’s argument gives the appearance, at the very least, of extending from the scientism 
of an eminent scientific scholar in late career, fed up with toeing the line on different 
theories of knowledge and who has decided to have a go at creating a theory of everything. 
Notably, and this will be referred to below, he uses the device of a popular media journal 
rather than a peer-reviewed philosophy journal. This enables him to avoid scrutiny by 
serious scholars, who will understand how such articles provide a licence to speculate 
beyond the strict boundaries of scholarship, but to influence public discourse.  
 
Today, Wilson’s ideas for “consilience” between science and non-science scholarship are 
influential at the highest level of UK government and serves for some as an intellectual 
infrastructure upon which edugenics is overlaid (Cummings, 2019).  
 
To be clear, it is argued in this thesis that edugenics scholars such as Plomin do not quite 
fall into the chasm Wilson does. They may think it, but they do not say it. Other writers 
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who amplify such messages in the media domain, such as Rutherford (2020), do however 
and this is explored at Chapters 4 and 5 below.  
 
In his tract, Wilson is in fact attempting to deal with what he regards as a binary problem. 
He wishes to achieve “consilience” between the scientific and the non-scientific 
epistemologies through a takeover by his own scientific perspective. His attempt is based 
upon subordinating the non-scientific to scientific method and thereby somehow rescuing 
it. He wishes to put what he sees as non-scientific epistemologies through a scientific 
washing machine and pull them out again cleansed of unscientific thinking and now 
somehow fit for purpose. As is characteristic of scientism, Wilson has spent too little time 
trying to understand scholarly fields, literature, paradigms, epistemologies and even 
scientific perspectives which are not his own.  
 
The significance of his effort lies not in its obvious failure, but in his failure to recognise 
what many contemporary scientists do: namely, that even the most scientifically sound 
facts and theories are conditional and theory dependent; and that the binary phenomenon, 
the gulf, he sees is itself a human construction.   
 
Below at Chapter 3 this thesis will explore how German scientists such as Werner 
Heisenberg developed quantum theory in part as a consequence of their rejection of 
cultural and intellectual orthodoxies pressed upon Weimar Germany by the First World 
War victors. They relied heavily upon the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, although 
later saw flaws in its failure to account for the way science, other epistemologies and 
human experience intersect.  
 
At the same time, and against the notion of philosophy and enlightenment thinking as 
essentially the handmaiden of science, was ranged scholars of the Frankfurt school such as 
Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno. These scholars were concerned that unvarnished 
positivism and enlightenment rationality was leading to a Nazi catastrophe where scientists 
and doctors were competing for influence within a regime soon to commit atrocities 
against humans on a staggering scale. In due course, post-war, science and non-scientific 
scholarship did indeed find accommodations which took account of both the value of 
scientific method and the importance of understanding its conditional context.   
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Chalmers (2013) points out that historical accounts of scientific advances show they have 
not come from the simple process of gathering observations and dispassionately 
constructing theories around them. He notes that much of Galileo’s ostensibly 
experimental work, for example, in fact came in the form of abstract thought experiments. 
He argues that observation is affected by the perspective of the observer, and that the truth 
of observation judgements is judged by reference to what is believed to be true, so the 
observable is rendered as fallible as the underlying presupposition.  
 
In practical terms, many of these problems can be mitigated through trained observation, 
public scrutiny, an acceptance of the need or scope of revision, the minimising of 
subjectivity and good experiment design. But since scientific truths are all subject to 
revision then they are conditional; repetition is useful but does not remove contingency 
altogether. Induction involves making inferences about the unobservable and the need for 
induction to be justified by induction means that in practical terms ‘scientific truth’ is 
better qualified as ‘probable truth’ or even ‘best (available) truth’.  
 
Popper’s “falsifiability” (Popper, 2005), where logical validity is contingent upon the 
possibility of falsification, constituted a major contribution to understanding the 
intersection between science and non-science, particularly in a post-genocide context.  The 
Duhem/Quine problem, Quine’s exploration of an earlier idea by Duhem (Harding, 1975), 
argues that a complex theory is not falsified where the falsification may extend from a flaw 
in an interconnected theory, or auxilliary assumption, and not the theory under test.  
 
Lakatos (Chalmers, 2013; p.84) points out the scope for continuous denial of falsification 
by deflecting the problem on to an endless series of hypotheses rooted in the auxilliary 
theories. Moreover, theories can be falsified using present theories which turn out to be 
wrong. By way of example, Astrology is falsifiable. Theories must therefore be both 
falsifiable and not falsified.  Finally, it is left to the falsifier to decide which part of a 
complex theory is falsified. This leaves little scope for practical advance when in fact it 
may be that the overall structure remains intact.  
 
Chalmers argues that science is best understood through the theoretical constructs which 
contain them:  
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“A case could be made to the effect that the typical history of a concept, whether it be 
‘chemical element, ‘atom’, ‘the unconscious’ or whatever, involves the initial emergence 
of the concept as a value idea, followed by its gradual clarification as the theory in which 
it plays a part takes a more precise and coherent form” (Chalmers, 2013, p.99).  
 
Kuhn’s paradigm shift solves some of the problems of Popper’s falsification. Here, 
“normal” science takes place within an orthodox scientific paradigm; flaws and anomalies 
are ironed out through experiment; eventually, though, too many flaws appear and the 
meta-theory is threatened, then a new consensus forms around a revolutionary new 
paradigm and normal science again takes place in this new context.  
 
Scientific advance, within this paradigmatic context, has the benefit of substance over time 
which in turn allows normal science to correct errors and fill out the detail and apply the 
science to practical pursuits. A perceived weakness of Kuhn’s paradigm shift is that it can 
be become lost in relativism. If, as he says, no notion within one paradigm can be justified 
on the basis of another, then revolutionary paradigm shift does not necessarily entail 
progress.  
 
This question lies beyond the scope of this thesis. However Lakatos (1976, 1980) 
developed Popper’s falsification and sought to deal with the relativism of Kuhn’s 
paradigm.  
 
Lakatos’ “research programme”, in effect an updated Kuhnian paradigm, proposed a “hard 
core” and a “protective belt” of concepts and theories within an overall programme. The 
negative heuristic guides the scientist not to challenge the hard core, the positive heuristic 
guides towards the actions needed to shore up the hard core. Here, the hard core is able to 
survive failures of prediction, by ascribing such failures to the protective belt. In this way, 
in the practical terms accepted by this thesis at least, scientific progress can be seen 
through the collapse of one paradigm and its replacement by another but with the latter 
accompanied by surviving orthodoxies which existed within the previous paradigm. 
Lakatos’ research programme casts objectivity not simply as empirical, but as inter-
subjective understanding through the open inspection of methods.   
 
It will be argued below, however, that in the midst of this practicable post-war progress, 
the notion of a clear binary divide between science and non-science, with the former often 
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in the ascendant and in the EO Wilson mode, is often prevalent in the public presentation 
of genetics scholarship.  
 
1.4 Terminology: Edugenics, edugenomics, edugenetics, intelligence  
 
Scholarly proposals to design education around genetic testing (Plomin, 2018), to select 
human embryos for educational performance (Devlin, 2019; Ball, 2019) and, arguably, to 
deploy human genetic engineering for intelligence and educability (Cocker, 2019) employ 
the same behavioural genetics research (Hsu, 2014; Cummings, 2019).  
 
On the basis that such research presents multi-function social and ethical risk analogous to 
“dual use” in arms exportation regimes (Fiott & Prizeman, 2013), the term Edugenics in 
this thesis refers to the application, in any way, of behaviourist genetic research for 
educational outcomes.   
 
This term, with its etymological debt to eugenics, is designed to sound a cautionary note 
extending from the principle, implied by Agar’s “liberal eugenics” (Agar, 1998), that it is 
better to confront directly those questions of ethics and risk which accompany new 
research and technology than to conceal or evade them through euphemisms.  
 
Here, edugenics is intended to convey the imperative that any consideration of the 
application of genetic or genomic research to education involves important questions of 
ontology, epistemology, methodology and ethics; and many other value judgements 
besides.  
 
Some edugenics scholarship deals with the principles and broad nature of relationships 
between each person’s whole genome and their education: edugenomics in this paper 
(Grigorenko, 2007). Other scholarly work (Belsky et al, 2016; Selzam et al, 2017) is 
concerned with what is referred to here as edugenetics: the actual or potential function in 
education of sub-gene genetic information. Many authors engage the field from both 
perspectives (Petrill and Justice, 2007).   
 
Edugenics scholars stress the what they claim is the highly predictive function of general 
intelligence, or ‘g’. This, as mentioned above, is a highly contested matter where 
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hereditarians stress the importance of inherited genotypic traits and anti-hereditarians 
stress the dominant role of the environment. Typically, an environmental approach has 
dominated public policy although the hereditarian argument has gained popular traction 
every generation or so over the last century. Notably, however, as with what will be 
described as Scientific Racism 2.0 below (Birney et al, 2019; Rutherford, 2020), some 
scholars who claim to be anti-hereditarian appear in fact to accept virtually all of the 
hereditarian premises. Here, the claim seems to be an authorial device aimed at 
entrenching hereditarianism while avoiding some of the less publicly palatable 



























Chapter Two: The Historical arc of edugenic literature 
 
2.1 Geneticists, Eugenics, Edugenics 
Eugenics had a disastrous 20th century. Geneticists, other scholars and public figures who 
were proponents sought to benefit society through the mechanism of human trait heredity. 
They promoted the utilising and replicating of human genetic material judged desirable 
and the suppressing of that judged undesirable. An important feature of eugenics was that 
supporters sought its application through state agency. That is to say, force.  
 
In the 19th and 20th centuries, eugenics amounted to the social operationalising of the 
evolving science of genetics. The science was flawed. For example, that the Hardy-
Weinberg ‘equilibrium’ principle determined that adverse genetic human conditions would 
be selected for very slowly and would appear randomly was well-known by the mid-1920s. 
It followed from this that attempts to reduce adverse occurrences on a society-wide basis 
through, for example, sterilisation, would be unsuccessful. The standard response of 
geneticists, however, was not to reject eugenic theory on this basis, but to reframe it.  
“It is true that many eugenicists were muddled about genetics. But what about the host of 
respected geneticists, such as R. A. Fisher in the United Kingdom, Erwin Bauer in 
Germany, Herman Nilsson-Ehle in Sweden and Edward Murray East in the United States, 
who championed eugenics long after the implications of the Hardy-Weinberg principle 
were understood? The insight that selection is slow when genes are rare originated in 
1917 and was popularized in the 1920s by J. B. S. Haldane in the United Kingdom and H. 
S. Jennings in the United States. Yet in the 1920s and 1930s, nearly all geneticists, 
including those traditionally characterized as opponents of eugenics, took it for granted 
that 'mental defectives' should be prevented from breeding….it was possible to recognize 
all these flaws and still remain a eugenicist. After 1920, it was well understood that most 
genes for mental defects would be hidden in apparently normal carriers. For most 
geneticists this seemed to be a good reason to widen eugenic efforts rather than abandon 
them” (Paul and Spencer, 1995, p.302, 304)  
 
In this way, uninterrogated value judgements, some of which reflected the orthodox and 
racist assumptions of the time, were normative within the scholarly assumptions of such 
geneticists and in their eugenic prescriptions for public policy.  
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Scientific arguments were advanced to justify ideological arguments about racial 
superiority and inferiority (Mazumdar, 1992). These were primarily around intelligence 
and other traits which were believed to affect educability and many other life outcomes.  
 
Today, edugenics scholars, mainly behavioural geneticists, claim to apply contemporary 
genetic science to education. They do not rely, they say, upon the flawed science of old 
eugenics. However, in the case of proposals to construct general education around early 
DNA testing, and unlike Agar’s liberal eugenics, they cleave to the notion that the state 
should take an active role (Asbury and Plomin, 2013).    
 
It will be argued below that, in the literature, edugenics scholars invariably move from an 
explanation of their scientific results directly to an assumption that such results should be 
applied to education (Gaysina, 2016; Plomin, 2018; Rimfeld & Malanchini, 2018). There 
is a vacuum in respect of social policy and other literature necessary to inform scholarly 
progress from results to application. This appears to be a 21st century expression of 
Hayek’s scientism mentioned in Chapter one.  
 
Some scholars who express disagreement with or scepticism about edugenics nevertheless 
regard such developments as now having an unstoppable momentum:  
“The floodgates of genetic data have opened. It is our opinion that education will 
undoubtedly be affected” (Martschenko et al, 2019).  
A common feature of such critiques, however, is that they often themselves fail to consider 
the social and political theory necessary to inform the scholarly judgement. It is not 
possible to make a scholarly judgement about whether a thing is likely in policy terms, or 
whether it has policy implications or not, without referring to relevant social policy 
literature.  
 
For example, the Overton window (Russell, 2006) is often used in fields such as health 
scholarship to gauge policy relevance and practicability (Morgan, 2019). This author has 
been unable to find any references to any such device, or indeed any relevant social policy 
literature at all, in edugenics literature.  
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More specifically, it will be suggested below that while edugenics literature makes 
frequent claims of policy neutrality, in fact this is to conceal its more likely place as part of 
a conservative, or indeed neoliberal, worldview.  
 
Lauder (2020) employs the perspective of the Lakatosian research programme to argue that 
while neoliberal thinking in education may have rested on firmer intellectual grounds at its 
instigation a generation ago, today its hard core is crumbling through its reliance upon 
Human Capital Theory and the failure of education marketisation to date to deliver the 
wide socially beneficial outcomes the research programme predicted. It is suggested at 
Chapter 5 below that edugenics may fit into a wider pattern of attempted policy 
formulation which reflects this crumbling theoretical hard core. Of particular interest in 
this respect is the displacement of scholarly sources by non-scholarly publications and 
government sponsored mechanisms in shoring up government policy ideas.  
 
Viewed through the prism of the Overton window, however, it is not implausible that the 
qualified application of genetic research to education, for example to identify and help 
children born with otherwise debilitating learning difficulties (Middlecorp et al, 2016;  
Stergiakouli et al,  2016), could command public support. This could naturally apply 
whether or not such research was useful in practice, or even valid in itself.  
 
Notably, while the wider use of new gene-editing technologies such as CRISPR and the 
idea of embryo selection for intelligence remain the subject of controversy and proposed 
moratoria (Caplan et al, 2015; Cohen, 2019; Shulman and Bostrum, 2014; Jaarsma and 
Welin, 2013), the use of advance DNA tests in education has already begun to enter the 
margins of classroom practice (Callier, 2012; Wright et al, 2019).   
 
The extensive ethical treatment of the former two technologies has not been visible in this 
steady advance towards the introduction of advance DNA testing into the classroom. With 
cheap DNA testing already widely used by consumers to access health advice, it seems at 






2.2 Edugenics scholarship 
 
The period since the mapping of the human genome in 2004 has seen considerable growth 
in research into the possible application of genetic and genomic research to education; or 
edugenics. The field is dominated by behavioural geneticists studying human trait 
variation.  
 
Prior to 2004, the primary methodology was twins studies (Trouton et al, 2002; Neal & 
Cardon, 2013). Here, the traits of zygotic and non-zygotic, or identical and fraternal, twins 
are studied in order to separate the functions of heredity and environment. Where the traits 
of identical twins vary the role of the environment can be apportioned. Conversely, where 
environmental conditions are the same, variation can be assigned to genetic heredity.  
 
Since 2004, Genome Wide Association Studies (GWASs) have taken advantage of rapidly 
growing commercial DNA banks where members of the public provide voluntary samples. 
This enables scholars to analyse patterns within very large datasets using ever-greater 
computational power (Bush and Moore, 2012).  
 
Such datasets are today collocated and catalogued to facilitate a high level of interrogation 
by scholars (MacArthur et al, 2017). These assets are used by geneticists to study human 
trait variation at the molecular level in order to identify, for example, multi-factorial 
relationships between genetic coding and human health outcomes (Raat et al, 2010; 
Freedman et al, 2011).  
 
An early search for simple associations between a single gene and a particular condition, 
an ‘intelligence gene’ or a ‘gay gene’ were popular media chaff, have given way to the 
study of the combined polymorphic effects of sub-gene material.  
 
Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) are variations in alleles caused by substitution at 
particular points along the human DNA sequence.  Researchers say can together have 
predictive value in respect of health conditions.  
 
“SNPs are the most common type of genetic variation among people. Each SNP 
represents a difference in a single DNA building block, called a nucleotide thymine 
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(T) in a certain stretch of DNA…they occur once is every 300 nucleotides on 
average, which means there are roughly 10 million SNPs in the human genome. 
Most commonly, these variations are found in the DNA between genes. They can 
act as biological markers, helping scientists locate genes that are associated with 
disease” (NIH, 2018).  
 
Geneticists analyse GWASs for correlations between the presence of these markers and 
that of health conditions such as cancer.  While geneticists seek to understand the function 
and interaction of SNPs, the emphasis within behavioural genetics is upon observing the 
correlations themselves.  
 
So, for example, human height correlates to around 20,000 identified SNPs. The presence 
of SNPs in particular combinations permit a high degree of predictive validity in respect of 
height outcomes (Lello et al, 2018). This validity is a matter of probability and based on 
the presence of particular SNPs, rather than geneticists understanding how the SNPs 
actually work on height. The same principle is applied across the field of human health 
(Pharoah, 2013; Hagenaars et al, 2016).  
 
Some behavioural geneticists, often psychologists by scholarly background, apply these 
techniques to education. A key variable is Intelligence Quotient (IQ). Here, Spearman’s 
(Jensen, 1993) notion of general intelligence, or ‘g’ (Gottfredson, 1998), is linked to the 
presence and patterns of SNPs to provide what researchers say is a high degree of 
predictive validity in respect of educational, social, economic and many other outcomes 
(Gottfredson, 1998; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002; Plomin, 2018; selzam et al, 2017; von 
Stumm et al, 2020).  
 
Spearman’s innovation was to observe that people performed similarly well in different 
types of test:  
 
“Central to Spearman’s work is his observation that people perform similarly well on tests 
measuring different aspects of cognitive ability such as working memory, problem solving 
and spatial tests involving puzzles. Deploying his own Factor Analysis (Harman, 1976), 
Spearman concluded that each individual’s cognitive ability is influenced by a number of 
specific single-task variables and by environmental variables such as nutrition, but 
crucially that around half is the result of their genetic make-up. This is general 




General Intelligence, ‘g’, is measured though psychometric testing, commonly known as 
‘IQ’ tests. IQ is the most pervasive expression of intelligence, although rival theories exist 
(Gardener, 1990, 1992, 1994) and it is important to place IQ into this wider context.  
 
There are many theories of intelligence (Spearman, 1927; Cattel, 1971, Ciancolo & 
Sternberg, 2004), but edugenics scholars work in the tradition of Spearman’s ‘g’. They do 
not in theory deny the possibility of other intelligences, but their work is dominated by the 
claimed predictive validity of ‘g’.   
 
Gardner’s notion of multiple intelligences, on the other hand, provides a conception of 
intelligence based upon a range of learning modalities. He does not seek to refute the 
corellations expressed by ‘g’, such as between the “logical-mathematical” and “verbal-
linguistic” modalities.  He argues, however, that some modalities have much weaker 
relationships with ‘g’. These include the “bodily-kinesthetic”, which influences physical 
movement and skill, and the “musical rhythmic”.   
 
Some psychometricians (Allix, 2000; Gottfredson, 2006) note that Gardner’s multiple 
intelligence idea has not been supported by empirical evidence, and argue that ‘g’ accounts 
for at least some of Gardner’s non-IQ modalities (Visser et al, 2006). Gardner does not 
dispute these points and accepts that judgements about non-IQ modalities remain 
subjective. Critics (Gottfredson, 2006) suggest that those intelligence modalities of 
Gardner’s which do not correlate to ‘g’ simply amount to re-naming aptitudes as 
intelligence.  
 
However, Gardner’s conception of intelligence is sensitive to cultural context and exposes 
at least one potentially circular feature of the claimed predictive validity of ‘g’. That is to 
say, if ‘g’ is socially predictive, this may in full or part reflect that society has been 
constructed to favour the traits of those who had most power in the constructing.  It may 
follow that societies constructed along different lines and with different imperatives may 
show much weaker correlations between ‘g’ and social outcomes. 
 
Moreover, Gardner’s conception raises the question of when judgements about a theory’s 
accuracy or predictive validity should be made. This encompasses Lakatos’ emphasis upon 
time-bound contingency. Here, Lakatos’ emphasis upon power relations appears, to 
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scholars whose aim is to lessen social inequality, to commend Gardner’s conception of 
intelligence as a heuristic device or starting point. This is not necessarily to deny that ‘g’ 
has validity and utility, but to place it lower on the hierarchy of cause and effect than 
structural variables which lend themselves to socially unequal outcomes. Notably, 
Gardner’s approach places a greater imperative on more inquiry in respect of the group IQ 
differences claimed by hereditarians, for example where deeper questions about the values 
and assumption implicit within algorithms may throw considerable light on the subject. 
 
While edugenics scholarship makes a superficial appeal to social justice, as discussed 
below, it both extends from a wholesale acceptance of the validity of ‘g’ and rejects claims 
that ‘g’ is culturally bound. Alternative conceptions of intelligence are regarded as without 
scientific foundation but are in theory at least not wholly rejected as possibilities. As noted, 
however, hereditarians (Gottfredson, 2006) tend to criticise non-IQ conceptions of 
intelligence as wordplay, where sporting and musical aptitudes are re-labelled as 
alternative conceptions of intelligence.  
 
A full exploration of the idea of intelligence is beyond the scope of this thesis, although it 
is suggested below that edugenics scholarship is at best unclear in its social intent. 
Moreover, it is argued that a faux distinction exists between hereditarian scholars and some 
ostensibly anti-hereditarian scholars since both groups stress the special place of ‘g’.  
 
In all events, intelligence is a highly-contested idea. Meanwhile, the purpose of this thesis 
is to examine edugenics scholarship and so psychometric ‘g’ is referred to often.   
 
Alongside, IQ, non-IQ variables, such as determination, or Grit (Rimfeld, 2016), are also 
studied by edugenics scholars and this augments the SNPs correlated to IQ. This, they say 
(Plomin, 2018), shows how many phenotypic traits which appear to extend from the 
environment are genetic in origin and enhances the extent to which they are able to predict 
educational performance.   
 
Edugenics scholars propose constructing children’s mandatory education around universal 
pre-school DNA tests supplemented by continuous IQ tests (Plomin, 2018; Selzam, 2018). 
The same researchers, some influential at the highest levels of the present UK government 
(Cummings, 2019), argue that the application of genetic information to education is now 
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inevitable (Plomin, 2018; Selzam, 2018). Some are associated with scholars (Hsu, 2014) 
studying the field of embryo-testing where in vitro fertilisation (IVF), recipients select 
embryos according to trait prediction (Yong, 2013). 
 
It is a matter of orthodoxy, although not uncontested, within the psychometric testing 
literature that there exists a racial hierarchy of general intelligence. In IQ tests, it runs, 
people who self-define as black score on average lower, likely significantly so, for general 
intelligence than those who self-define as white or asian. This provides predictive validity 
and apparent explanatory power in respect of the average poorer educational, social and 
economic outcomes (Flynn, 1999, 2010; Dickens and Flynn, 2006; Nisbett et al, 2012). 
Implicit within edugenics literature, and present within wider genetics scholarship, is the 
notion that this racial variation is likely partly caused by genetics (Gottfredson, 1995; 
Plomin, 2014; Plomin, 2015). This is explored below.   
 
2.3 The Lineage of edugenics literature 
 
2.3.1 Galton to The Holocaust 
 
The term “eugenics” was coined in 1883 by Sir Francis Galton (Galton, 1883; pp.24-25) to 
refer to what he later refined thus; "Eugenics is the study of the agencies under social 
control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either 
physically or mentally" (Galton, 1904, p.81). 
 
The term’s primary usage since then has reflected Galton’s own emphasis upon the 
proposed application of policies informed by such study. This includes the belief that the 
cause of human progress is served by seeking to improve human stock through 
intervention in the transmission of heritable genetic traits, in order to increase the 
incidence of desirable ones and decrease that of undesirable ones.    
 
Galton was influenced by the epochal natural selection theory of Charles Darwin, with 
whom he shared a grandfather and who in return endorsed Galton’s arguments on the 
heredity of human intelligence (Rose, 2009). Galton placed intelligence and education at 
the core of this theory, although he stressed the importance of other human traits in species 
success too (Gillham, 2001).   
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The primary means of intervention promoted by Galton were the selective breeding of the 
more intelligent members of society and the constraining of breeding among the less 
intelligent. Since Galton assumed domestic social stratification reflected genetically 
informed intelligence, he proposed that the middle and higher social orders reproduce more 
and the lower social orders less. And because he also assumed, following the Swedish 
scholar Linnaeus (Linnaeus, 1758), that there existed a hierarchy of racial categories 
rooted in intelligence, genetics and biology, he proposed encouraging white people to 
breed more and black people less.  
 
Galton’s scholarship was rooted in the scientific study of human heredity, most notably 
what he considered to be genius (Simonton, 2003); this naturally included himself.  It was 
characterised by the early application of scientific method and serves as an example of the 
rapid growth of scientific method in late-Victorian England (Lightman, 2008).  
 
Many of Galton’s broad theories and insights have had a substantial influence upon 
modern scholarship, notably psychometrics. Goldstein (2012) notes that the tradition of 
factorial analysis generating the theory of intelligence, ‘g’, followed by edugenics scholars 
such as Robert Plomin today, is essentially that originally proposed in principle by Galton, 
developed during his lifetime by Spearman, then developed by other scholars since. This is 
the tradition which saw the design of many modern psychometric tests in wide usage 
within industry, clinical psychology and indeed genetics scholarship (Jensen, 2000). 
 
Galton overlaid his statistical and scientific inquiry with a series of value judgements about 
the human condition and the nature of social progress. These reflected then-dominant 
cultural assumptions about the human superiority of white, upper-caste men; late-Victorian 
ideas central to the retention of empire through military and economic means.  
 
Galton’s values were informed by the system of Christian beliefs, although he took a 
utilitarian view of religion as that which binds us to duty and moral stability (Gillham, 
2001). From an epistemological perspective, therefore, the empirical scientific method of 
Galtonian eugenics was overlaid by an informal Christian moral epistemology.   
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Today, the Galton Institute and other features of modern genetic scholarship such as the 
Galton professorship of genetics at University College London, speak to a strong 
commitment amongst leading scholars in the field of genetics to Galton’s place in the 
science pantheon. Indeed, that The Galton Institute’s previous name, The Eugenics 
Society, changed only the in the 1990s, reflects the fact that for its first 40 years or so, 
eugenics and the study of genetics were essentially interchangeable terms (Mazumdar, 
1992).  
 
In the three decades after Galton’s death, Eugenics became an orthodox perspective across 
the political spectrum. In the UK, Galton’s scholarly work was continued by his protégé, 
the biostatistician Karl Pearson. Pearson argued:  
 
“My view, and I think it may be called the scientific view of a nation, is that of an 
organized whole, kept up to a high pitch of internal efficiency by insuring that its numbers 
are substantially recruited from the better stocks, and kept up to a high pitch of external 
efficiency by contest, chiefly by way of war with inferior races." (Pearson, 1901) 
 
Pearson was a socialist (Semmel, 1958) and remains an econometrician of historical note 
(Read, 2016). Liberal reformers such as Marie Stopes routinely saw eugenics as a logical 
way of gradationally improving the lot of the least well-off. The Eugenics Society was 
established to this end and included Winston Churchill amongst its members (Mazumadar, 
1992). In 1942, the eugenicist and architect of the UK welfare state, William Beveridge, 
promoted to the London Eugenics Society of which he was a member the merits of his 
child benefit proposals on the basis of their eugenic function (Sewell, 2009, pp73-34). This 
was at a time when the Nazi eugenics programme was well-known in the UK.  
 
Mazumdar (1992) argues that Edwardian and inter-war support for eugenics was driven by 
a classical 19th century educated middle-classes’ fear of pauperism described by authors 
such as Charles Dickens. This was reflected in 19th century reform legislation such as the 
1834 Poor Law and in the Victorian emphasis upon improving educational provision for 
the masses.  
 
Stone (2001) allies this notion to the middle classes’ fear of losing control over the lower 
orders as labour became increasingly organised. Poverty’s conversion, via eugenics, from 
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an amorphous social problem into a fixable, biological one therefore gave eugenics the 
appearance of being driven primarily by ideas about the merits and demerits of given 
social classes.  
 
However, Stone argues that ideas about the application of eugenics to the domestic social 
classes required deep assumptions about the ethnic make-up of that population. Here, 
eugenics in Edwardian and inter-war England was steeped in racial assumptions such as 
the need to protect white English stock against the threats represented by immigration and 
miscegenation (Stone, 2001).  
 
By this conception, the oft-assumed distinction between English hereditarianism and the 
German racial hygiene it informed may be more accurately considered a matter of social 
and political nuance. Indeed, Stone argues that this narrative was largely the post-war 
creation of geneticists seeking to preserve the influence of genetics in the wake of the 
holocaust (Stone, 2001). 
 
In the United States, the ideas of Galton and other English eugenicists were adapted into a 
context of pre-existing thinking about race in the tradition of Samuel Morton (Kohlman, 
2015) and the American School of Enthography (Kohlman, 2018).  Eugenics became 
synonymous with healthy living, seen in the creation of popular “better baby” contests at 
fairs across the country (Stern, 2002). As in the UK, while scientific epistemology and 
scientists themselves were fundamental to the creation of eugenics, the system was 
popularised by professionals whose role was to interpret and work towards social progress.  
 
“Many of the leaders in the eugenic movement were influential social scientists as well as 
educators, administrators and public health officials. From the natural sciences, such as 
evolutionary biology and genetics, to social sciences such as anthropology, psychology 
and sociology, to curriculum and educational policy eugenics was based on melding of a 
broad range of fields whose harmonious combination was seen as leading to scientifically-
based societal efficiency and progress and the evolution of the ‘Overman’ (Bobbit, 1909)” 
(Kohlman, 2018, p.12). 
 
Eugenicists in the United States were more successful than their English counterparts in 
achieving legislative outcomes. Indiana enacted the first legislation in 1907, permitting 
eugenic sterilisation. The 1924 Immigration Act prevented entry to the US by southern 
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Europeans on the eugenic basis that such immigrants brought with them a greater 
preponderance of feeble-mindedness and insanity (Lombardo, 2001).  
 
The 1927 US Supreme Court ‘Buck v Bell’ case established the constitutional validity of 
sterilisation for the feeble-minded and in the following 5 years 8300 ‘feeble-minded’ 
people were sterilised in Virginia alone. By 1942, 13 states had passed legislation allowing 
for the sterilisation of criminals. Lombardo (2001) notes that 33 states had statutes under 
which more than 60,000 Americans were involuntarily sterilized. 
 
The 1924 Immigration Act and Buck v Bell strongly influenced Germany’s 1935 
Nuremburg Laws on racial hygiene (Scales-Trent, 2001). US geneticists shared papers 
with German colleagues and encouraged the latter’s uptake of eugenic principles. Integral 
to this was the 1927 US Rockefeller Foundation-funded creation of the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institute of Anthropology (Gausemeier, 2010).  Its successive directors, geneticists Eugen 
Fischer and Otman Freiher Von Verschuer, with leading geneticist colleagues Fritz Lentz 
and Erwin Bauer, produced the key “racial hygiene” texts which both introduced Adolf 
Hitler to the idea then underpinned the 1935 eugenics legislation (Schmul, 2008). They 
supervised sterilisation programmes and all joined the Nazi Party. After the war, they 
continued their careers in Germany as respected scientists.  
 
In Germany, 340,000 people were forcibly sterilised by German doctors; over half of all 
doctors joined the Nazi party (Haque et al, 2012) and many of those very early. The 
eugenic principles underpinning the Nuremburg laws led to the Jewish Holocaust and the 
extermination of other population groups, where many members of the medical and 
scientific professions played key roles in planning and, literally, execution (Cohen, 2010; 
Caplan, 2012; Steger, 2016).  
 
2.3.2 After the Holocaust 
 
Following the Holocaust and World War Two, eugenics’ association with the German 
regime saw the field universally condemned.  The field of genetics suffered through its 
close association to the point of amounting to the same thing. The United Nations 
approved The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
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(United Nations, 1948) outlawed as genocide the killing, harming and otherwise targeting 
of racial, national or religious groups.  
 
In 1950, The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
approved a statement on The Race Question. The purpose was to make a strong 
international moral and scientific statement against the assumptions of racial difference 
which underpinned the Holocaust. There was a subsequent iteration of the statement the 
following year and again in 1967 and 1978. The first statement took a social 
constructionist position on race; the second returned race to biological understanding of 
race (Brattain, 2007).  
 
The 1978 statement “Declaration on race and racial prejudice” includes the strong 
statement of scientific principle:  
 
“Any theory which involves the claim that racial or ethnic groups are inherently superior 
or inferior, thus implying that some would be entitled to dominate or eliminate others, 
presumed to be inferior, or which bases value judgments on racial differentiation, has no 
scientific foundation and is contrary to the moral and ethical principles of humanity” 
(UNESCO, 1978).  
 
The 1950 and 1951 iterations reflected a battle between empirical scientific method and 
what would become known as social constructionism (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) which 
is at the root of eugenics and edugenics today.  
 
Brattain (2007) notes that the 1950 statement was drafted primarily by sociologists such as 
Morris Ginsberg and Ashley Montagu, and influenced by the ethnologist Claude Levi-
Strauss. Social constructionism was to the fore. There were many dissenting scientific 
voices, however.  
 
The second statement, more strongly influenced by scientists, returned to the notion of 
biological racial categories but issued a strong moral statement of intolerance towards 
racial discrimination. Brattain notes that there was consensus that the Holocaust had 
“made the refutation of racism ‘a legitimate intellectual stance’” but also that; “What 
actually seems to have replaced scientific racism was a stalemate over what had become 
the default assumption, or null hypothesis, about racial differences” (Brattain, 2007).  
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Scholarly and public discourse around issues of race and eugenics was framed in the 
immediate post-war years by The Holocaust.  Over the following two decades, however, 
segregation in the United States and apartheid in South Africa lent a new political 
imperative to the principle of racial equality. Education was at the core of this discourse.  
 
The US Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v Board of Education ruling, the first in a long 
series of emancipatory rulings under Chief Justice Earl Warren (Belknap & Warren, 2005), 
led eventually to the formal racial de-segregation of US schools, although informal 
segregation still persists there (Hanushek et al, 2009).  
 
The Johnson administration’s 1965 Immigration Act (Keely, 1979) was designed to amend 
the eugenics-influenced cultural bias of the 1924 Immigration Act. The US Head Start 
programme, which began in 1964, was aimed at low-income families and because of the 
over-representation of black children came specifically to address black children’s 
educational underperformance (Zigler & Styfco, 2010). The 1960s US Civil Rights 
struggle led, in due course, to the 1968 extension of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the end 
of the Jim Crow laws (Klarman, 2006); the Act was passed during the riots which 
immediately followed the assassination of Dr Martin Luther King. 
 
When, in the face of Martin Luther King’s assassination and the riots which followed, by 
far the world’s most powerful nation sought to build racial equality into legislation and 
executive action, Jensen’s; ‘How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement?’ 
(1969) provided a real-time riposte from behavioural genetics; 
 
“It is well known that children’s IQs, by school age, are correlated with the socioeconomic 
status of their parents.….this relationship between SES (Social and Economic Status, 
author’s italics) and IQ constitutes one of the most substantial and least disputed facts in 
psychology and education (Jensen, 1969, p.75)…..negroes test about 1 standard deviation 
(15 IQ points) below the average of the white population….the discrepancy in their 
average performance cannot be completely or directly attributed to discrimination or 
inequalities in education. It seems not unreasonable, in view of the fact that intelligence 
variation has a large genetic component, to hypothesize that genetic factors may play a 
part in this picture. But such an hypothesis is an anathema to many social scientists. The 
idea that the lower average intelligence and scholastic performance of Negroes could 
involve not only environmental, but also genetic, factors has indeed been strongly 
denounced (e.g. Pettigrew, 1964). But it has been neither contradicted nor distorted by 
evidence (Jensen, 1969, p.82).  
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Social and educational programmes such as Head Start, argued Jensen at length, would not 
be effective in closing social and racial educational performance gaps because deprived 
children on average have lower IQs than their non-deprived peers. Black children are over-
represented in this former group because they are on average less intelligent than white. 
Regardless of the role of the environment, it is likely that genetic heredity causes black 
people to be on average less intelligent and have poorer life outcomes than white; at very 
best there is no scientific evidence that the significant black-white intelligence gap is 
caused by environment alone.  
 
Jensen’s views were considered mainstream by many within his scholarly field and, it will 
be discussed below, are central to edugenics today. He refined his ideas and published on 
the subject for decades (Jensen, 1998; Rushton, 1998). Most recently, with “Educability 
and group Differences” (Jensen, 2012), he continued to seek to refine and employ 
Spearman’s ‘g’ factor to theorise IQ variation, and therefore educability variation, between 
racial groupings and social classes. 
 
In 2015, Robert Plomin explained his “softly, softly” approach to the subject of racial IQ 
variation by pointing out what happened to his colleague Jensen when he; “just mentioned 
race” (Al Khalili, 10.20). In fact, Jensen’s 1969 paper was over 100 pages long and 
discussed claimed racial group IQ variation extensively.  
 
Rose (1976) argued that Jensenism represented the latest iteration of a scientific racism 
which ran from Galton in spirit and Spearman in scholarship. This is discussed in detail at 
Chapter Four. Below, this thesis will propose a new latest iteration in the form of Scientific 
Racism 2.0.  
 
2.3.3 Jensenism, The Bell Curve, The Mainstream Science on Intelligence (MSI) 
statement 
 
‘Jensenism’, as it came to be known, has the potential to undermine assumptions about 
environmental effect which underpin the political allocation of public resources upon 
social policy. From a political perspective, this theory supports the notion that social 
expenditure targeted on the least well off is often inefficient because poverty reflects low 
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IQ and it is the latter which largely determines life outcomes. This theory potentially 
entirely re-frames discourse around social policy expenditure.  
 
Social expenditure is justified politically and supported publicly on the basis of what is 
often today known as equity. Here, applying the principles of fairness and impartiality 
requires everyone to be given an equal chance to succeed (Gorard & Smith, 2004; Simon 
et al, 2007). This operationalises as targeting resources at groups who suffer environmental 
disadvantage and where this disadvantage leads to poorer outcomes.   
 
In education, the principle of equity is rooted in the idea of the level playing field. Students 
should in theory have the same chances to take advantage of their own talents and should 
not be hampered or helped by their different environmental conditions, the argument runs.  
 
If it can be shown that unequal collective social and racial outcomes can be explained in 
full or part by heritable variation in general intelligence, or IQ, the argument for targeted 
expenditure on environmental factors, such as poverty, may be weakened because such 
groups of children are not being hampered so much by their environmental conditions after 
all. Rather, they are at least in part hampered by IQ heritability.  
 
Jensen’s scholarship led to public controversy (Banks, 1995), and reflected the continued 
uneasy relationship on the matter of race between geneticists and social scientists 
observable within the UN’s 1950/51 “The Race Question” statements. Jensen and his work 
were marginalised by many academy members (NY Times, 2012).  
 
A generation later, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) drew heavily on Jensen’s scholarship in 
their book The Bell Curve to make similar broad arguments about intelligence, social 
outcomes, social expenditure, social IQ hierarchy and race.  
 
For Herrnstein and Murray a cognitive elite sits atop society, an underclass beneath, with 
society broadly organised around intelligence and associated phenotypic traits. These traits 
are a function of both environment and heredity. Poor people and by extension black 
people are on average less intelligent than the better-off and white and this helps explain 
racially unequal social outcomes (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994).   
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Much public and scholarly comment, both critical and supportive, followed publication of 
The Bell Curve (Murray, 1994 [1995 edition]; Sternberg, 1995). For example, Fischer et al 
(1996) argued that Herrnstein and Murray incorrectly weighted variables to arrive at an 
overestimation of the effect of IQ and an underestimation of the effect of education. They 
also argued that caste impacted upon IQ results and that race was implicit within caste. 
Extensive criticisms around statistical techniques and social intentions were levelled at the 
authors (Fraser, 2008). 
 
In reply, a large group of eminent psychologists and Intelligence scholars published the 
“Mainstream Science on Intelligence” statement in support of the data and main 
assumptions made by Herrnstein and Murray (Gottfredson, 1994). Its key message was 
that variation in social outcomes was in large part a function of the fact that:  
 
"The bell curve for whites is centered roughly around IQ 100; the bell curve for American 
blacks roughly around 85; and those for different subgroups of Hispanics roughly midway 
between those for whites and blacks. The evidence is less definitive for exactly where 
above IQ 100 the bell curves for Jews and Asians are centered. …Heritability estimates 
range from 0.4 to 0.8, indicating genetics plays a bigger role than environment in creating 
IQ differences”. 
 
In respect of those scholars who had generated and supported the statement, Schlinger 
(2003) writes:  
 
“The list of co-signers reads like a Who’s Who of those theorists (e.g. Thomas J Bouchard, 
Jr, John B Carroll Raymond B Cattell, Hans Eysenck, Linda Gottfredson, Seymour Itzkoff, 
Arthur Jensen, Robert Plomin [author’s bold], J Phillipe Rushton and Vincent Sarich) 
who have continued Spearman’s tradition of factor analysing intelligence test scores to 
generate a theory of general intelligence – g – and some of whom (e.g. Thomas J 
Bouchard, Robert Plomin [author’s bold]) believe that behaviour genetic research 
supports the conclusion that ‘g’ is highly heritable” (footnote 1, p.16).   
 
There was extensive comment upon the Mainstream Science statement itself, both 
supportive and antagonistic (Armour-Thomas et al, 2003; Harrington, 1997; Graves and 
Johnson, 1995). Some critics attacked the methodology or assumptions of signatories, 
while others were opposed to using science in a way which appeared to give succour to 
extremist groups motivated by race hatred.  
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These signatories, who included figures of historical note in the discipline of psychology 
and a dozen key scholars from the field of Intelligence in particular, emphasised that their 
assertions on race and intelligence were central to, and justified by, the theory upon which 
their scholarship was built. None of them, as far as this author can ascertain, subsequently 
retracted their position or explained how their later theoretical assumptions and 
methodology have or had been altered as a consequence.  
 
Rather, some doubled down on the race and IQ issue and have since published 
continuously in this vein (Jensen, 1998, 2012; Jensen and Rushton, 2005; Rushton and 
Jensen, 2010; Rushton, 2012; Gottfriedson, 2007; 2012; Lynn et al, 2002; Lynn, 2006; 
Lynn and Mikk, 2007; Lynn and Meisenberg, 2010; Lynn and Meisenberg, 2019).  
 
Meanwhile, others exited the topic of race, or at least stopped mentioning it, and instead 
focussed their factorial analysis and wider scholarly theory in areas they felt would be 
more useful. These included addressing late-in-life cognitive degeneration, child 
development (Kaufmann, 2004, 2009, Kaufmann et al, 2012; Lichtenberger and 
Kaufmann, 2012) and learning difficulties (Walker and Plomin, 2005 Haworth and Plomin, 
2010; Asbury and Plomin, 2013; von Stumm et al, 2019; Malanchini et al, 2019).   
 
The American Psychology Association (APA) formed a commission to study the statement 
and the wider discourse around The Bell Curve. A report, “Intelligence: Knowns and 
Unknowns” (Neisser et al, 1996), was produced. The report discussed different 
conceptions of intelligence but in the context of a psychometric approach supported most 
of the key aspects of the statement. This included the claimed one standard deviation (15 
IQ point) gap between average black and white performance on IQ tests, the cross-cultural 
validity of such tests and the predictive validity of ‘g’ in respect of educational 
achievement and other social outcomes.  
 
‘Knowns and Unknowns’, however, stated that while no environmental causes for black-
white group variation had been evidenced;   
 
“There is even less empirical support for a genetic interpretation. In short, no adequate 




The APA report in effect laid down an orthodoxy which exists today. To be clear, this 
orthodoxy is that an average black-white IQ gap exists which has predictive and 
explanatory power in respect of many life outcomes, including educational achievement; 
and that IQ is highly heritable within groups but there is no evidence that this is true in 
respect of the variation between them.  
 
Since then, a battle line has ostensibly developed between those hereditarian scholars such 
as Plomin supporting the ‘Mainstream Science’ position that a black-white IQ gap is likely 
a function of both environment and genetics, and those who say it is likely a function of 
the environment alone. Both sides agree there is no definitive proof either way (Nisbett et 
al, 2012; Dickens and Flynn, 2001).   
 
2.3.4 Features of hereditarian vs anti-hereditarian discouse 
 
This discourse has a number of particularly notable features. 
 
First, the hereditarian claim that likely both environment and genetics cause an average 
black-white IQ gap includes an implicit claim that each alone causes an effect, not that 
they work as a cause only in conjunction with each other. In other words, the claim 
includes the notion that were environmental conditions equal, black people would still on 
average have lower IQs than white and this would still affect life and education outcomes.  
 
Second, an argument sometimes used to sweep the whole question aside is that race is 
widely agreed today as a social construction, so the notion of a black-white difference is 
rendered meaningless. However, scholars of all stripes routinely use the racial categories 
black and white today on the basis that these social constructions have research meaning 
and value. Meanwhile, hereditarians say they accept the socially constructed nature of race 
(Plomin, 2018).  
 
Third, anti-hereditarians sometimes employ the argument that there are conceptions of 
intelligence which do not rely upon psychometrics, ‘g’ and factorial analysis. This, in 
effect, restates the position of the APA ‘Knows and Unknowns’ statement and is reflected 
in scholarly work such as Gardener’s (1992).  Yet while hereditarians tend to contest the 
usefulness of other conceptions of intelligence, they say their argument rests upon the 
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correlational and predictive validity of ‘g’ and not upon a refutation of the idea that other 
ways of understanding intelligence may be theoretically possible. 
 
In the context of this thesis, many anti-hereditarians themselves employ ‘g’ and tend not to 
commit a performative error by, at the same time, claiming it is invalid.  
 
Fourth, anti-hereditarians hypothesise that various environmental factors create the black-
white IQ gap, yet they generally oppose research which may prove their case. This is 
explored below as the Plomin Dilemma.  
 
Fifth, hereditarians say they do not argue that evidence exists for a genetic causation of a 
black-white intelligence gap, but that this is the most likely explanation and will in due 
course be discovered through molecular research. Conversely, anti-hereditarians do not 
claim that evidence exists which shows the gap to be wholly a function of the environment.  
This is also developed below.  
 
Sixth, and linked to the fifth, the hereditarian position is today almost invariably referred to 
by its opponents as pseudoscience. Yet anti-hereditarians often accept the scholarly 
credentials and output of hereditarians, notably Plomin’s in the context of this thesis. As 
will be explored in below, this claim appears to be highly selectively applied and is often 
ignored by some anti-hereditarians where it is inconvenient.  
 
Finally, some apparently anti-hereditarian writers, explored below at scientific racism 2.0, 
appear to accept all or virtually all of the hereditarian argument about racial IQ variation 
and social outcomes. Their opposition to the hereditarian position, it is argued below, may 
be more a function of gamesmanship than reflecting a true anti-hereditarian position.   
 
2.4 Edugenics over-reach 
 
Today, then, there is considerable literature around the subject of factor-analysing IQ test 
results to generate a theory of intelligence, ‘g’, in the Spearman tradition (Schlinger, 
2003); studying human variation using twins studies; analysing SNPs at the molecular 
level via GWASs to create predictive polygenic scores; using these scores to predict 
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educability and educational propensity; and seeking to make use of these scores a matter of 
public education policy.  
 
Some scholars recognise the possible utility of polygenic scores, but downplay present 
predictive power at the level of the individual:  
 
“Our results suggest that while polygenic scores can be informative for identifying group 
level differences, they currently have limited use for accurately predicting individual 
educational performance or for personalised education” (Morris et al, 2020). 
 
Others raise regulatory and ethical questions (Martschenko et al, 2019): 
“When should genetic data be used? What regulations should be put in place? These are 
challenging questions that demand informed engagement. How we as researchers engage 
with these new developments to proactively combat the use of genetically informed 
research for racist, classist, or inequitable purposes will be of the utmost importance” 
(p.9).  
Some recognise the predictive power and perhaps future value but are cautious about the 
speed, and even the possibility, of progress:  
At the present time, the predictive power of the polygenic score is clearly too weak to have 
“clinical” value, and we are sceptical that even increased predictive power would make 
the score useful as the basis for intervention…. it is becoming increasingly clear that just 
as biology plays a role in shaping social outcomes, such as education, the social 
environments in which humans are placed play a role in shaping their biology” 
(Domingue et al, 2015, p.10-11).  
In the same vein, Belsky et al (2016) note that while some degree of genetic prediction for 
education exists, it is far from being of applicable to policy. The policy action they suggest 
is regulatory oversight of the ethics of the use of genomic information in education:  
At present, genetic prediction of educational outcomes and life success in general is far 
from sensitive or specific enough to recommend any translational application. Although 
there is movement toward improving the predictive power of polygenic scores through 
increased GWAS sample sizes and improved genomic measurements, a precision medicine-
type approach to human capital development remains well out of reach. And yet debate is 
already under way about the possibility for genetic testing to someday be used in 
forecasting human potential. Policy action may be needed to regulate the ethical use of 
genomic information in school admissions and tracking decisions, and such actions should 
be informed by realistic estimates of the magnitude of genetic effects (p.970).  
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Other scholars, however, are gung-ho. Their confidence that policy application of 
behavioural genetics research is ahoy is often striking. Strong assumptions are made 
without evidence in the text, and carefully constructed language is used to push the 
envelope. This latter group constitutes core edugenics scholarship.   
For example, Smith-Woolley et al (2019) are not burdened by the scholarly doubt Belsky 
et al express about progress on prediction:  
 
“As GPS prediction improves thanks to the increasing sample sizes of GWA studies and 
methodological advances, GPS will become more powerful for prediction of education-
related measures” (p.1159).  
 
von Stumm et al (2020) cut to the chase and argue, through the freighted language of open 
and closed doors, that their work should lead to learning personalised through genetics:  
 
“It is our hope that our results and others like them can serve to open doors for individual 
children, not close them, by stimulating the development and provision of personalized 
environments that can appropriately enhance, supplement, and remediate educational 
achievement” (von Stumm, 2020, p.7).  
 
Krapohl et al (2018) stress that prediction capacity is moving fast. They refer to scope for 
very early educational interventions and suggest that “even pre-natal” applications may 
bring benefits which overcome “concerns”.    
“Eventually, MPS models could be useful in both society and science to estimate genetic 
potential as well as risk in relation to all domains of functioning, including cognitive 
abilities and disabilities, personality and health and illness. This predictive power will 
raise concerns about potential early, even prenatal, prediction. It is important to begin 
discussions that are informed by the empirical data because genotype-based trait 
prediction is moving towards the point of practical relevance. Although concerns are 
warranted, these might be outweighed by the benefits that could result from being able to 
predict problems and potential early and develop stratified preventions and interventions 
accordingly” (p.1373) 
Selzam et al (2017) insist their work has no necessary policy implications:  
The finding that individuals’ polygenic scores for years of education predict educational 
achievement entails no necessary policy implications. However, our findings corroborate 
that individual differences in educational achievement are partly due to DNA differences 
between children and are not solely created by environmental forces. By creating a 
dialogue between scientists and policymakers, the introduction of polygenic scores may 
soon become a useful tool for early prediction and prevention of educational problems and 
for personalized learning” (p.271).  
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Gaysina (2016) explains what would “most likely” be a much more cost-effective way of 
educating children than at present:  
 
“By considering DNA differences among people in the future, educational genomics could 
provide the basis for a more personalised approach to education. This would most likely 
be a much more effective way of educating pupils because educational genomics could 
enable schools to accommodate a variety of different learning styles – both well-worn and 
modern – suited to the individual needs of the learner”. 
 
Krapohl et al (2014) foray into comment about the nature of public discourse about 
teaching, while noting a; “trend towards personalized learning” and employing value-
laden “once size fits all” language:  
 
“genetic thinking counters the deplorable tendency to blame teachers and parents rather 
than recognizing that learning is inherently more difficult for some children and that 
differences in children’s educational achievement are more a matter of genes than schools 
or home environments. At the practical level of curricula, the active genotype–environment 
correlation model of education adds support for the trend in education toward 
personalized learning. This trend toward personalized learning has become more practical 
with rapid advances in technology and educational software to supplement or supplant 
one-size-fits-all traditional systems of education” (p.15276). 
 
 
In a report in the Daily Mirror newspaper, Rousewell (2014) quotes Professor Robert 
Plomin of Kings College, London as follows:  
 
“Genetic thinking counters the deplorable tendency to blame teachers and parents rather 
than recognising learning is inherently more difficult for some children and differences in 
children’s educational achievement are more a matter of genes than schools or home 
environments. This trend toward personalised learning has become more practical with 
rapid advances in technology and educational software to supplement or supplant one-
size-fits-all traditional systems of education”.  
 
This quotation bears a close resemblance to the one from Krapohl et al directly above it 
because Plomin is co-author of that paper as with many others. Plomin is routinely cited 
both as one of the world’s leading living psychologists (Best, 2020) and also as one of the 
most eminent psychologists of the 20th century (Haagbloom, 2002).  
  
Since he left the US in 1994 Plomin has attracted over £30m of funding to his laboratory at 
Kings College (Kings 1, 2020) from bodies such as the UK Medical Research Council 
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(UKMRC).  He has authored and co-authored almost a thousand scholarly works (Kings 2, 
2020) and has recently authored and co-authored two well-received popular books 
summing up his scholarly research for a wider readership (Asbury and Plomin, 2013; 
Plomin, 2018). He has been cited for a huge range of papers over 34,000 times in the last 5 
years, with an annual upward trend, and over 110,000 times in his career (Google Scholar, 
2020).  
 
Plomin works commercially alongside Stephen Hsu, arguably the best-known US 
proponent of the use of genetic prediction in embryo selection (Hsu, 2014). They have 
collaborated with the Chinese state in joint venture company BGI (Shanks, 2013; Hayden, 
2013; Yong, 2013), a private venture ostensibly aimed at determining the genetic basis 
human of “genius” a` la Francis Galton’s own study of hereditary genius (Galton, 1869). 
He remains listed as an adviser to BGI (BGI, 2020). The present UK government has, at 
the highest level, expressed considerable interest in Plomin’s edugenics work and that of 
BGI (Ahmed, 2020; Mason and Sample, 2020; Cummings; 2019; Merrick, 2013;).  
 
Plomin is a signatory to the Mainstream Science on Intelligence statement (Gottfredson, 
1995) which noted that on average black people have significantly lower IQs than white, 
that this helps explain poorer social and educational outcomes, and that it is likely to be in 
part a function of heredity and genetics. He has confirmed this remain his position in 
recent years and says that he avoids the issue of race today because it is contentious 
(Wilby, 2014; Al Khalili, 2015), because there is more variation within than between 
groups and because he does not feel the need to study everything (Harris, 2020a).  He has a 
high media presence (Ahmed, 2020).  
 
There are scholars across the world pursuing the scholarly and commercial possibilities 
offered by behavioural genetics in the field of education. But Plomin sits at the apex, not 
least because of his personal scholarly cachet and advocacy, and his preparedness to take 
risk at or arguably even beyond the leading edge of scholarship.  This thesis will suggest 
below that questions it raises about edugenics are illuminated by Plomin’s scholarship and 




This chapter opened with the idea of new technology, in this case what it being called 
‘edugenics’, creating a dual or multi-use risk. Chapter Three will deal with the 
technologies of mass killing in the first half of the 20th century and note that those scholars 
who developed the science which made them possible were not seen queuing up to take 
credit once the killing was over.   
 
In the literature of edugenics it is de rigueur to see it stated that the scholarship itself 
should be applied in policy but that this has no particular policy implications; that 
knowledge of each individual’s genetics will simply inform more effective and efficient 
resource apportionment according to policies set by policymakers.   
 
For example, Selzam et al (2017,p.271) write; “The finding that individuals’ polygenic 
scores for years of education predict educational achievement entails no necessary policy 
implications”, then go on to speculate about the value of application; “the introduction of 
polygenic scores may soon become a useful tool for early prediction and prevention of 
educational problems and for personalized learning”. 
 
Robert Plomin’s most recent popular book, Blueprint (2008), contains a number of 
examples of a near identically worded caveat:  
 
“No specific policy implications necessarily follow from finding that inherited DNA 
differences are by far the most important sources of difference in individual school 
achievement and that schools make so little difference” (p.88).  
 
“no specific policies necessarily follow from genetic findings, because policies depend on 
values. My values, not my science, lead me away from meritocracy towards a just society” 
(p.105). 
 
References in such literature to social policy and political science are strikingly absent, 
however. So how is it possible for such scholars to make any kind of assessment about 
whether or not particular policies “flow from” their findings.  
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It will be shown in Chapter Three that in 1945 those Nobel prize winning physicists who 
worked to develop a German nuclear bomb were aghast, some literally suicidal, when 
informed that two had actually been used to kill a quarter of a million civilians. Yet from a 
political science perspective, to paraphrase and slightly misuse Chekov’s gun principle, if 
there is a massive bomb on the table during a world war involving a genocidal regime over 
here and a power which will fight to the death over there, and a looming battle between 
allies for post-war supremacy elsewhere, someone’s going to get blown up.   
 
If a sociologist with no knowledge of physics announced she was about to step off a cliff 
but was confident that there were no necessary physical outcomes, scientists may try to 
explain to her that her ignorance of gravity would not prevent her from plummeting to a 
speedy death rather than floating skyward.   
 
On this basis, edugenics literature’s “no specific policy implications” might have come 
from the mouths of German atomic scientists. It might be said that other people well-
placed to judge - Adolf Hitler, Franklin D Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill 
– had a better-informed sense of what the “policy implications” of a nuclear weapon 
programme were.  
 
With social policy and political science literature absent from edugenic literature, there 
appears to be an authority fallacy in play. Scientific authority extends from the undoubted 
scientific credentials and methodology of the scientific scholars and scholarship, but this 
authority cannot be transferred to claims where knowledge of different literature is 
required. Edugenic literature typically urges policy adoption of its results; but without 
referring to relevant literature, claims of any sort about policy implications are surely 
invalid?  
 
A related problem is one of definition. A plan to DNA test all children, regularly IQ test 
them and design mandatory public education around the results is of course a vast top-level 
policy in itself.  
 
The authority fallacy leads on to another. Edugenics literature like that above makes broad 
reference to the educational benefits DNA testing would bring through early intervention. 
Yet there is no evaluation of the present educational literature on, for example, early 
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intervention for learning difficulties. Edugenics in effect calls for vast upheaval in 
educational provision yet provides no educational argument for change.  
 
What exactly, for example, do Krapohl et at (2018) mean by; “early, even pre-natal” 
prediction? Is it a reference to embryo selection and selective abortion? Or does it imply 
scope for educational intervention in learning difficulties earlier that it takes place at the 
moment? Yet in the latter case, many children begin pre-school at the age of 3 when 
teachers take note of early signs of difficulties.  Reading difficulties, which often have 
other educational implications, are noted when children begin to read at school around the 
age of 5. In other words interventions already take place early.  Specifics about the benefits 
of even earlier intervention should therefore be bread and butter to edugenics scholars 
since this is supposed to be its central function. Yet the literature is silent on the matter. 
This is particularly striking since it is hard to imagine what form an intervention before the 
ages of three to five might take. 
 
None of these weaknesses are necessarily fatal to edugenics. It is possible that in future 
evidence will emerge to serve edugenics ends in due course. Perhaps medical diagnosis of 
particular disorders will render edugenics useful in this medicalised context, although such 
a context brings its own social dangers. For now, however, all of this is unknown and 
edugenics literature is much the weaker for not acknowledging its scholarly limitations. 
 
A larger lacuna appears to exist in edugenics literature, however.  
 
Because of word limits, some orthodox and uncontroversial positions on the nature of 
policy formulation are taken as axiomatic in the 5 paragraphs following. 
 
Social policy today is constructed around an assumption that the primary levers open to 
policymakers are environmental; that the main drivers of societal progress come variously 
in forms such as economic growth, poverty alleviation, equal opportunities and child 
rearing choices made by parents. Policymakers decide how and where best to raise, 
apportion and deploy available resources in order to adjust environments for intended 
outcomes. The general principle of fairness underpins the broad contract between 
policymakers and public.  
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The is much disagreement around what constitutes fairness in any specific case and this is 
reflected in the political discourse. However, rival ideas are inevitably framed by this 
assumption that social policy is a matter of how social expenditure impacts the 
environment.  
 
The political right tends towards ‘fair’ resource-raising, distributive and spending policies 
which reward natural abilities while creating some form of protection for the least able. 
The left tends towards the notion that social outcomes do not reflect ability, but instead 
reflect unfair societal and economic mechanisms. It therefore urges wider, redistributive, 
expenditure targeted upon improving outcomes for the least well off.  
 
In each, case, however, the notion of equity plays a central part. Equity is a slippery 
concept, particularly in respect of its precise relationship with equality, but the educational 
concept of equity - that socially disadvantaged children should be provided with additional 
resources to give them a crack of the whip equal to that of their better-off peers - is as 
much a principle of the right as of the left. Indeed, the idea of enabling natural talent to 
flourish wherever it appears underpins economic capitalism.  
 
Meanwhile, much of the left, perhaps excluding neo-Marxists, does not on the whole 
dispute that there should be variation in outcomes. Instead, it argues broadly that outcome 
variation should not be as great as it presently is and that each child should have an equal 
chance to achieve the outcomes his or her abilities permit.  
 
The application of genetics to social policy turns this ‘environmental’ assumption 
underpinning public policy upon this its head. To the extent the environmental effect of 
unequal social outcomes is reduced, so the idea of equity would need to be adjusted to 
account for ‘unfair’ distribution of natural talents. This would precipitate an epochal shift 
in the philosophical basis of social expenditure in general and education expenditure in 
particular.   
 
The edugenics response to this is to argue that this philosophical upending could lead to 
expenditure turning around the compensation of people born less able. Plomin criticises 
meritocracy for deceptively presenting unearned natural ability as a function of hard work; 
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he implies that society need not be structured so that the more able, however we may 
define that, have greater power and better life outcomes.   
 
“meritocracy sounds like an irresistibly good idea, both parts of the neologism 
‘meritocracy’ are loaded with unpalatable connotations. The noun ‘merit’ refers to ability 
and effort but it also connotes value and worth. It is derived from the Latin word meritum 
meaning ‘worthy of praise’. The ‘ocracy’ part of ‘meritocracy’ refers to power and 
governance. Putting these two components of meritocracy together with genetics implies 
that we are governed governed by a genetic elite whose status is justified by their ability 
and effort. Instead, it could be argued that people who got lucky by drawing a good 
genetic hand do not merit anything. Their luck at learning easily and getting satisfying 
jobs is its own reward. And who says we should be governed by genetic elites? (P.92-93) 
 
In Harris (2020a), however, Plomin restates this but also suggests that people might be best 
to choose learning programmes which reflects what he calls their own “appetites”; this 
seems in the use a simple euphemism for aptitude. If getting satisfying jobs should be its 
own reward, as he says, then his anti-meritocratic notions appear to imply that society 
should not be structured to reward those with an “appetite” for brain surgery over those 
lucky few who have one for toilet cleaning. At face value, this is literally a revolutionary 
idea.  
 
Plomin says his politics are of the centre-left (Wilby, 2014). He offers a critique of 
meritocracy and social injustice consistent with Michael Young, the writer who coined the 
term; he is a co-author with Young’s son, Toby (Smith Woolley et al, 2018). But like 
edugenics as a whole, Plomin offers no argument or evidence as to how or why a radical 
reduction in ‘environmental’ expenditure could reasonably lead to the anti-meritocratic 
policy ideas he says he lauds.  
 
Such a valid scholarly argument could of course only extend from literature of political 
science and social policy, which is absent in the edugenics literature. It takes only the most 
superficial considerations of what Plomin’s aspirational outcome would look like in 
practice to suggest that the search for plausibility would be challenging at the very least.  
 
Affirmative action on the basis of social disadvantage, for example, is often resisted in 
practice; for example across the United States during the 1960s civil right legislation. The 
notion that people would be prepared to accept affirmative action on the basis of some 
notion of genetic injustice is hard to understand. A new public conception of injustice 
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would certainly be required. And the ideas that it might be desirable to remove any 
correlation between IQ and social success, and that policy levers might be available to do 
this in any case, seems to border on the absurd. Could universities be compelled to stress 
lower intelligence and ability in their entrance criteria? Would people accept others being 
promoted above them not in spite of being less intelligent or otherwise less able but 
specifically because of it?   
 
Meanwhile, Charles Murray, one of the authors of The Bell Curve (Herrnstein and Murray, 
1994) and a self-described “Madison Republican” (Harris, 2017) presents the alternative 
prospectus. He is a sophisticated and experienced political analyst and author of the right 
who is unafraid to court controversy (Murray, 2020; Sehgal, 2020; Murray and Phillips, 
1990; Murray and Field, 2001; Prideaux, 2010). His present appointment as holder of the 
FA Hayek chair in Cultural Studies at the right of centre American Enterprise Institute 
(AEI, 2020) reflects his credentials as a scholar of social policy in the Hayekian tradition.  
 
Murray’s conservative policy imperatives, reduced welfare expenditure and lower taxes, 
flow coherently from the views (Murray and Herrnstein, 1994) about heredity and the 
function of IQ in educational and wider social outcomes he shares with Plomin (Plomin, 
2018). It is not necessary to agree with his argument in order to understand why a radically 
reduced emphasis upon the social effects of the environment lends itself to Murray’s 
conservative and social prescriptions (Murray, 2020).  
 
The claim from edugenics, therefore, that the science would lead to no particular policy 
imperatives, looks decidedly shaky. It will be argued below that in fact this is the kind of 
magical thinking design to conceal some controversial features of edugenics.  
 
Scientism, in Hayek’s terms, is the inappropriate application of scientific method within 
non-scientific fields. It reflects an epistemological confusion on the part of some scientific 
scholars and creates significant yet unexamined risk for edugenics.  
 
The common scholarly lineage of eugenics and edugenics is instructive in this respect. It is 
often argued (Rust and Golombok, 2014; Goldstein, 2012) that Galton’s statistical work 
was of great historical significance, while his ideas about eugenics were nonsense 
(Gillham, 2001). But edugenics scholarship today does not rest upon the nonsense. Galton 
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is celebrated by geneticists because his statistical insights led to Spearman and onwards to 
21st century scholarly orthodoxy in the field of intelligence theory. Asked in July 2020 who 
he would choose if he; “could resurrect one person and put them in the world today”, 
Robert Plomin replied with Francis Galton (Harris, 2020b, 6:40). This is the scholarship 
and approach which underpins edugenics theory.   
 
This scholarship has led Plomin and a large number of other eminent scholars in his field 
to insist that much social inequality reflects IQ variation, that black people on average have 
lower IQs than white and that this is likely influenced by genetic inheritance.  
 
Here, the heritability and behaviourist theory which edugenics rests upon crashes into 
social constructions extending from non-scientific epistemologies.   
 
It is in theory perfectly possible for a scientific theory to be recognised as empirically 
correct but also be racist or deterministic. Indeed, the APA and most psychologists today 
accept the idea that racial inequality can in large part be explained by black people on 
average having lower IQs than white. This is manifestly a racist proposition to many 
people, regardless of the effect or non-effect of genetics, because racism is constructed by 
those who see and experience it.  
 
While much literature criticises this hereditarian thinking, (Gillborn, 2015; Turkheimer, 
2016; Turkheimer et al, 2017; Comfort, 2018), the behaviourist genetics research 
underpinning edugenics is not unorthodox. It is conducted by often eminent scientists and 
employs conventional and recognised techniques of scholarship.  There seems at least a 
chance, and perhaps much better than that, that the claimed scientific application of genetic 
prediction to education and other fields is a fast approaching possibility. But edugenics 
literature is limited to scientific method; it cannot at present legitimately deal with 
problems of social policy which require the lenses of different epistemologies without 
lapsing into scientism. 
 
Data appears neutral, although as Kuhn and Lakatos argued it is theory impregnated.  It is 
characteristic of edugenics scholarship that it advocates for its own application as social 
policy. It seems from this that edugenics scholarship must extend beyond its present 
scientific epistemological boundaries to include other ways of knowing or accept that its 
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application could or would lead to outcomes society may deplore. Using one example, that 
of racism, Chapter Four below examines how edugenics scholarship seeks to evade its own 

































Chapter Three: Critical Theory and Critical Race Theory  
 
3.1 Critical Theory (CT) 
 
The school of social and philosophical thought which would become known as Critical 
Theory emerged during the second half of Germany’s interbellum Weimar Republic. 
Initially, it followed Max Horkheimer’s tacit programme for the Frankfurt Institute of 
Social Research, of which he was appointed director in 1930. The rise of the Nazi Party 
displaced the institute first to Switzerland in 1933, then to the United States in 1934 as an 
adjunct of New York’s Columbia University (Abromeit, 2011; Berenzden, 2017).  
 
Frankfurt School scholars such as Horkheimer (Horkheimer, 1972), Theodore Adorno 
(Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972 [1944]), Erich Fromm (2011 [1941]) and Herbert Marcuse 
(Marcuse, 2007), developed Critical Theory as a means of critiquing contemporary society 
(Landmann, 2011).  
 
After World War Two, the Frankfurt Institute returned to Frankfurt but the Frankfurt 
School became a metonym covering those associated scholars who returned to Germany, 
those who remained in the US, and a second generation of scholars who revised Critical 
Theory in the light of their own post-war critique of Critical Theory itself.   
 
The birth of Critical Theory amongst Jewish Marxist scholars in Nazi Germany reflected 
the historical times (Jacobs and Jacobs, 2015). The adoption by Germans of fascism over 
Marxist revolution, the perceived embracing by some German scientists of hard positivism 
and military-industrial research imperatives, the rejection of liberal Weimar values by the 
same; each contributed to an intellectual context which ostensibly set scientists led by an 
analytical framework informed by logical positivism against anti-positivists led by the 
imperative of human emancipation (Heller and Ritter, 1978).   
 
Between 1919 and 1933, Germany’s constitution and governance conformed largely to the 
requirement of the Treaty of Versailles. The abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm made Germany 
a de facto republic and the first meeting of the assembly which agreed the new 
constitutional convention took place in the town of Weimar. The period was, and remains, 
known informally as the Weimar Republic.  
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Unlike the US-funded Marshall Plan for the economic regeneration of Germany and 
Western Europe which followed World War Two, the Treaty of Versailles which followed 
the end of the Great War laid punitive reparation costs upon Germany. This severely 
constrained that country’s economy and drove extensive internal poverty. The collapse of 
exports, the low permitted level of imports and hyperinflation combined with low 
agricultural productivity led to near starvation for many Germans (Hansen and Debus, 
2012; McElligot, 2009).  
 
In this climate, the unstable administration came under continuous pressure from both right 
and left. The former bred on the humiliation and desperation felt by many Germans, 
although national socialism was an admixture of fascist and socialist ideas; the latter 
sought the overthrow of the capitalism they saw at the root of the nation’s problems.  
 
From 1919 until 1924 social and economic conditions worsened for most Germans, from 
the already low base of wartime need. From 1924 to 1929, there was a modest easing of 
the challenging economic conditions faced by most Germans. The Dawes Plan saw US 
lenders enable Germany to mortgage capital assets within Germany to help pay annual 
reparations agreed at Versailles (Ritschl, 2013). This short period of relative improvement 
in conditions for Germans has been called; “The Golden Era”.  This epithet refers not just 
to the modestly improved economic conditions, but more significantly to the liberal and 
artistic developments of the late few Weimar years (McElligot, 2009; Weiner, 1991; 
Phelan, 1985). This period in effect ended with the collapse of the New York Stock 
Exchange in October 1929, which in turn precipitated the worldwide Great Depression and 
led to the withdrawal from Germany of the US lines of credit.  
 
The cultural liberalisation of parts of increasingly polarised Weimar Germany and the 
relative strength of the political left and centre-left was at that time juxtaposed with the 
growing in prominence of the far right. Yet in the 1928 general election, the Nazi party 
commanded only 2.5% of the suffrage (Hawes, 2017; Hansen and Debus, 2012). Months 
after the beginning of the depression, however, it had become the largest party in 
Germany. By Spring 1933, Hitler was Chancellor and had suspended the constitution 
through The Enabling Act of that year. This signalled the end of the Weimar period and the 
beginning of a Nazi dictatorship given legitimacy through a landslide general election 
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victory. This in turn led to the flight from Germany of Jewish and Marxist intellectuals 
such as the Frankfurt School scholars.   
 
The creation of The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research in 1923 as an adjunct of Goethe 
University had represented an effort by some Marxist scholars, in the wake of the failed 
German revolution of 1919, to understand the reasons for that failure and to consider the 
preconditions for the success of Marxist prescriptions. During the second half of the 
Weimar period, when a relatively strong political left gave hope that some form of Marxist 
programme could still find practical application, it had followed the broad template of 
Marxist economics.  
 
By 1930, in the wake of wholesale economic collapse and fast-growing fascism, then from 
1933 onwards in the school’s new form, Horkheimer and others concluded that a new 
social and philosophical critique was required to rescue those Marxist tenets which had not 
been controverted by German experience. Why had Marx been wrong about revolution in 
industrialised societies? How had enlightenment values led to fascism? How to combat 
fascism and apply potentially rescue-able features of Marxism? Marxism was not 
abandoned by the Frankfurt School at this stage but was instead critiqued and synthesised 
with new intellectual influences.  
 
This new critique was rooted in Kant’s transcendental idealism (Allison, 2004), Hegel’s 
dialectical discourse (Adorno, 1993), a near-wholesale rejection of enlightenment 
rationality and a critique of hard ‘logical’ positivism. The former elevated the role of 
human understanding of external stimuli, with space and time operating as notional 
mechanisms through which we understand the appearance of empirically measurable 
things. This stood in opposition to the idea from realism that empirical measurable things 
have existence independent from how they are formed in the real world by humans 
(Moore, 1903); it sought to synthesise the role of empirical and philosophical inquiry, with 
the former informing the latter and thereby enabling higher understanding.   
 
Here, historical process and the transitional context of an object played a central role. The 
meaning of empirically measurable things extends from their historical context and their 
location in cycles of changing existence. A chair, say, formerly part of a tree and in future 
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returned to the wood’s constituent parts, is given existential meaning by humans who place 
its present empirical existence into its cyclic context.  
 
Crucially, however, the Frankfurt scholars followed Marx’s revision of Hegelianism in the 
form of dialectical materialism. This reflected the Young, or New, Hegelian tradition of 
rejecting Hegel’s conservative emphasis upon the past, present and the status quo, and 
introduced the idea that the forces of production and society create the underlying human 
consciousness, which in turn produce the possibility of future revolutionary change.  
 
The Frankfurt scholars considered that Marx had overplayed the effects of economic 
theory alone. He had, they argued (Horkheimer, 1937), underplayed individual human 
psychology and failed to account for its role in collective human behaviour. Marx had not 
foreseen the way capitalism would control how individuals in industrialised societies 
would become conditioned to see their powers of agency in terms which ensured the 
conservation of the capitalist status quo. He did not account for human psychologies 
conditioned primarily for individualism rather than collective action; concerned with 
relative material progress rather than revolutionary overhaul.  
 
For the Frankfurt school, class consciousness lay at the heart of how individuals operate in 
society and constrained emancipation; the conditions in industrialised societies did not lend 
themselves to revolution as Marx had supposed. 
 
Instead, they theorised, a society’s dominant ideology normalises and frames people’s 
understanding of their lived-in world. This includes the way scientists categorise and 
describe empirically observable phenomena. At the core of Critical Theory was the 
analysis of those often-unexpressed assumptions built into the infrastructure of human 
understanding.  
 
Critical Theory’s purpose was emancipatory. It stressed the functional importance within 
theory of explanation, practicality and normativity. In this way, and as distinct from what 
the Frankfurt scholars referred to as traditional sociology, critical analysis was developed 
for the purpose of creating new normative behaviour and structures; of going beyond 
analysis to address injustice and propose new structures and processes of human 
organisation (Bohman, 2019).  
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Horkheimer (1937) critiqued traditional enlightenment theory, such as Descartes’, as 
suffering from a failure by materialists, or positivists, to “recognise that the economic (and 
thus currently capitalist) structure of society shapes scientific work” (Berendzen, 2017).  
 
Foreman (1971) has argued that the development, at exactly the same time as the early 
Frankfurt School, by Heisenberg and others of Bors’ and Planck’s quantum theory was in 
part driven by the intellectual free-thinking made possible by their rejection of what they 
saw as alien Weimar culture values imposed by the First World War victors. Here, 
although some such scientists may have eschewed the broader political platform of the 
right, they nevertheless validated and even led its scientific narrative. This came to be 
reflected in the reliance of such scholars upon the industrial, then overtly military 
industrial, sponsors (Foreman; 1974) as they worked to further the ends of the Nazi-run 
state.  
 
While anti-positivist social scientists hostile to the rise of the Nazi Party, often Jews, were 
driven from Germany, many scientists who ostensibly reflected the positivism of The 
Vienna Circle and embraced military-industrial interests became integral to Germany’s 
military industrial, eugenic, genocidal then nuclear programmes. Many scientists 
(Weigmann, 2001), and half of Germany’s doctors (Kater, 1989) joined the Nazi Party, the 
latter by far the highest professional group represented amongst the membership. Their 
scientific and medical expertise became essential to the design and execution of the 
German eugenics programme, the Aktion T-4 Project which executed large numbers 
people considered mentally defective, then the systematic extermination of millions of 
Jews, Romany, and other minorities deemed genetically undesirable or inferior (Wikler 
and Barondess, 1993).   
 
Indeed, while in the 1930s eugenics became official German state policy then served as the 
philosophical underpinning for genocide, it was a notion given scientific form by doctors 
and scientists though 1920s Rassenhygeine [Racial Hygeine] ideas; Hitler took them up as 
a scientific principle championed enthusiastically to him by doctors and scientists. Stein 
(1988, p.50) notes: “Nazi racial and biological policy grew out of a well-established and 
generally accepted scientific tradition”. Gallagher (1990, p.191) writes: “the Nazi 
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administration was as close as the world has come to being a medical state: a government 
run in accordance with 'doctor's orders'”. 
 
Meanwhile, the views and actions of other scientists under Nazi rule were more complex, 
sometimes perhaps seeking to protect German science and scientists from Nazi excesses. 
For example, Cassidy (2010, Foreword) writes of Heisenberg:   
 
“The second significant event of the Twentieth Century entailed the world’s first encounter 
with industrialised totalitarianism and genocidal dictatorships, the Nazi dictatorship in 
particular. How did this happen, and in Germany of all places, the leading cultural and 
industrial nation at that time? As a member of the non-Nazi upper academic stratum of 
German society, the product of the best culture and education that Germany could offer, 
Heisenberg provides a valuable insight into these questions as he, and many others like 
him, encountered and eventually found accommodation with the new regime. This raises a 
host of further questions. What events of their past informed their response to the regime, 
and why did their efforts at opposition fail? How could Heisenberg remain in Germany 
and lend his prestige to that society as one of its prominent remaining scientists? How 
could he become a representative to occupied nations? How could he work on nuclear 
fission, and potentially an atomic bomb, for such a regime at war”? 
 
Heisenberg led the German attempts to weaponise nuclear fission and build a nuclear 
bomb, but also helped persuade the German government to accept by 1942 that the project 
was not feasible. After the war, he was appointed Director of the Max Planck Institute. 
This renamed Kaiser Wilhelm Institute had previously been run by the originator of 
quantum theory Nobel laureate Max Planck and funded by US Rockefeller money. In in 
the 1920s it had been pivotal in the development of American Eugenics into the form 
applied by Nazi Germany (Gausemeier, 2010).  
 
Some scholars detect a clear chain of reasoning which connects the 1920s logical 
positivists to post-war pragmatists and post-positivists such as Willard Quine and Karl 
Popper (Misak, 2016).  This was reflected in the personal positions of the key scientists 
themselves. Moreover, the quantum theorists had through analytical logic, in a near 
paradox, reached the novel scientific conclusion that an objective position upon a physical 
phenomenon was not possible. This lent itself to the post-war intellectual emphasis upon 
subjectivity, which in turn brought non-scientific methodologies into scientific discourse.  
 
Post-war, Heisenberg (1971, p.213) distanced himself from positivism:  
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“The positivists have a simple solution: the world must be divided into that which we can 
say clearly and the rest, which we had better pass over in silence. But can anyone conceive 
of a more pointless philosophy, seeing that what we can say clearly amounts to next to 
nothing? If we omitted all that is unclear we would probably be left with completely 
uninteresting and trivial tautologies”. 
 
While it is true that many medical scientists and biologists knowingly facilitated the Nazi 
German regime’s eugenic and genocidal programmes, it seems that physicists such as 
Heisenberg and Planck objected to, but felt themselves as elite scientists somehow above, 
the Nazi politics of the day. In the early years they believed Nazi populism was a flash in 
the pan, and as time passed they believed they could somehow influence policy for the 
better.  
 
Personal failings; arrogance, ambition and in Planck’s case simply old age, combined to 
lead them to suppress their deeper fears about the likely destination of the application of 
their own science as national policy (Cassidy, 2010).  Heisenberg’s historically significant 
1941 meeting in Copenhagen with his former mentor Niels Bohr, another after the war in 
1947 and their exchange of letter in the 1950s (Niels Bohr Archive, 2002) have become 
key exhibits in discourse around science, ethics and morality.  
 
These exchanges reflected the wider post-war imperative, after the horrors of a genocide 
which had extended from decontextualized scientific ‘truth’, of the search for pragmatic 
ways of synthesising the empirical and what would soon become known as the socially 
constructed. The possibilities presented by the new atomic age were immense. It was clear 
to scholars that this potential for human progress would need to be managed through a new 
consensus on the nature of the relationship between scientific method and other 
epistemologies.  
 
The German experience, in this way, sits at the core of critical theory. Why were hard-
pressed Germans attracted to fascism rather than Marxism? Why had many scientists 
ignored the implications of other epistemologies in the application of their scientific 
method to such terrible ends? What did it mean for the positivist epistemology 
underpinning science and medicine that most German doctors had joined the Nazi Party? 
How do empirical facts operate in conjunction with historical patterns of meaning? How 
do we account for the influence upon empirical knowledge at any one time of visible and 
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invisible influences, such as who is funding research, and why? How do power 
relationships and social stratification affect the ways humans make sense of empirical 
facts?  How do we create categories through which we understand and operationalise 
empirical knowledge? 
 
Post war, Horkheimer and Adorno believed that 1920s state intervention had overcome the 
problem of production being alienated from the producers, yet they could see that this had 
led on not to emancipation but to fascism. They maintained their attack on positivism and 
enlightenment reasoning. They theorised (Horkheimer and Adorno; 1944, 1947) that 
capitalist societies industrialised culture and created pseudo political and consumerist 
choices which acted to prevent emancipation in a similar way to dictatorship. Marcuse 
(1965, 1966), who had stayed in the US, developed this idea into the notion of educational 
dictatorship in the 1960s and became a touchstone for participants in the 1960s protest era 
(Kastiafacas, 1996). His notion of supposed tolerance as a mechanism of oppression on 
university campuses remains influential today (Sculos and Walsh, 2018).   
 
Yet while the Critical Theorists stressed the employment of empirical scientific method 
alongside the study of the social context and its historical development, Berendzen (2017) 
argues that their interest in scientific theory was limited to stressing its importance rather 
than laying out exactly how its relationship with social science should work. This is 
important, since without a properly thought through place for empirical science, critical 
theory risked becoming a post-modern device of deconstruction alone.  
 
In the post-war context of the search for a new and effective synthesis of scientific method 
and other epistemologies, Jurgen Habermas (1981a, 1981b, 1991) critiqued Critical Theory 
itself and concluded that Horkheimer and Adorno had been wrong to reject enlightenment 
reasoning outright.  
 
It was true, he theorised, that a form of enlightenment rationality had led to the Holocaust. 
And because opposing views can be supported by equally valid reasoning, conclusions can 
precede their supporting arguments with a contest between equally valid arguments won 
not through reason but, as with the Nazis, through force. Here the victor is unchallenged in 
the field of reason and, with the post-enlightenment passing of religion and in the absence 
of any other transcendent idea, is beyond challenge altogether.  
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Habermas parsed the idea of enlightenment reasoning and proposed that the rationality to 
which Critical Theory heretofore referred was in fact “instrumental”. That is, the kind of 
logical reasoning which creates the means to an end. Instrumental reasoning follows 
logically in pursuit of a particular outcome. It is self-contained and sub-transcendental, 
whether it is a group of friends erecting a marquee or German scientists building a 
genocide machine.  
 
This dominance of instrumental rationality gave rise, for Habermas, to strategic rationality, 
where arguments were pitted against each other not for reasons of finding or agreeing a 
higher truth or best solution but in the tactical or strategic interests of the employer of the 
argument. The seed of strategic rationality was planted in the enlightenment itself, he 
argued. The rejection of the authority of the religion was replaced by rationality, but 
rational discourse became progressively strategic as the public domain became more 
complex. Open face-to-face discourse gave way to the construction and delivery of 
arguments through ever-growing media. Commercial, industrial and financial imperatives 
led to small ‘p’ and and large ‘P’ political discourse where arguments reflected vested 
group interest. Public discourse became characterised by proxy arguments, often distilled 
into simplistic rhetoric, where the public were able to make choices only within the 
frameworks constructed by the elites who packaged them up.  
 
Habermas’ solution was communicative rationality (Habermas; 1981a, 1981b). Empirical 
facts and non-empirical reasoning and constructions acquire meaning through human 
perceivers; communication is therefore an essential part of the meaning-making process. 
Communication must be authentic. Participants must ensure that what they say is true, 
right, honest and normative. They must be open to valid argument and prepared to accept a 
superior argument in the search for new normative behaviours (Geuss, 2011).  
 
Communicative rationality was informed by the US liberal pragmatism of vO Quine (1976 
[1951]) and the post-positivism of Popper (1959). It appears to offer the rescue of 
enlightenment rationality and the synthesising of scientific and other knowledge in 
common pursuit of best social outcomes. These best outcomes, in practical terms, are of 
course framed by their capitalistic context. They provide scope for a pragmatic, gradational 
improvement in respect of wider social justice. It might be seen as a kind of Fabianism.  
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Scholars such as Harvey and Reed (1991) criticise Habermas for throwing the Marxist 
baby out with the bathwater. Kompridis (2011) criticises him for collapsing Critical 
Theory into the sphere of liberal theories of justice, essentially as a mechanism for 
agreeing the rules for settling moral and political questions and rejecting the action-based 
tenets of Marxism. In other words, Habermas creates a new utility for Critical Theory but 
in the reduced context of achieving iterative improvements in a capitalist system.  
 
These points might be viewed as observations rather than criticisms. Habermas’ purpose is 
to rescue Critical Theory as an emancipatory system with practical effects in the world. 
This was Critical Theory’s original purpose as conceived by Horkeimer et al, working at a 
time when Marxism had failed to take hold in Germany and fascism was instead in the 
ascendant. Marxism did not have a great time in post-war Stalinist Soviet Union either. By 
the time Habermas formulated his theory of communicative action, the great regime most 
closely associated with Marxism had imploded.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, in any case, it is a moot point whether Habermas’ 
conception of Critical Theory leads to a rejection of emancipation in favour of a kind of 
soothing balm, or indeed whether his criteria for “communicative rationality” is 
practicable. Instead, the purpose is to illustrate the post-Holocaust demand and scope for a 
pragmatic synthesis of empirical scientific method with non-empirical epistemologies in 
order to arrive at conceptual meaning and meaningful social progress.  
 
3.2 Critical Race Theory (CRT) 
 
The 1960s onwards, saw the deconstruction of social and subject-area problems across the 
spectrum of social studies. Habermas fiercely resisted the relativism of postmodernism. At 
a technical level, he criticised postmodern scholars such as Derrida and Foucault for 
performative errors which required the use of the rationality their own intellectual 
paradigms rejected (Aylesworth, 2008). On the larger tapestry, postmodernism appeared to 
threaten deconstruction without any scope for reconstruction or application. This was a risk 
which has faced unrevised Critical Theory as it failed to fully respect scientific method and 
to produce workable proposals for progress. Again, it is moot whether Habermas was 
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identifying genuine flaws in the earlier work of Horkheimer and Adorno et al or simply 
urging the greater accommodation of capitalism.  
 
Postmodernist conceptions of critical theory have nevertheless become commonplace and 
often influential over the last half century.  These have sometimes morphed into new 
critical approaches. In this way, as the field of Critical Legal Studies widened and 
inevitably created internal intellectual tensions between competing imperatives, some 
scholars wished to maintain a focus upon race. The result was the emergence of Critical 
Race Theory (CRT).  
 
CRT extends from a number of ostensibly simple axioms. These include that racism is 
endemic in modern society and institutions, and not simply the aberrant behaviour of some 
individuals; intersectionality is important in how it operates on people of colour, but the 
focus on race must not suffer from the liberal tendency to risk dilution by creating ever-
more protected categories with equivalence to race;  individual experience and voice have 
an essential role in challenging dominant societal narratives.  
 
Gillborn (2016) writes:  
 
“Despite its name, CRT is not so much a theory as a perspective. That is, CRT does not 
offer a finished and exclusive set of propositions that claim to explain precisely current 
situations and predict what will occur under a certain set of conditions in the future; 
rather it is a set of interrelated beliefs about the significance of race/racism and how it 
operates in contemporary society (p.92)”. 
 
Citing Carabado’s (2011) emphasis upon establishing boundaries, and therefore definition, 
for CRT Dixon and Rousseau Anderson (2016) include a number of characteristics:  
 
CRT, the authors say, challenges the notion of continuous progress, or “linear uplift”, in 
the history of race relations;  repudiates the idea that present social arrangements are the 
result of accumulated merit; challenges the principles of colourblindness and colour 
consciousness; argues that race is socially constructed; examines structural racism and 
view racism as endemic; recognises intersectionality; is both ideological and pragmatic 
(p.34). It can manifest in a number of ways; through counternarrative in order to disrupt 
received orthodox narratives as a first-hand account or as an analytical tool.  
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Gilborn (2016) adds that CRT;  
 
“crosses epistemological boundaries…..critiques civil rights law as fundamentally 
limited… critique(s) liberalism; claims of neutrality; objectivity; colourblindness and 
meritocracy as camouflages…challenges ahistoricism and recognises experiential 
knowledge of people of colour” (p.97). 
 
Here, conceptual tools include storytelling, interest convergence and critical studies of 
whiteness. Ladson Billings and Tate (2016) place the intersection of CRT and Education in 
the context of society’s emphasis upon property rights; as a prism through which to 
examine educational iniquity through legislation and policy instruments (p.14).  
 
For example, Gillborn et al (2017) illustrate how, over the last generation, policy execution 
has, to the detriment of black children, interacted with educational provision in England to 
continuously “move the goalposts” of normative secondary school benchmarking.  
 
Over that period, governments regularly moved the attainment targets for 16 years olds. As 
black children almost caught up gradationally with white children against the new targets, 
the targets were increased and the earlier disparity was re-embedded. 
 
“whenever the key benchmark for achievement has been redefined, it has had the effect of 
restoring historic levels of race inequity; in essence, policy interventions to ‘raise the bar’ 
by toughening the benchmark have actively widened gaps and served to maintain Black 
disadvantage”(abstract).  
 
Did policymakers regard the predictable negative effect upon black children as a fair price 
to pay for being seen to toughen standards? Or was the matter never given standing in the 
policy discussion either because of ignorance or choices made by advisers within the civil 
service?  
 
Gillborn (2016) writes:  
 
“At the beginning of this paper we posed a simple question; what has happened to the 
Black/White achievement gap over the last quarter of a century? Our analysis has shown 
that the ways in which the gap is measured by policymakers plays a crucial role in 
maintaining race inequity, despite a pattern of rising achievement over time”.  
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This is the epitome of structural racial injustice in Education, exposed and given clarity 
through the prism of CRT. The critical argument views the reported empirical facts from 
the race perspective of CRT to arrive at a different conclusion from present policymakers. 
This in turn reflects the synthesis of epistemologies proposed by the later Frankfurt School 
(Habermas, 1981, 1991; Honneth, 1996)  
 
This thesis focuses upon theories around human variation and how they impact black 
people. In the example explored by Gillborn, where children have improved life outcomes 
because of higher standards of education per se then higher standards on average help all 
children.  But a significant reason for linking higher standards of mandatory education to 
life outcomes relates to competition. Where children compete for subsequent courses and 
jobs on the basis of qualifications, through mechanisms like examinations at age 16, 
success is a function of performance variation. In other words, regardless of how high 
standards become, much social benefit will remain locked into performance variation. 
Where that variation is consistently racial, therefore, this variation also locks in racial 
inequality. 
 
Official rhetoric invariably stresses levelling-up; mechanisms which purport to attempt to 
close black/white disparities are proposed (Harding, 2019). But the historical and 
contemporary evidence of entrenched racial disparity remains. A simple question exposes 
why:  
 
Which is more important, higher standards or racial equality?  
 
This question transcends the matter of how standards might be measured, whether through 
formal examination results, the quality of undergraduate essays or through laying the 
scientific discoveries which improve the lot of humankind. Against this is pitched the 
simple principle of racial equality.  
 
A policymaker may evade the horns of the dilemma and say that we should aim for both. 
But by not addressing the racial dimension of educational outcome variation through 
structural changes, and indeed by sometimes actually making it worse as Gillborn et al 
illustrate, policy of this nature literally stresses higher standards over racial equality.  
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Another example may be seen in elite university access. In the UK, black Caribbean 
students are well under-represented at so-called elite universities. Some colleges of 
Cambridge University did not admit any black Caribbean students over a period of several 
years (Quinn, 2018). Some such universities, including Cambridge, have taken action in 
recent years to increase black-Caribbean intake figures. But when challenged on why 
significant disparities still exist, even when variables such as entry qualifications are 
controlled for, they invariably cite process causations such as the courses black people 
apply for and the schools they attend for mandatory education (Boliver, 2014).  
 
Asked about black Caribbean under-representation, Cambridge University argued that it 
could not solve the problem by itself, said it was achieving gradational improvement by 
doing what it could internally and blamed external factors (Busby, 2018). But of course 
any university can solve the problem by itself by adopting affirmative action. The 
Cambridge position therefore implicitly rejects affirmative action and prioritises the 
principle of higher standards over racial equality.  
 
A CRT perspective therefore commends the following answer to the question asked above: 
Racial equality is more important than higher standards. If it is never accepted as such, 
then racial disparity is a permanent feature of all policy and institutions.  
 
At chapter four, CRT serves to contextualise a critique of aspects of edugenics. It is not 
necessary, however, to accept the perspective in order to understand or validate the 




The development of Critical Theory (CT) took place as a response to fascism fuelled, and 
at times actually directed, by the notion that societal progress could be facilitated by 
scientific method alone. Habermas’ revision came in the context of a world negotiating 
new epistemologies which would enable practical social and scientific progress while 
avoiding the German horrors.  Critical Race Theory came about following the US civil 
rights period. It has roots in critical theory but also has a debt to the postmodernism 
Habermas was determined to avoid.  
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This is all a drop in the ocean of post-WW2 philosophical, scientific and applied social 
thought which led to a vast array of epistemologies and approaches. This section has barely 
mentioned post-postivism, pragmatism and post-modernism, for example. In effect, 
singling out CT and CRT is more or less arbitrary. Indeed, Critical Race Theory (CRT) 
may itself be said to be an ambiguous collection of philosophical and practical ideas, some 
of them mutually contradictory.   
 
But the purpose here is to explore how the need for new epistemological approach to 
science arose, during the lives of millions of people alive today, to place scientism into 
historical and epistemological context. CT is apt because of its emphasis upon the cyclical 
nature of history, and because the trajectory of its own development mirrors that of 
scientism. In addition CT in the Habermas tradition seeks to find practical ways ahead 
which avoid the relativism of postmodernism.  A feature of this approach is to stress the 
practical reconstructing and creation of solutions, rather than accepting CT as primarily a 
postmodern mechanism of deconstruction.  
 
At face value, it is hard to find anyone who disagrees with the idea that societies must 
employ a range of epistemologies when making decisions about science and technology 
with profound implications for their members. This is evident across fields of scholarship 
including genetics.  
 
And yet, as the last chapter showed, today’s edugenics literature extends from positivistic 
scientific method alone. Where mainstream genetics intersects with areas attracting serious 
societal oversight, such as with embryo selection and human genetic engineering, there is 
evidence of as much scholarly and public concern and thought as with any other potential 
medical therapy yielded by the rapidly advancing field of human genetics (Brokowski, 
2018; Joseph, 2017; Kaplan et al, 2015; Dondorp et al, 2013;). But this evidence is not 
present in the edugenics literature itself.  
 
Where this intersection does not apply, therefore, notably in respect of proposals to design 
personalised general education around DNA testing, edugenics literature is wholly a 
function of claimed scientific methodology. There are occasional references to the need for 
society to give wider moral and practical thought to the science before implementing, but 
edugenics literature does not actually extend to reviewing such literature. Rather, on the 
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basis of scientific method alone it insists that educational policy should, or inevitably will, 
accept a central role for personal genetic information.  It shows no awareness of any other 
epistemological perspective.  
 
Were this a marginal area of scholarship with little social significance, this contemporary 
manifestation of scientism may not be a significant public concern. But as laid out in the 
previous chapter, the field has attracted considerable interest at the highest level of 
government and it is likely that products based claiming to take advantage of it will come 
on to the market very soon. 
 
The 1941 Heisenberg-Bohr meeting in Copenhagen is instructive in this respect. It seems 
likely that Heisenberg was at the very least hoping Bohr could be persuaded to help the 
faltering German atomic bomb project in some way. Even allowing for the veiled talk 
required at that meeting Bohr, one of the great scientific minds of the century taking about 
his own speciality within physics just four years before Hiroshima, believed it was 
virtually impossible that fission could ever produce a weapon. Heisenberg, another of the 
great scientific minds of the century, may have thought it possible but certainly felt this 
point was some way off in the future. Indeed, when he learned of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
he did not believe it was possible and assumed it was a ruse.  
 
Operation Epsilon was the British holding, between VE and VJ Days, of the ten key 
German atomic scientists in a bugged country house (Cassidy, 2017).  The official 
transcript of the moment they were told of Hiroshima reads as follows:  
“1. Shortly before dinner on the 6th August I informed Professor HAHN that an 
announcement had been made by the B.B.C. that an atomic bomb had been dropped. 
HAHN was completely shattered by the news and said that he felt personally responsible 
for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, as it was his original discovery which 
had made the bomb possible. He told me that he had originally contemplated suicide when 
he realized the terrible potentialities of his discovery and he felt that now these had been 
realized and he was to blame. With the help of considerable alcoholic stimulant he was 
calmed down and we went down to dinner where he announced the news to the assembled 
guests.  
2. As was to be expected, the announcement was greeted with incredulity. The following is 
a transcription of the conversation during dinner.  
HEISENBERG: I don't believe a word of the whole thing” (GHDI; 1945).  
 73 
 
The assemblage of scientific geniuses at Los Alamos and the breathtaking speed of their 
results were made possible by the determined application of US power and money to a new 
and fast-moving scientific field. The application of the resulting technology came without 
public discourse around its morality. There were no philosophers nor social scientists 
present at Los Alamos to consider the epistemological or philosophical dimensions of the 
puzzle.  
 
Instead, the development of the atomic bomb as an endeavour of scientific method alone, if 
not its actual use, was presented retrospectively as justifiable on the basis of being a means 
of defeating a genocidal regime itself informed by scientism. Only once the bombs had 
been dropped did the possibility of their future use join the Holocaust as the subjects of the 
great post-war discourses around science, epistemology, morality and the meaning of 
societal progress.  
 
While genetics may not so far have yielded the practical benefits predicted at the mapping 
human genome two decades ago, it is nevertheless a fast-moving field of scientific study 
whose applications seem potentially prodigious. In the absence of war, the money and 
determination which led the Los Alamos scientists to near impossibly fast results will 
come, as capital markets dictate, from investors seeking high returns in innovative areas.  
 
Meanwhile, geneticists stress the need for careful consideration of the societal implications 
any such new technology may bring with it. Oversight is in considerable evidence, albeit 
necessarily sometimes ad hoc in view of the fast-moving nature of new technologies like 
CRISPR. Few scholars are suggesting that we must press on immediately with genetically 
informed embryo selection or the designing of babies more intelligent or superior in some 
other way.  
 
A small number do, it is true, argue that the difficulty of world regulation means that some 
nations will carry on regardless (Devlin, 2019). This lowest common denominator 
argument is present in edugenics (Hsu, 2014).  Plomin, a collaborator of Hsu’s (Specter, 
2014) on a project in China, writes:  
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“Knowing about genetic risk might also become a self-fulfilling prophecy, for example if a 
child is labelled as at risk for learning disorders. Parents might select embryos (pre-
implantation as in in vitro fertilisation) or fetuses (abortion) with fewer genetic risks and 
more genetic strengths. These are serious problems, but some of the fears derive from 
misunderstandings about what genetics can and cannot do” (Plomin, 2000). 
 
This thesis argues that the scientistic nature of edugenics literature generates considerable, 
and so far unexamined, risk. The perspective of CRT is employed as a means of illustrating 
one manifestation of that risk. The value of CRT in this respect extends less from its 
overall coherence as theory than from its imperative that epistemologies which impact 
upon society and public policy must account for structural and pervasive racism. This 
principle is present in discourse around mainstream medical genetics. As the next chapter 
























Chapter 4: Colourblindness and Scientific Racism 
 
It was suggested at chapter two that edugenics in the application is essentially a dual-use 
technology; the scholarly basis for designing education around genetic inheritance, and a 
mechanism of embryo selection for intelligence and other traits deemed desirable by 
consumers. The historical relationship between edugenics and eugenics has been 
examined. It has been noted that the modern science of edugenics pushes at scientific 
boundaries, which is its purpose, but is broadly orthodox in its theoretical assumptions. 
The leading scholar in the field, Robert Plomin, is a psychologist of both current and 
historical renown; his laboratory is well-funded and has published extensively on its twins 
then GWAS work since 1994.  
 
Edugenics literature is characterised not just by its science, but also by its appeal for 
application in social policy; notably education policy. Yet while its theory is rooted in long 
standing psychometric, statistical and behaviourist genetics scholarship, it contains little or 
no reference to literature in the fields of education or political science. This gap seems to 
account for the strange failure of edugenics scholarship to make any concrete or even 
useful proposals for educational practice which would justify upending current educational 
practice. It was also suggested that references to policy in edugenics literature often 
appears to be made in the context of an authority fallacy.   
 
This chapter will illustrate how this literature gap reflects a deeper epistemological 
problem. This epistemological weakness may be viewed through a number of prisms. 
Chapters 2 and 3 juxtaposed the lineage of edugenics with that of critical race theory. In 
this chapter, edugenics is considered through the prism of race and two particular 
phenomena are explored.  
 
4.1 Colour blindness 
 
“Color blindness is rooted in the belief that racial group membership and race-based 
differences should not be taken into account when decisions are made, impressions are 
formed, and behaviors are enacted. The logic underlying the belief that color blindness 
can prevent prejudice and discrimination is straightforward: If people or institutions do 




A generation after a World War 2 fought by racially segregated US military units, and 
while miscegenation and other racist law still fully applied in that country, the aspiration of 
a colourblind society was central to the US civil rights struggle. The most famous section 
of Dr Martin Luther King’s 1963 speech at the Lincolon Memorial includes: “I have a 
dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be 
judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character. I have a dream 
today" (King, 1999). 
 
King’s rhetoric is sometimes used by conservatives to defend the idea that from that point 
onwards, society should be organised on the basis of a colour blindness which presents 
affirmative action as anti-white racism (Carbado and Gulati, 2002, pp1173-4 & p.1174 
footnote 74; Turner, 1996, p.101). They refer to the equalities legislation which came as a 
consequence of the actions of members of the civil right movement (Hartman, 2013).  
 
Notably, the Civil Rights act of 1964 outlawed racial segregation in schools, public 
services and the workplace; the 1965 Voting Act equalised the right to vote by outlawing 
Southern states’ rules on voter registration designed to suppress turnout amongst black 
people; the 1968 Civil Rights Act outlawed racial discrimination in the renting or selling of 
houses (Ware, 2012).  
But although King did argue for a class-based approach to affirmative action (Haley, 
1965), he was manifestly a supporter of affirmative action, such as Executive Order 1092 
actioned by the Johnson administration in 1965 and which mandated the targeting of 
resources at under-represented minorities. Asked in 1965 interview by Alex Haley: “Do 
you feel it's fair to request a multibillion-dollar program of preferential treatment for the 
Negro, or for any other minority group?”, King replied:  
“I do indeed. Can any fair-minded citizen deny that the Negro has been deprived? Few 
people reflect that for two centuries the Negro was enslaved and robbed of any wages, 
potential accrued wealth which would have been the legacy of his descendants. All of 
America's wealth today could not adequately compensate its Negroes for his centuries of 
exploitation and humiliation” (Haley, 1965, paras 22-24).  
The legislation Haley and King were discussing was precisely that which, in the immediate 
aftermath of King’s 1968 assassination, prompted Arthur Jensen to write his real-time 
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criticism on the basis that black people are on average of lower intelligence than white 
(Jensen, 1969). This is discussed above at Chapter 2 and is returned to in Chapter 5.  
Bonilla-Silva (2017) argues that this modern colour blindness is a reframing device 
employed to maintain racial discrimination for the post-Jim Crow law era in ways which 
fit the post-1960s discursive landscape. White people antipathetic to racial equality 
accepted it was no longer acceptable or effective to argue for black inferiority and adopted 
“abstract liberalism” with respect to race.  
The frame of abstract liberalism involves using ideas associated with political liberalism 
(e.g., “equal opportunity,” the idea that force should not be used to achieve social policy) 
and economic liberalism (e.g., choice, individualism) in an abstract manner to explain 
racial matters. By framing race-related issues in the language of liberalism, whites can 
appear “reasonable” and even “moral,” while opposing almost all practical approaches 
to deal with de facto racial inequality” (p.56).  
 
In an empirical study, Knowles et al (2009) distinguish between distributive and 
procedural justice. The former runs in the spirit of King’s and the 1960s legislation around 
colour blindness as an aspiration which can only be realised through targeted expenditure 
upon disadvantaged racial groups. The latter is a retreat into process by antiegalitarians. 
The authors study attitudes of white respondents to ideas about racial colour blindness. 
White egalitarians accept the distributive meaning until they feel their interests may be 
threatened, for example through affirmative action which may deny their children a 
university place, then most adopt a procedural interpretation. White anti-egalitarians 
interpret the concept of colourblindness in procedural terms. 
 
“In Study 1, White people high in egalitarian sentiment were found to shift their construal 
of color blindness from a distributive to a procedural principle when exposed to intergroup 
threat. In Studies 2, 3A, and 3B, the authors used manipulations and a measure of threat to 
show that antiegalitarian White people endorse color blindness to legitimize the racial 
status quo” (Knowles et al, 2009, p.857).  
 
Johnson (2019) argues that in this way colour blindness has changed over half a century 
from being a progressive concept designed to legitimise affirmative action in the search for 
eventual full racial equality, into a conservative device aimed at the opposite. In the US, 
this has been facilitated by the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of the US constitution:  
 
“As the nation underwent a massive civil-rights transformation from the end of the Civil 
War to the dawn of the 21st century, color blind constitutionalism evolved from an 
argument made by racial progressives to one championed by racial conservatives. What 
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was once a legal framework for justifying the extension of citizenship and rights to 
oppressed black Americans is now an argument for the unconstitutionality of any measure 
intended to address the harms caused by the state-sanctioned denial of those rights. In its 
application today, color-blind means protecting white Americans from the discrimination 
that some conservatives perceive results from attempts to remediate historical wrongs” 
(para 3). 
 
At the beginning of his seminal exploration of this issue, Race Without Racism (2017), 
Bonilla Silva writes:  
 
“Whereas Jim Crow racism explained blacks’ social standing as the result of their bio- 
logical and moral inferiority, color-blind racism avoids such facile arguments. Instead, 
whites rationalize minorities’ contemporary status as the product of market dynamics, 
naturally occurring phenomena, and blacks’ imputed cultural limitations” (p.2). 
 
Gillborn (2018) notes how anti-white racism is becoming an increasingly heard complaint 
as white people grow in confidence:  
 
“Advocates of color-blindness often portray themselves as occupying the moral high 
ground—that is, as rising above petty racialized disputes in order to see the true worth of 
people and the arguments they make. In practice, however, color-blindness has become an 
argument to ignore race inequality and silence critical discussion of racism in all but its 
most crude and obvious forms”. 
 
He cites Annamma et al (2017), who take an intersectional approach fusing CRT and 
disability criticism (Discrit). Extending from Gotanda’s theoretical structure of 
constitutional colour blindness, they note that from the late 19th century until now the US 
Supreme Court has upheld the principle of colourblindness. This has in turn laid down the 
orthodoxy in the public sphere including Education and Research. They propose “colour 
evasiveness” as an adjusted notion that removes both the possible positive connotations of 
colour blindness and its unintended disable-ist connotations. In addition, it sharpens the 
phenomenon to take into account Gotanda’s non-paradox that it is not possible to ignore 
race unless you have noticed it then performatively, or otherwise, claimed to lay it aside.   
 
It is interesting to note that in Justice Harlen’s influential dissent in Plessy v Fergusson, 
1896 (Harlen, 1896), which argued for racial equality before the law, the following 
appears:  
 
“The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  And so it is, in 
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power.  So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the 
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principles of constitutional liberty.  But in the view of the Constitution, in the eye of the 
law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is no 
caste here.  Our Constitution in color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens”. 
 
Harlan, while dissenting from a conservative verdict which upheld racial segregation in 
service delivery, nevertheless set his original conception of colour blindness into a wider 
context of perpetual white supremacy. This procedural, or process-based, approach to 
colour blindness is the dominant judicial and institutional one in the US today. 
 
The same broad phenomenon of colour blindness as colour evasiveness is widely 
observable across Europe. Hübinette and Andersson (2012) write of colour blindness in 
Sweden; Clelland and Cashmore (2014) in English sport and Madriga (2018) in English 
higher education. In Italy, writes Migliarini (2018);  
 
“concealment (of race and racism) processes are based on the general assumption that 
race does not exist at the biological level. This ideology proposes that because race is 
unscientific and problematic; it seems best to avoid race’s harmful effects by discounting it 
or by looking for the cause of discrimination elsewhere, namely in the realm of sentiments 
such as fear” (pp440-441). 
 
In contemporary institutions, then, colour blindness manifests as a conservative disposition 
on race aimed at preserving the unequal status quo while maintaining an outward 
appearance of fairness. When employed commonly by white liberals, it might be described 
as that point of hypocrisy where altruistic intent is capped by self-interest.  
 
4.2 Edugenics Colour blindness 
 
A form of colour blindness is visible in contemporary behavioural genetic science which 
explores and promotes the role of genetics in education, or edugenics. This is not because 
it accounts for race in a colourblind way, but because race is a calculated absence in the 
research literature.  
 
Edugenics colour blindness is not, in fact, rooted in what Bonilla-Siva describes as a 
replacement of the “facile argument” of biological superiority. Rather, it emerges from the 
deliberate concealment of precisely that biological argument via an evasion of the ideas of 
race and racism altogether.  
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As described in chapter two above, edugenics contains within its own DNA a scholarly 
position that black people have on average lower IQs than white, that this goes a long way 
to explaining unequal educational and wider life outcomes, and that this variation between 
black and white is more likely than not partly a function of genetic inheritance.  
 
To recap, in 1994 a large group of eminent psychologists and intelligence theorists 
published a joint statement expressing their strong support for a number of scientific 
propositions in the field of intelligence scholarship. The strength of their support, and 
feeling, was emphasised by taking the unusual step of publishing not in an academic 
journal, but in The Wall Street Journal newspaper. The long statement reflected the theory 
and assumptions upon which their own extensive research was based. It included:  
 
"The bell curve for whites is centered roughly around IQ 100; the bell curve for American 
blacks roughly around 85; and those for different subgroups of Hispanics roughly midway 
between those for whites and blacks. The evidence is less definitive for exactly where 
above IQ 100 the bell curves for Jews and Asians are centered. …Heritability estimates 
range from 0.4 to 0.8, indicating genetics plays a bigger role than environment in creating 
IQ differences” (Gottfredson, 1994). 
 
The signatories worked in the Spearman tradition of factor analysis and ‘g’. As noted at 
Chapter two, the statement reflected the strongly held scientific opinions of senior scholars 
in the relevant fields. They went to went to the trouble of making a major public 
announcement of views they knew would be extremely politically contentious in support 
of key premises of a highly controversial book. They felt the statement was of great 
importance because there was much public misunderstanding of crucial aspects of their 
own scholarly theory.  
 
It should not be at all surprising, therefore, that none later changed their mind about the 
principles they asserted in the statement. If any had, it could not have been limited to some 
form of politics-aware apology for causing offence. As scholars they would have had to 
explain how their theory had to that point been in serious error; they would have had to 
show the implications for previous results and also how they had substantially modified or 
abandoned the theories which underpinned their scholarship going forwards. That none felt 
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the need to reflects the profound importance of the principles in the statement to their own 
scholarship.  
 
Some of these signatories continued to write about intelligence and race, and some do 
today. They have often suffered personalised attacks on the various bases that their work is 
not useful, is faux or that it gives succour to non-scientific racists who misuse the 
scholarship in popular discourse (Ceci and Williams, 2009; Gottfredson, 2010; Sesardic, 
2005).  
 
As noted in chapter two, many scholars employ intelligence theory in the Spearman 
tradition, notably ‘g’, in the study of cognitive decline and other fields which have scope 
for practical medical applications. In addition, the same broad theory is applied widely 
today in the form of psychometric testing across professional fields including clinical 
psychology, educational psychology and in schools administration. This is not to say that 
such people have the same view on race and intelligence as the signatories of the 
mainstream science statement, but rather to note that the signatories’ science extended 
from orthodox views on race and intelligence within the field of psychology.   
 
Robert Plomin, one of the signatories, moved from the US to establish his present highly 
successful laboratory at Kings College, London the same year as the statement and its 
aftermath. He has never mentioned race since, although he has written two highly 
successful popular books designed to bring the ideas contained in his many highly-cited 
scholarly papers to a wider public audience. In recent years, he has been asked about his 
opinions on race and intelligence, as expressed in 1994. One on occasion, Wilby (2014) 
reported:  
 
“He says he doesn't regret signing. As he wrote in 1996, genes gave him a stubborn 
nature, while family nurture ‘gave me a strong dose of self-esteem’, allowing him to ‘take 
the heat’” (Wilby, 2014). 
 
On another occasion (Al-Khalili, 2015), Plomin said:  
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“race is an extremely tricky issue, I’ve ducked it my whole life….in general I’ve felt ‘softly, 
softly’, is the better way to go…it’s a distraction to my research, but I think the basic facts 
are there about heritability of intelligence”. 
 
In July 2020, Plomin said he does not focus upon; “the politically explosive issue of 
average differences between (racial) groups”; “because I don’t have to” (Harris, 2020b). 
 
These statements appear unambiguous. A world-leading scholar is asked by journalists 
about by far the most politically contentious feature of the theory which underpins his 
life’s work. He explains that his views on race and intelligence are as stated in a statement 
he made in 1994.  This is in common with other signatories working today, such as 
Professors Richard Lynn and Linda Gottfredson. And it is not surprising, since if they had 
changed their minds about principles which were so important to their research that they 
were placed by them into a major newspaper, then they would surely have already 
published on the matter in order amend the theoretical, and even paradigmatic, basis of 
their own work.  
 
Unlike Lynn and Gottfredson, however, Plomin explains openly, if rarely, that he avoids 
the issue of race and intelligence now because his views would get in the way of his highly 
successful research programme at Kings. Where there may be racial implications arising 
from his work, he says he proceeds; “softly, softly” or simply ignores the implications.  In 
other words, he protects the progress of his wider research agenda by veiling, or ignoring, 
that part of his theory which many would consider racist.  
 
Gillborn (2016), who describes Plomin as “hereditarian” and an “educational gene-ist”, 
notes that this “racial inexplicitness“:  
 
“provides a way in which authors can avoid public condemnation while indirectly 
advocating a causal biological/evolutionary connection between race and intelligence. 
Following the public ridicule and disgrace of James Watson this approach has become 
much more common than the old style direct assault in-the-name-of-scientific-truth that 
found its peak of popularity in the 1990s (in the work of Rushton, Herrnstein and Murray). 
Race and racism remain a vital absent presence in this work; the hereditarians have not 
changed their beliefs about race and the supposed intellectual inferiority of Black people – 
they simply do not advertise it anymore”. 
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Tory Duster (2015) describes a phenomenon elsewhere in medical genetics which provides 
a useful perspective upon Plomin’s move here:  
 
“A significant wing of the Biological Sciences has found an unusual and effective way 
around the problem of confronting the matter of ‘race as a biological category’. The 
strategy is to not deal with race in a full‐scale case‐control design, but to ‘back into’ a 
clinical study that was never designed to test whether race plays any role, only to 
discover ex post facto that the race of the clinical population, however defined, played a 
role in drug efficacy” (p.12) .  
  
Plomin and his colleagues do not control for inter-racial IQ variation when they analyse 
GWASs for SNP and polygenic function. But at the same time, their theory includes an 
assumption that there is likely to be a genetic causation for much of the racial variation 
geneticists of all stripes say is observable through IQ testing.  They then propose the 
application of their results to public policy. They know that if they are correct about a 
genetic causation of inter-racial IQ variation, this will come out in the post-application 
results analysis. In the way Duster describes, Plomin et al will have incidentally ‘backed 
race’ into a study which was ostensibly colourblind.  
 
‘Backing into’ goes to the heart of Plomin’s “softly, softly” (Gillborn, 2016) strategy. He 
believes there is a genetic component to inter-racial IQ variation but there is little utility for 
him, and indeed much hazard, in openly researching the matter. So he does not control for 
race believing it will come out as a by-product of post-application statistical analysis and 
he will not be the one to do that.  The is the essence of edugenics colour blindness. It is an 
attempt to evade the charge of scientific racism, discussed in the next section.  
 
As noted above, England’s mandatory education system is already racialised at the margins 
through the use of IQ testing to select for grammar schools. Grammar schools are 
themselves a contentious matter since they symbolise a particular vision of education 
usually linked with the political right. The racial disadvantage they create has been 
tolerated by successive governments.  
 
This leads to the Plomin Dilemma, discussed at more length below. Namely, if Plomin et 
al are correct about a genetic causation of racial IQ variation, then the use of DNA testing 
to introduce polygenic prediction into education provision would risk vastly multiplying 
the racial effect currently observable in the very small grammar school system; both in 
local effect within each school and across the whole country. Regular IQ testing would 
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supplement DNA testing and together this would result in the existence of strong racial 
patterns within the resultant personalised learning programmes edugenics scholars 
propose. 
 
While if Plomin et al are incorrect about the genetic causation of racial IQ variation, this 
would expose an error inherent deep within their theory which, unamended and 
unexplained, would make it impossible to justify policy informed by it.  
 
Either way, this risk is presently unexposed and Plomin explicitly says he evades it 
because of its contentiousness.  Referring back to the Overton window for practicable 
policy mentioned in Chapter two, for policymakers the notion that edugenics would or 
even could, according to its own theory, lead to the advance racialisation of education 
provision across England would surely place the application of genetic research to 
education outside the realm of possible policy application? This risk is what edugenics 
colourblindness is designed to evade, at least perhaps until the application of genetics to 
education has taken place and has become the new status quo; Duster’s “back(ing) into”.   
 
4.3 Scientific Racism  
 
This thesis does not lay down a definition of racism or scientific racism. A full exploration 
of the problem of definition would require a thesis in itself. Instead, scientific racism is 
treated here as a frequently used pejorative; a charge laid by some scholars against some 
lines of inquiry which explore the relationship between race and intelligence. The 
researchers who follow such lines are often described as racists themselves, or otherwise 
criticised in personalised terms. Such work is often described as “pseudoscientific” (Paludi 
and Haley, 2014; Cofnas, 2020).  
 
This section makes some contextual remarks about how scientific racism is described in 
the literature the next argues that an attempt by some geneticists to deal with the problem 
of scientific racism both fails as a coherent argument and amounts to a refinement of the 
notion it seeks to criticise.   
 
A typical scholarly definition of scientific racism may be found at The Encyclopedia of 
Critical Psychology (Paludi and Haley, 2014), which begins:  
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“Scientific racism describes ways researchers have justified inequalities between races 
by relying upon pseudoscience, i.e., methodologically flawed science. Scientific racism is 
an ideology based on the spurious assumption that biological race exists 
(Winston, 2004)”. 
 
This formulation, which extends from a publication of the American Psychological 
Association (Winston, 2004), has a number of striking features. First, the phrase; “ways 
researchers have justified inequalities”, appears calculatedly ambiguous. Is it intended to 
mean that researchers have claimed there are empirically measurable inequalities of, say, 
IQ between races? Or to mean that researchers have sought to use such claims to justify 
social inequalities? The use of “justify” rather than “explain”, “spurious”, and 
“ideology” appears to invite the latter interpretation.  Yet if this meaning is taken, it 
excludes scholars to whom the first meaning would apply, like Plomin. These scholars 
think it likely there is a genetic explanation for inter-racial IQ variation and indeed that 
this explains much social inequality, but Plomin for one is explicit in saying he wishes to 
use his scholarship not as a justification for inequality but a means of addressing it 
(Plomin, 2018).   
 
The definition makes two other claims. The first is that biological race does not exist. 
This presents as settled something which is still much-contested within the disciplines of 
psychology and genetics. The 1994 mainstream science statement is unambiguously a 
claim of a biological basis; the 1996 APA response does not take a final position on the 
matter and there is no record that the APA position has changed in this respect. These 
constitute a paradigm or part thereof. It is not possible rationally to overturn this model 
simply by saying it isn’t so.  
 
The second claim is that scientific racism by definition includes a biological claim. But, 
as will be argued below, it is a contradiction fallacy to argue both that race and racism 
are social constructs and also that a scientific criterion must apply. Social constructions 
need not be evidenced, or even true.  
 
The rest of Paludi and Haley’s extensive, APA-sourced, definition treats scientific racism 
as a corollary of pre-World War Two eugenics and erroneous science. It says that eugenics 
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was pseudoscience rooted in ideology and that there was a parting of the way between 
geneticists and eugenicists at the end of the war. This narrative from modern psychology 
and genetics, pre-WW2 genetics and scientific racism as erroneous science with genetics 
since then shorn of the risk of scientific racism, is noted by Stone (2001) above and is 
discussed below.  
 
It is a matter of orthodoxy, albeit contested, within psychology and genetics that self-
defined black people on average score more poorly that white in IQ tests, that such tests 
are predictive of social and educational outcomes, and that it is possible that there may be a 
genetic explanation. It is also a matter of orthodoxy that ‘g’ is not a mathematical artefact 
but is instead an empirical thing. It follows from an assertion that ‘g’ is not an artefact that 
average IQ difference between black and white is in some sense empirical and not socially 
constructed, even if this does not of itself prove that variation between groups is heritable.  
 
The purpose of such value-laden and apparently calculatedly ambiguous definitions as 
Paludi and Haley’s then, in the wake of these orthodoxies, appears to be to protect 
scholarly fields such as psychology from the harmful pejorative of scientific racism while 
keeping virtually all of the old assumptions alive.  
 
This approach is not confined to psychology and genetics. In 1998, following the APA 
statement of 1996, the American Anthropology Association put out its own statement 
(AAA, 2020). These two statements are often used as the basis for the charges of 
pseudoscience made towards hereditarians by some ostensibly anti-hereditarian writers.  
 
There is insufficient room in this thesis for a full analysis of the AAA statement, but it 
involves little actual science and instead has the appearance of a document aimed at 
defending a professional field without providing much in the way of substance.  
 
It consists mainly of references to historical norms and the colonialist use of racial 
categories to subdue and control. It begins shakily by citing what is sometimes now known 
as will be the Lewontin fallacy (Lewontin, 1976; Edwards, 2003); the notion that 
biological race cannot exist because there is more variation within so-called races than 
between them.  Its references to “frizzy hair” and “dark skin” look almost quaint from a 
2020 perspective, when race is accepted ostensibly by all sides as a social construction. 
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The paper’s arguments may guide an intelligent and human approach to the general subject 
of race and intelligence, but wide acceptance of the socially constructed nature of race 
together have served together to by-pass whatever science the hypothesis contained within 
the statement sought to validate.  
 
Similar to the 1996 APA statement, however, the AAA statement’s primary purpose does 
not seem to be scientific.  
 
Armeligos and Goodman (1998), writing at the same time the statement was made, 
describe race as; “a core concept in anthropology since its inception” (p.359). In a paper 
entitled; “the profession of the colourblind”, Shanklin (1998) argues that; “anthropology 
has been a colourblind profession for nearly half a century” (p.669). She goes on to draw 
attention both to Boas’ role in the UN statement on race and tendency within 
anthropological literature since then to evade the question ever since by taking a 
colourblind stance.  
 
Rigby (2020 [first published 1997]) writes of the role white US anthropologists played in 
maintaining race as a biological category. Ingold (2008) argues that the AAA statement is; 
“internally inconsistent in the meanings it attributes to both biology and culture”, and 
unhelpfully embeds the notion of an absolutist battle between the two”.  Branklin et al 
(2011) analyse the field through the prism of “anthropology as a white space” and note 
that within anthropology departments and literature; “‘colorblind’ racial explanatory 
practices - discourses that explain away racially unequal institutional practices as being 
‘not about race’- are common” (abstract).  
 
In short, the AAA statement on race appears to reflect a political imperative extending 
from anthropology’s failure to that point to fully confront its own past, combined with its 
desire to remain a relevant ‘science’.  
 
To this extent, the statement may be seen best as a progressive wish on the part of many 
anthropologists to move on from a colourblindness which steadily displaced biological 
explanations of race. It does not appear, however, to serve in any way as a document of or 
about scientific method.  The biggest absence is an account of when, how and specifically 
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in what ways eminent anthropologists changed their scientific theories about race, with all 
the implications this would have had for their life’s work.  
 
4.4 Scientific Racism 2.0  
 
Edugenics colourblindness seeks to evade the charge of scientific racism not by actually 
denying the racially contentious scholarship, but by simply avoiding any reference to race 
at all. In a distinct but related phenomenon, some ostensibly liberal geneticists seek to 
defend their broad field of scholarship, human genetics, by condemning long-outmoded 
scientific ideas while preserving the ones which truly underpin modern scientific racism. 
This argument is referred to here as Scientific Racism 2.0 (SR2.0) because it refines the 
very notion it ostensibly seeks to invalidate. 
 
SR2.0 is promoted by geneticists and science journalists not through peer-reviewed 
scholarly papers but through non-scholarly media such as popular books, blogposts and 
social media. This means of amplification has been mentioned above in respect of EO 
Wilson’s “consilience” and Robert Plomin’s more speculative popular books such as 
Blueprint (Plomin, 2018).  
 
Publishing a popular book or magazine article aimed at the mass market enables scholars 
to take a holiday from the peer-review crucible while potentially smuggling untested ideas 
into mass circulation as if they had academic provenance. In this way, difficult questions 
can be evaded and favoured themes promoted. Reviews by laypeople rather than qualified 
scholars can be carefully managed and projected to convey the impression that such 
publications have scientific cachet and are important contributions to the field. The effect 
of this amplification upon public perception via high sales, newspaper extracts, media 
interviews and rebroadcasting through social media can be profound.   
 
SR2.0 has informed a BBC series fronted by a geneticist (BBC, 2014a); newspaper articles 
written by geneticists (Rutherford, 2015) and blogs producted by geneticists (Birney et al, 
2019). It is at the core of one of the UK’s best-selling non-fiction books of 2020 entitled; 
“How to argue with a racist” (Rutherford, 2020). The book is essentially the text, with 
some amendments, of a keynote 2019 lecture by with the same title and by the same author 
(Rutherford, 2019), widely available on the internet.  
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Rutherford (2020) provides a fine example of SR2.0 and how it works.  
 
Here, the pre-20th century and early 20th century work of celebrated geneticists, scientists 
and racists such as Linnaeus, Galton and Pearson are sorted into good and bad; “we should 
be capable of recognising and celebrating great scientific achievements while 
simultaneously condemning bigotry, even when they occur in the same individual” 
(pp.143-4). The taxonomic and statistical ideas which have great influence on scholarship 
today are also celebrated. Long since falsified and racist ideas, such as phrenology and the 
innate savagery of the African, are set up as an Aunt Sally. Most of the subsequent 
argument then goes into ridiculing both those falsified ideas and the extremist fringe who 
support them today.  
 
But this racist fringe is surely characterised by its failure to accept rational scientific 
argument? So what is the purpose of the book? Meanwhile, the great majority of racism in 
society extends from people and institutions already ostensibly converted to the cause 
Rutherford espouses. The notion that contemporary institutional, structural and personal 
racism can somehow be argued with by producing an argument from genetics not only 
fails logically and epistemologically, it actually concedes to the racist fringe the framing of 
the discourse.  
 
Meanwhile, the statistical work for which Galton, Spearman and Pearson are celebrated, 
and which others have built upon over the years, is discussed as the basis for claims that 
white people on average have higher IQs than black and that this helps explain unequal 
social and educational outcomes. This claim is not disputed;  
 
“IQ has been tested and scrutinised for a century in thousands of studies. That alone 
makes it a useful metric”; “IQ has great value when looking at populations” (p.147). 
 
“The value of IQ for science is undeniable. It also correlates well but not perfectly with 
other measures of cognitive abilities that are often used in scientific studies, such as 
educational achievement (results in exams) and duration (how long you stay in education). 
People who score well in IQ tests tend on average to live longer, get better grades at 
school, are more successful at work and have a higher income. When it comes to looking 
at IQ scores around the world and between different populations, the picture is far from 
clear, but there are some undeniable differences. The most up-to-date meta-analyses 
suggest that countries in sub-Saharan Africa are likely to score in the 80s, as compared to 
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UK IQ standards, though these results are not universally accepted. This, obviously, is 
significantly lower. Interpreting these results is not easy at all, and while it is not possible 
to fully exclude genetic factors, these seem unlikely” (pp. 149-150, author’s bold). 
 
IQ is described as an effective and valid predictor of educational achievement and other 
social outcomes; society is structured around IQ. There is great variation between racial 
groups (although in-country variation is ignored here) and it is not possible to exclude 
genetic factors.   
 
Average intelligence variation is said to be highly heritable within populations but not 
necessarily between populations;  
 
“intelligence is highly heritable….but we have a poor understanding of the genetics that 
underlies cognitive performance…so when we see different IQ scores in 
different populations, and we know that the heritability of intelligence is high (more than 
50 per cent), that doesn’t mean necessarily that the different DNA variants account for 
the differences between the populations” (p.158, author’s bold). 
 
Rutherford (2019) agrees that in scientific terms we don’t know one way or the other 
whether there is a genetic influence on inter-population variation;  
 
“Would it make any difference, if we, as scientists, as honest brokers, did demonstrate that 
there was a significant biological basis for intelligence or for sporting success that did 
coincide accurately with folk descriptions of race? If we could do those things, which I 
think are highly unlikely, but we don’t know, I think are highly unlikely, would that mean 
that we would treat anyone differently?” (1:08.27, bold reflects verbal emphasis in 
lecture). 
 
An extensive blogpost co-authored by geneticist Ewan Birney, Rutherford, a further 
geneticist and an anthropologist, is promoted widely on social media and is another 
example of the genre. It is billed by the authors as an “explainer” refuting 
“pseudoscience” (Birney, 2019). In fact, in the text they do not attempt any such 
refutation. Instead, the post comprises warnings about the limitations of genetic research to 
date, which can be read both ways, and a plausible case for why it is likely that inter-racial 
trait variation is not influenced by genetics. But at every turn the authors use soft terms 
designed to tacitly acknowledge the open-ness of the scientific questions:  
 
“A plausible argument for the putative lower average IQ score. Here, “putative” is 
employed to slightly distance the authors from the very notion, black intellectual 
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inferiority, they appear to accept since explaining it is the purpose of their “plausible 
argument”.  
 
“It is our contention that any apparent population differences in IQ scores are more easily 
explained by cultural and environmental factors than they are by genetics”.  
 
Here, “apparent” has the same function as “plausible” above.  
 
“for most traits, including IQ, it is not only unclear that genetic variation explains 
differences between populations, it is also unlikely”.  
 
The authors make careful use of the qualified language of the untested hypothesis; “it is 
our contention”; “more easily explained by”, “a plausible argument”, “unclear”, 
“unlikely”.  Yet the post attacks peer-reviewed scientific papers and their authors in 
emotional and unscholarly terms; “pseudoscience”, “darker currents”, “semblance of 
science”, “technical-seeming”, “misleading”, “distorted science”. With unintended irony, 
the blogpost specifically attacks “a cottage industry” for publishing peer-reviewed 
scientific papers.  
 
The authors follow the same line as Winston (2004) and Paludi & Haley (2014). The 
argument against a genetic role in variation between populations is presented as if it were 
already settled science yet the authors are careful not to suggest that it actually is. 
Opponents are instead attacked in personalised terms, their peer-reviewed scientific papers 
discarded without analysis. SR2.0 then insinuates that research which might prove the 
science one way or the other is itself motivated by racism on the right and scientific 
ignorance on the left;  
 
“This misuse is mainly from the right wing/cranky human biodiversity/alt right crowd 
(they are rather odd) but the argument often spills over into a left wing, progressive, 
genetics of intelligence measures is all hookum (sic)” (Birney, 2019b).  
 
Rutherford (2020) writes: “people fixated upon finding biological bases for racial 
differences appear more interested in the racism than in the science….very few people in 
genetics study questions specifically of race. Only the fixated remain” (p.179).  
 
Finally, scientists in general and geneticists in particular are; “honest brokers” (2019, 
1:08.30) who can be trusted to illuminate the path of scholarship, otherwise darkened, as 
Birney notes, by right wing ideologues on one side and left wing ideologues on the other.  
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The ostensible central argument of SR2.0 may therefore be summarised in the following 
arc:  
 
Scientific racism is defined by the claim by some scholars that IQ variation between 
human racial groupings has a biological basis. It is rooted in very early scientific error 
and current pseudoscience. Race and racism are social constructions. Black people do 
have on average lower IQs than white; this is probably a function of environment alone. 
But, all that said; “we don’t know” because genetics is complicated and much is still 
unknown. It may be that some genetic explanation will turn up after all. But if it does 
geneticists are “honest brokers” and can be trusted not to tolerate or downplay racism.   
 
The early part of this arc seems unambiguous and intended to combat the use of genetics as 
a basis for racist beliefs; it appears to be an attack on ‘bad’ science. However, the way the 
central premises are then qualified, it is accepted that black people do indeed have lower 
IQs and that this has social explanatory power, then steadily give way to ambiguity and 
carefully expressed scientific uncertainty, weakens the argument to a point which suggests 
its substantive function lies elsewhere. For brevity, two key features are noted here.  
 
First, the argument is invalid. SR2.0 asserts that race and racism are social constructs 
(Birney et al, 2019, para 3), but also insists the claim of genetic heredity in inter-racial trait 
variation is a definitive or necessary component of scientific racism (Rutherford, 2015, 
2019, 2020, Birney et al, 2019). These two main premises are incompatible, so the 
argument has a contradiction fallacy at its heart.  
 
The scientific notions that white people are on average more intelligent than black and that 
this helps explain social inequality is routinely used to justify racial inequality; an example 
of school selection has been provided above. This, and the related use of psychometric 
testing for the purpose of selection, may be considered to be racist of itself (Milmo, 2016; 
Gillborn, 2010) since it produces racially unequal access to services and life outcomes. It is 
not open to scientists who accept race and racism as social constructs to determine which 
science is included within the ambit of scientific racism, and which is not. Moreover, if 
anything embeds the notion of white superiority, this does.  
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Second, the argument’s proponents do not scientifically support its own central pillar; they 
simply claim that it is more plausible than alternatives.  Much care is taken to leave open 
the scientific possibility that there is indeed a genetic basis for inter-population IQ 
variation, to play it down and to instead shift the focus to a present lack of evidence which 
opponents do not in any case dispute; and to warn against simplistic inferences which peer-
reviewed opponents do not in any case make, and even then in ways which keep both 
options open;  
 
“when we see different IQ scores in different populations, and we know that the 
heritability of intelligence is high (more than 50 per cent), that doesn’t mean necessarily 
that the different DNA variants account for the differences between the populations (p.158, 
author’s bold). 
 
Why do these ostensibly liberal and anti-racist geneticists produce an argument of 
elementary logical invalidity? Why do they confidently criticise rival theorists in highly 
personalised terms (i.e. imply, correctly or not, that they are racist) then quietly play down 
their confidence in their own central argument? A poor understanding of epistemology 
seems one cause.  
 
Hayek  (Hayek, 1942, 1943, 1944) described the inappropriate application of scientific 
method to non-science subjects. At the core of this notion is the nature and function of 
social constructions (Berger and Luckmann, 1966).  
 
Scientism entails regarding social constructions as lesser or even irrelevant forms of 
knowledge compared to that arrived at through scientific method. As discussed above, Karl 
Popper and others developed post-positivism as a means of placing empirical reality into 
its socially constructed context (Popper, 2005). This is the subject of an extensive literature 
and is visited above. 
 
A topical example might be that the existence of a narwhal tusk can be tested empirically 
and described in every way. It is a sensory organ; unless it is wielded post-mortem by a 
human to attack a terrorist, in which case it is very much a weapon (BBC, 2019). The 




However, in an article (Rutherford, 2015) written after he had fronted the BBC series on 
the subject referred to above, his concluding paragraph begins:  
 
“Race doesn’t exist. Racism does. But we can now confine it to opinions”. 
 
In the first sentence, it is said that race does not exist because it is a social construct, while 
in the second racism does exist because it is a social construct. This is incoherent, of 
course, but hints at what is at the core of SR2.0; that is revealed in the third sentence. 
Racism exists, but only as some erroneous and unscientific opinion. It is not at all clear 
what kind of existence the author refers to, but he seems to mean a lesser kind of existence 
than scientifically proven facts.  
 
Later, the same author (Rutherford, 2020) accepts racism as “real” (p.186). This implies 
an epistemology other than scientific method, but no epistemological development is 
provided. Race is described as a social construct throughout SR2.0, but no explanation of 
what this means and how it relates to scientific facts is broached. This reference to the 
reality of race seems instead a manifestation of scholarly brinkmanship (Gardner, 1992; 
Gillborn, 2016). 
 
Without any other suggestion of a recognition of other epistemologies, SR2.0 appears to 
wish to relegate race to an epistemological status subordinate to that of scientific fact, and 
racism as simply an erroneous opinion. The aim seems at face value an anti-racist one, but 
without any recognition of an epistemology outside of scientific method this relegation is 
scientistic and fallacious.  It reduces to absurdity a profound phenomenon which impacts 
daily the lives of many millions of people. Racism is structural and embedded in language, 
including within science; for people affected it is every bit as real as a small lead projectile 
flying towards them at high speed.  
 
This subordinating of the social constructs ‘race’ and ‘racism’ to empirically-discovered 
facts is essential to SR2.0 and indeed reveals its substantive function. This is to protect the 
application of genetic research by narrowing the definition of scientific racism, thereby 
excluding almost all claims of racism from its ambit. At a linguistic stroke, it makes 
scientific racism disappear from “mainstream” genetics. Almost all the constituent parts of 
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scientific racism pass through this assumed definition like milk through a sieve. A remnant 
may not pass for now, but there is no true filtration process and even that remnant may 
make its way through in the end.  
 
One theme within SR2.0 does appear consistent. This is that in the event that science does 
uncover uncomfortable facts about race and intelligence, geneticists today can be trusted 
not to make the terrible mistakes their forebears of the first half of the last century 
universally did.   
 
Rutherford (2020) argues: 
 
“Hypothetically, if there were genetic differences between populations that have not found 
yet, and these do correspond with race, the fact that we have not yet found them means 
they are tiny at best. If those things were true – and there is no evidence to suggest that 
they are – would that have any impact on how we should treat each other? If science were 
somehow to show that there are genetic differences that align with our folk use of the terms 
of race, and that these also accounted for perceived differences in ability, would that 
justify segregation? Would you afford people different rights if they are ancestrally faster, 
brighter or stronger? (p.185, author’s bold)”.  
 
Here, hedged around by protective caveats; “hypothetically”, “tiny at best”, “no evidence 
to suggest that they are”, “somehow”, the writer’s very purpose is to acknowledge that a 
genetic basis for folk categories of race may be turned up by science after all and to urge 
readers not to use it as a basis for racism if and when it does.  
 
Notably, too, while Rutherford seems to rely on simple logical inference for the 
assumption that differences between populations must be small, Reich (2018) provides a 
developed scientific argument about why this is not the case (Cofnas, 2020, p.127). This 
thesis does not seek to adjudicate rival scientific arguments on this point, but in this case 
Rutherford simply makes an unexplained or defended point as if it is a definitive argument 
in itself.  
 
Rutherford (2019) notes; “Science new, and old to a certain extent, has done nothing but 
undermine the traditional and folk distinctions of race” (Rutherford, 2019, 1:09.18). Here, 
the notion that a small number of bad apples may have spoiled the early case for genetics is 
notable. In fact, geneticists enthusiastically supported old eugenics until under after World 
 96 
War Two, even when the science had been fatally undermined (Paul and Spencer, 1995). 
The Eugenics Society was renamed The Galton Institute only in the 1990s. It continues to 
celebrate Galton’s legacy today. The Mainstream Science statement in 1995 reflected just 
that; the APA statement of 1996 used folk categories of race; researchers today still use 
folk categories.  
 
Rutherford (2020) writes of James Watson’s 2018 racism ; “Geneticists had finally had 
enough” (p.143). In fact, in 2019 and 2020 geneticists at UCL, led by geneticist and media 
figure Professor Steve Jones, fought a running battle against a college plan to rename The 
Galton Lecture Theatre to honour someone not racist instead (McKie, 2019).  When Saini 
(2020) argued that geneticists had at times overlooked and understated their discipline’s 
racist past, geneticists including Rutherford attacked Saini extensively in a much-
publicised letter to Nature Magazine (Pomiankowski et al, 2020). At the same time, 
another scholar documented the enormous resistance from geneticists to renaming a prize 
in honour of eugenicist and racist RA Fisher (Witen, 2020).  
 
Interviewed by Rutherford for an extensive, three-part BBC programme on the subject of 
genes and intelligence, leading geneticist Professor Steve Jones is asked about the lessons 
history may have for the notion of applying genetics to public policy today. Jones replies:  
 
“The facts don’t change, opinions do. And I think it would be a great mistake to have the 
jackdaw of conscience constantly cawing in your ear saying; ‘you can’t do that because 
Hitler wasn’t a nice man’. I mean that’s just foolish” (BBC, 2014b, 27.08).  
 
This quote from Jones is placed by editors into a programme peroration delivered by 
Rutherford which implies the inevitability and value of applying genetics around 
intelligence to policy. Jones’ misrepresentation of The Holocaust simply as Hitler being “a 
bad man” rather than the consequence of years of ideology and enthusiastic work on the 
part of geneticists-and-biologists-turned-Nazi-party-officials goes unchallenged.  
 
The same series of programmes features Robert Plomin more than any other scholar. His 
views on genetics and IQ are given a long airing on multiple occasions; he is, after all, a 
leading scholar in the field. No comment whatever is made about his belief that inter-racial 
IQ variation is likely in part genetic.  
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SR2.0’s epistemological and structural weaknesses, and its strategic intention, reduce even 
its reliability as a guide to the state of genetic science. It argues that genetics is going 
through accelerated change and some of the science which previously underpinned 
scientific racism has been controverted. This is true. But it also accepts that many other 
variables remain in the air.  
 
And since SR2.0 accepts the existence of trait patterns within populations at some level, 
again because of the constructed nature of race it is not possible for scientists to control 
what race means. Like any social construct, it can change in meaning. Proponents argue 
that populations and groups exist which are not presently considered races. But this has no 
bearing on whether the term race can or will be adjusted in meaning to fit the patterns as 
new discoveries are made through molecular study.  
 
There are scientific, epistemological and philosophical arguments to be had here, for sure; 
a mechanism for transparent discourse is essential. Meanwhile, SR2.0, to paraphrase it;  
 
It is true that self-defining white people have on average higher general intelligence than 
self-defining black and that this helps explain racial inequality, that heritable trait patterns 
do exist within populations but these don’t perfectly correlate to folk conceptions of race, 
and that intelligence and other traits are heritable within groups. But genetics probably 
doesn’t explain the differences between racial groups; although, admittedly, it might 
because we don’t know. But in any case, whatever science turns up, it’s wrong to treat 
people unequally on the basis of perceived racial traits….  
 




Procedural colourblindness (Paul and Spencer, 1995) is in evidence across nations and 
institutions in spite of the obvious fact that half a century of the principle has left 
significant variation in outcome between black and white people; indeed the phrase and 
sentiment was employed on the radio at the moment the words above were being written 
(Ziegler, 2020).  
 
Over the latter half of that half-century, a genetic explanation for this variation, formally 
proposed by Jensen (1969), has been marginalised by scholarly institutions. Scholarly 
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bodies such as the APA and AAA have sought to navigate a route through these difficult 
waters which embraces the social implications of scientific scholarship and yet does not 
deny uncomfortable science. In the case of Anthropology, greater scientific credibility has 
been conceded in order to lean more heavily into an emphasis upon the sociological.  
 
Edugenics colourblindness uses officially-sanctioned procedural colourblindness as cover 
to conceal what its proponents think is likely to be a partly genetic explanation for black-
white average intelligence variation.  In this way, it seeks to, in Duster’s (2015) terms, 
“back” the genetic explanation for inter-racial variation “into” studies which do not refer to 
it. This appears more cynical than procedural colourblindness. Certainly, any policymaker 
who adopted edugenics ideas into education policy only to discover the racial implications 
a few years later would be entitled to think so.  
 
Scientific racism is often used today ostensibly to refer to the specific idea of a genetic 
influence upon claimed inter-racial variation in intelligence. The targets are early scientists 
such as Galton and contemporary scientific inquiry referred to as pseudoscience. Yet at the 
same time, Galton remains celebrated by geneticists.   
 
SR2.0 is an argument which amplifies in the media the politically-finessed positions laid 
down by the APA and AAA. Its ambiguous and nuanced structure seeks to deny, on a 
highly selective basis, that scholars with whom it disagrees are indeed scholars at all. It is 
subject to a number of fallacies and weaknesses. It claims to oppose scientific racism but 
by accepting almost all the tenets of heritage scientific racism succeeds only in refining it. 
The primary purpose of SR2.0 appears to be to defend wider genetic research from charges 
of racism.  
 
SR2.0 appears to have little or no scientific value; it is an argument invariably made not in 
peer-reviewed journals but instead in blogposts and popular science books. It appears 
manifestly scientistic; it is an attempt to de-fang science proponents largely accept but find 
socially uncomfortable. The greatest risk it presents is that it frames anti-racism as a 
biological argument, when the theory it rests upon here is highly contested; if the science 




Edugenics itself, however, does not appear the weaker for either its colourblindness per se, 
nor the charge of scientific racism. Its weaknesses are instead a question of true intent. 
Scholars press ahead with the application of scientific method and ignore philosophical 
and social problems, such as those around race, altogether. How is it possible to write a 
whole book about education with barely a mention of any educational literature? Or to 
propose policy and make judgements about what has and has not policy implications, 
without reference to the literature of policy or political science?  
 
Scientists are rightly brutal when social scientists misunderstand scientific principles. So it 
is hard to understand why eminent scientists would foray into social science without 
understanding the need to master the relevant literature first. Harder yet to understand why 
enormous time, money and scientific skill would be directed into behavioural genetics 
research searching for polygenic effects upon intelligence, only to pitch the results in a 
way which includes the implausible rejection of established educational orthodoxies with 
little more than a dismissive wave of the hand.   
 
Colour blindness and scientific racism are only two examples of hazards around edugenics 
which are so far almost wholly uninterrogated. The risk of social determinism is discussed 
at chapter five. Yet these things do not affect the science of edugenics; they affect its 
presentation and context.  
 
But why press ahead in any case with a line of scientific inquiry which relies for its 
application so implausibly upon the acceptance by policymakers of profound new social 
propositions? Why not at least concurrently examine in scholarly fashion whether there is 
genuine policy scope for application? Why not substantiate some practical possible uses of 
DNA testing in early special needs education, for example? This would require a 
multidisciplinary team, but the scale of the ambition and funding of eminent scholars such 
as Robert Plomin could surely readily accommodate this?  
 
The answer to these questions may lie in the dual-use risk of eugenics referred to above.  
 
The primary fruit of the work of edugenics scholars such as those in the Plomin laboratory 
at Kings is increasingly sophisticated polygenic scoring which emerges from the 
polymorphic effect of single nucleotide polymorphisms working together and with the 
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environment. They focus their ideas about the application of this science ostensibly on 
education, but their references to education are invariably, and strangely, unscholarly to the 
point of absurdity.  
 
The scale of philosophical and practical upheaval required within any education system to 
accommodate planning programmes around DNA testing, not least simply requiring 
everyone to have such tests in the first place, is almost unimaginable. And what do 
edugenics scholars promise in return? Some loose and ill-defined clichés about teaching to 
peoples’ strengths and providing more help to children with special needs?   
 
As noted at chapters one and two, genetic engineering technologies such as CRISPR may 
in future be executed to follow the polygenic data provided by edugenics scholarship. But 
since it is yet to be used for even health therapies and the ethical discourse around it is 
turned to loud in any case, this is a very long way off, if ever possible at all. 
 
Embryologists, on the other hand, presently provide IVF clients with a choice between 
embyros based on little or no information.  New commercial services are already available 
which seek to change this.  Edugenics scholarship, and scholars themselves, are at the core 
of an emerging technology which may realistically permit embryo probabilistic selection 
for cognitive and related abilities in the very near future. This, rather than the upending of 















Chapter 5: Drawing together and conclusion 
 
This research inquiry has explored key aspects of the science and historical antecedents of 
an area of scholarship and advocacy it refers to as edugenics. Such research is carried out 
mainly by psychologists working as behavioural geneticists. Intelligence, psychometric 
and statistical theory is employed in the service of molecular genetic research. The aims 
are the probabilistic prediction of cognitive ability through the analysis of genetic material; 
and the subsequent application of this foresight to the delivery of education or, perhaps 
more likely, embryo selection. 
 
A full critique of the science of edugenics is, for reasons of length and focus, beyond the 
scope of this thesis but there is much critical literature aimed at doing that job (Gillborn, 
2015; Turkheimer, 2016; Turkheimer et al, 2017; Comfort, 2018), The paper has instead 
sought to show where edugenics literature extends beyond the science into other scholarly 
fields, and where literary devices are employed to evade contentious problems such as 
those presented by the subject of race in humans.  
 
This literary evasion and invalid extension and into other fields of scholarship, such as 
education or wider public policy, is important for least two reasons.  
 
First, because here the scholarship moves from valid if contested scientific research into 
unevidenced opinion and fallacious reasoning about non-science scholarship. This is such 
a profound weakness that it suggests edugenics scholars view it as a price worth paying in 
order to cover risks, such as that of accusations of racism, while the scientific research 
carries on apace. In this way, it is more a token effort than true scientism.  
 
Second, because of way the errors implicit within scientism proper, notably the failure to 
apply any epistemology other than scientific method, led many psychologists and 
geneticists working in the 20th century first to support ideas which led to the miscegenation 
laws and the Holocaust, then into open conflict with racial equality legislation.  
 
This has led to an edugenics scholarly style which seeks to avoid contentious social and 
philosophical discourse through the defensive use of authorial gamesmanship, evasion and 
even fallacy.  
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Throughout the thesis, a historical approach has noted the epistemological assumptions and 
scientistic trends which informed 20th century eugenics, scientific racism and genocide. 
Critical Theory literature, notably that of the Frankfurt School, has been used to show how 
a science and non-science scholarship require a multi-layered epistemology in order to 
work constructively together. Critical Race Theory literature provides a perspective 
through which we may view one risk implicit within edugenics research; the charge of 
scientific racism. Other themes visited and discussed have been scholarly gamesmanship 
amongst some scientific scholars, and the use of the media to amplify misleading 
messages.  
 
The purpose of this conclusion is to draw together features of, and arguments about, 
edugenics literaure; to make comment about its meaning and most likely applications; to 
reflect on where contentiousness and ambiguity within edugenics simply reflects the same 
within the wider fields of psychology and genetics; to warn of the risk created by hazards 
presently unexposed to policymakers; and to make recommendations around effectiveness 
and ethics.  
 
5.1 History lessons 
 
Early scholars such as Linnaeus and Galton are widely celebrated today as distinguished 
scientists of considerable historical note. In contradistinction to respectively their 
taxonomic and psychometric work, which remains highly respected amongst many 
scholars, their racist views are often presented as a function of their time and place which 
led them to make long since falsified scientific errors.  
 
These errors are often characterised as the epitome scientific racism. Geneticists still 
regularly debunk scientific racism on this basis today (Rutherford, 2020). However, the 
basis for the work often labelled scientific racism over the last century is not the crude and 
erroneous normative cultural assumptions of the still much-celebrated Linnaus and Galton, 
but the intelligence scholarship from Spearman onwards, inspired by Galton, which 
sustains much scholarship and applied psychometric practice today.  This is not to 
condemn it per se, but it should at the very least behove us to be very careful not to allow 
its implications for the wider fields of psychology and genetics to be swept under the 
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carpet. Moreover, this might commend a Lakatosian perspective on the specific claims of 
edugenics, where for the purposes of policy they are the for treated as open and conditional 
rather than settled.   
 
Genetics and eugenics were inextricably intertwined until they were separated post-
Holocaust by worried geneticists. Geneticists today sometimes present a clear distinction 
between erroneous eugenics and legitimate genetics scholarship. However, the fact that 
celebrated geneticists of the day supported eugenics in spite of known theoretical 
weaknesses hints strongly that such scholars felt larger truths were in play and that these 
were somehow validated at a higher level.  Given that for half the life of the field of 
genetics many geneticists enthusiastically lobbied for, then participated in, forced 
sterilisations, organised mass executions and finally genocide it would be absurd not to 
consider this history when approaching potential innovations in genetics today.  
 
This thesis has not had space to pursue in detail the notion of ‘new’ eugenics. Certainly, 
there is important debate to be had about whether genetic engineering, embryo selection 
and other potential new technologies at least in spirit constitute Galton’s eugenics minus 
the messy business of old-fashioned sexual reproduction. The opinion of the author is that 
in view of the horrors of eugenics first time around it is better to start with the warning 
flagged by the label eugenics then consider whether new eugenic measures are socially 
desirable, than to bury the nature of the new moral choices society faces in the hope no-one 
will notice. This principle has been applied to the term edugenics used here to give 
temporary definition to a field which has so far received too little ethical attention.  
 
Behavioural geneticists say they may very soon create a technology able to predict to a 
high degree of accuracy which of a number of embryos is most likely to come towards the 
upper end of the IQ variation of around 10 IQ points typically present amongst embryos 
produced by the same human couple. New technologies such as pre-implantation genetic 
testing (PGT) and iterated embryo selection (IES), and indeed simply using present 
capabilities in egg donor selection, have the potential to greatly multiply this effect. In a 
world of growing international and domestic economic disparity, such technologies could 
lead to an engineered IQ gap – or increased gap depending upon one’s perspective – 
between rich and poor. It is hard not to see this as eugenic in nature.  
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That said, Agar’s notion that new eugenics can be defined by its exclusion of government 
control seems insufficiently robust as a means of delineating old and new eugenics. 
Presented as a matter of parental freewill, there is surely a risk that service access would 
follow capital as usual and a eugenic effect would become observable through government 
inaction? For the less well-off, the freedom to buy embryo selection technology would 
then be mediated by the economic system in the same way as the freedom to buy a Rolls 
Royce. Dominic Cummings’ writing is seems apposite in this respect. In the end, this 
thesis does not propose a solution to this naming dilemma, just to raise it.  
 
That geneticists in the first half of the 20th century held to eugenics even when the science 
seemed obviously wrong symptomatised their normative worldview. For them, society was 
best shaped along lines determined by scientific method. Other epistemologies and 
intellectual perspectives were judged by the service they could provide to scientific method 
and considered lesser knowledge. This broad approach led to genocide.   
 
At the same time, scientists driven by ambition sought to build weapons of mass 
destruction without the policy responsibility for their use. They successfully vapourised 
entire cities. In each case, after the wholesale killing, the scientists involved mainly carried 
on with their lives as before. Lessons have not always been learned; to re-state leading 
geneticist Professor Steve Jones’;  
 
“it would be a great mistake to have the jackdaw of conscience constantly cawing in your 
ear saying; ‘you can’t do that because Hitler wasn’t a nice man’. I mean that’s just 
foolish” (BBC, 2014b, 27.08).  
 
The notion of race in humans has been used here to explore risk implicit within edugenics. 
The period since Galton has been characterised by acute racism and geneticists have 
played their part in this; for example through an unscientific targeting of Jews and Roma, 
and through a narrative about the intellectual inferiority of black people which remains 
firmly in evidence today. To be sure, a new narrative from liberal geneticists that we 
should accept average black intellectual inferiority as a function of environment hardly 
marks a step forward. Indeed, in policy terms it seems little more than a banal PR move. 
 
Critical Race Theory (CRT), in spite of its sometimes postmodern turn, provides a 
perspective which emphasises the ongoing, pervasive and insidious nature of racism today. 
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Anti-racist and racial equality legislation has been in place in developed economies for half 
a century, yet profound inequality still exists. Structural and indirect racism has replaced 
openly racist legislation. CRT takes racial equality as its first principle, while edugenics in 
effect has the processes of scientific method as its own first principle. This sets up a 
potential clash of epistemologies and ethics. Built into the scholarship of edugenics, via the 
larger fields of scholarship from which this literature extends, are assumptions about the 
intellectual inferiority of black people. Black people on average have lower IQs than white 
and this leads them to poorer educational results and less enriched life outcomes across the 
board. This is simply science, they say. Edugenics literature has responded to this 
presentational problem by simply ignoring it through systematic colour blindness.  
 
Scientific Racism 2.0, however, is a more insidious construction of some geneticists 
seeking to impose a scientific definition of the social construct racism. It uses scapegoats 
to deny science’s ambiguity on the matter of race, then employs the mass media to avoid 
scholarly scrutiny. Such authors accept virtually all of the hereditarian science while 
claiming an anti-racist mantle for largely presentational reasons.  
 
Because racism is a social construct, there is no reason a valid scientific theory cannot also 
be racist. For example, if it is considered racist to ascribe poorer social outcomes amongst 
black people to their lower average IQs, then orthodox scholarly opinion, such as that 
expressed by the American Psychology Association in its 1996 statement on the matter, 
amounts to racist sentiment. The attempt by SR2.0 authors to insist that racism must 
defined by a claim about genetic influence upon IQ variation between races reflects both 
epistemological confusion and artifice.  
 
From a CRT perspective, engaging with conditional scientific ideas like this on their own 
merit risks conceding to scientists the setting of the parameters of the discourse. Science, 
as the Frankfurt scholars suggest, proceeds according to imperatives such as ideology and 
funding. The history of IQ is that of white scholars finding correlations within, and 
imposing explanatory power upon, how people perform in tests compared to how they 
flourish in societies constructed by white people. Meanwhile, wider science proceeds as 
informed by the power of capital. Ongoing scholarship in fields such as epigenetics 
cautions against overstating the importance of current scientific orthodoxy.  
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Edugenics scholarship is criticised in this paper not for its science per se but for its evasive 
literary devices, yet such devices are not the preserve of edugenics scholars. Others, like 
proponents of SR2.0 seek to control the definition of racism and thus define their way out 
of the problem. Finally, as is argued below, scientists are provided with templates by their 
own institutions and by august funding bodies. Where research seems evasive on a matter 
such as race, it seems likely that such institutions and funders are part of the problem.  
 
5.2 The Plomin Dilemma 
 
Historical statements on race and intelligence by key scholarly bodies such as the APA 
(1996) and AAA (1998) have overtone of pragmatism and small ‘p’ politics. This is 
consistent with some scholars’ emphasis upon the lack of purpose and value of race and 
intelligence study, or even its social harmfulness (Chomsky, 1972; Schlinger, 2003).  
 
What is lacking is a coherent account by scholars who say their view of the science has 
changed of where their science was wrong before they changed their scientific opinion, 
and how they corrected this in the theoretical underpinning of their scholarly work. This is 
of course not necessary for the signatories of the Mainstream Science on Intelligence 
Statement (1995), whose authors, such as Plomin, Lynn, Gotfriedson, Jensen and 
Herrnstein and Murray, contend there is likely to be a part-genetic explanation for inter-
racial IQ differences.    
 
The APA statement uses racial categories throughout; this may present a difficulty for 
those who wish both to deny the empirical status of race while employing the statement as 
a scientific source. It also uses Hernnstein and Murray, Lynn and Jensen and Plomin as 
authoritative scholarly sources. It confirms a significant difference between the average 
IQs of black and white people and restated the predictive validity of IQ in respect of 
individual educational, social, vocational and economic success. It notes that IQ is highly 
heritable within groups and cites Loughlin et al (1995) and Hernnstein and Murray (1994). 
It raises the issue of whether this inter-group heritability makes the notion of between-
group heritability more plausible. On this point it suggests that Lewontin’s example of the 
same seed being sowed in very different fields might apply if it was felt that the social 
experience of black and white people, in ways not allowed for in IQ tests, were as different 
as Lewontin’s seeds. It concludes this section;  
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“the issue ultimately comes down to a personal judgment: How different are the relevant 
life experiences of Whites and Blacks in the United States today? At present, this question 
has no scientific answer”. 
 
Finally, the statement notes that the inter-group variation does not extend from test bias but 
that there is no evidence of a genetic effect upon group difference; it insists that the cause 
is unknown;  
 
“If group differences in test performance do not result from the simple forms of bias 
reviewed above, what is responsible for them? The fact is that we do not know”.  
 
The APA and AAA statements are, however, the basis of frequent claims, notably with 
SR2.0, that a genetic causation is pseudoscience and that a wholly environmental 
explanation is settled science. This is simply untrue. Indeed, it is not at all the contention of 
the hereditarians that evidence exists, but that it is more plausible that inter-group IQ 
variation is caused by genetics and environment together rather than the latter on its own. 
They also contend that future molecular research is likely to provide the evidence to 
support their argument.  
 
As noted above, some hereditarians publish on the subject of race, but many prefer not to. 
Scholars who do conduct such research are often criticised in personalised terms by proxy 
means such as criticising funding sources or personal intent.  
 
But it has been argued above, in relation to Duster’s “backing in”, that this position 
amongst hereditarians within edugenics is informed by colour blindness. That is to say, the 
avoidance of race is part of a strategy to avoid a socially contentious issue until it is it is 
too late because such research has already been applied to policy.   
 
This broaches a profoundly important point which has yet to receive a reply from those 
who oppose race and intelligence research.  
 
Two substantive reasons are often given for opposing research into race and intelligence. 
First, that it may confirm a genetic causation of inter-group variation and this would be 
socially harmful. Second, that the harm cannot come from proof of genetic causation since 
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none can ever exist, but instead comes from the credibility such research bestows racist 
ideas in society at large.  
 
Both of these arguments are turned on their head by the concrete policy proposals and 
colourblindness of edugenics scholars, combined with the seriousness with which the UK 
government appears to take such proposals. The first argument would block research 
which could prevent policy designed to avoid social harm; the second becomes an appeal 
to blind and unscientific hope over responsible risk analysis.  
 
What is referred to here as the Plomin Dilemma is therefore as follows:  
 
1. Edugenics, in the form of personalised learning informed by genetic testing, IQ 
testing and the probabilistic prediction of learning predispositions, is a lawful and 
unregulated technology.  
2. If genetics influences inter-racial IQ variation, edugenics may yield biologically 
racialised patterns of education.  
3. We do not wish to research inter-racial trait variation because this is racially 
harmful. But if we do not carry out such research, we cannot know if edugenics 
will be racially harmful.   
 
This is not quite a true philosophical dilemma; it calls for more information about how 
much harm each option might do. But it does function as a useful device for understanding 
the root choices facing policymakers. At present, racialised patterns of provision exist as 
caused by environmental conditions. In some parts of England they also exist on the basis 
of 11+ testing. The UK already tolerates a degree of racialised provision. However, for 
reasons CRT tell us are quite likely caused by structural racism, these notions have limited 
traction in public discourse.  
 
The innovation of DNA testing for education would seem likely to place edugenics and 
genetically-informed education near the top of any national policy discourse. It seems 
unlikely that policymakers would wish to tolerate a new technology that could lead to the 
genetic racialisation of education. Supporting the status quo requires policymakers to put 
their faith in an unscientific anti-hereditarian proposition. Meanwhile, correlations already 
available through GWAS analyses would provide a strong scoping tool, and constantly 
evolving molecular research techniques would be available for further confirmatory 
research into the risk of what would after all be a revolutionary change to education policy.  
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Alternatively, policymakers, professional bodies and employers could prevent the use of 
personal genetic information in general education. However, this would entail in effect 
banning an innovative technology where no public harm had been demonstrated. This may 
have read-across to other technology-related decisions involving risk.   
 
Elsewhere pharmacogenetics, the trend in medical research towards personalised medicine, 
has obvious implications for race and ethnicity. Whether any given line of research 
amounts to scientific racism on the one hand, or to well-directed science and medicine on 
the other, is best judged by the non-white perceivers and victims of personalised and 
structural racism (Pena, 2011).   
 
Edugenics researchers often stress the application of their research to the field of early 
learning difficulties. Where such conditions are medically diagnosed, it may be that 
edugenic interventions could be judged by the same principles as pharmacogenetic ones. 
This could, however, cut both ways. 
 
5.3  Scientific Racism 2.0  
 
Scientific racism is a charge often laid upon scientists described as hereditarians. This 
description specifically refers to their belief that there is a part-genetic explanation for 
measured IQ differences between self-identified racial grouping. These scholars, 
exemplified by the signatories of the Mainstream Science on Intelligence statement (1995), 
argue that IQ is highly predictive of a wide range of social, economic and educational 
outcomes; that society is broadly structured along the lines of IQ; that poorer people have 
lower IQs than richer people and this is highly heritable; that black people have lower IQs 
than white; that intra-group variation is highly heritable; that there is no evidence that 
inter-group variation between black and white is heritable but this, along with 
environmental affect, is more plausible as a cause than environmental affect alone.  
 
Scientific Racism 2.0 (SR2.0) accepts all of these premises except the last, which they 
hypothesise is unlikely rather than likely.  SR2.0 authors do not publish papers in response 




5.3.1 Social and popular media amplification 
 
The style of SR2.0 is to publish in popular rather than scientific form in order to avoid 
scholarly review; to conceal the presentation of hypothesis as settled science through 
rhetorical and authorial devices; to throw up chaff in order to evade crux questions of 
science; to employ personal attacks where it suits their purpose.  
 
SR2.0 misuses scientific method by applying it to questions which require an epistemology 
informed by notions of social construction and thereby conforms to Hayek’s critical 
description of scientism.  Its style is the antithesis of Habermas’ communicative 
rationality; it seeks to frame discourse using scientific method while making rare but 
tactical, superficial and wholly undeveloped appeals to social constructionism. For 
example:  
 
“Race does not exist. Racism does. But now we can confine it to opinions” (Rutherford, 
2014, after fronting a three-part BBC documentary on the subject).  
 
“We are prone to saying glib things such as ‘race doesn’t exist’, or ‘race is just a social 
construct’… race most certainly does exist because it is a social construct [Rutherford’s 
emphasis]” (Rutherford, 2020 , pp20-21).  
 
This apparent reversal of opinion is, in an entire book, accompanied by no ontological 
explanation of what is meant by “exist”. Such an explanation is essential because without 
it we cannot know anything about the author’s epistemological assumptions, which also go 
wholly unexplained and undeveloped. Indeed, the latter quotation is followed by; “If race 
is a social construct, there is a biological basis to that too” (p.21). Here, Rutherford 
confuses the crude use of skin pigmentation and other physical traits to define race with the 
social construct itself; by this means biology is given a bridgehead into the world of social 
construction.  But the social construct is by definition wholly social; white people are 
perfectly capable of racism against other white people. The remainder of the introductory 
chapter is literally a long series of statements of equivocation which stress the complexity 
of biology and say nothing of epistemology; the entire book follows in this style.   
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Habermas sought, through communication, to find an accommodation between scientific 
method and a world of different theories of knowledge. His placing of communication at 
the core of meaning requires proponents of competing arguments to find optimal solutions 
through a series of rules which amount to an authentic intellectual engagement with no 
funny business. SR2.0 is the antithesis of this. Its use of social and popular media to 
promulgate hypothesis as fact, to selectively ridicule scientific opponents in the 
hereditarian camp while all the while still adhering to their main ideas appear to be 
manifestations of a calculated intention to engage in bad-faith discourse with strategic 
intent.   
 
For example, Galton is condemned as a racist in spite of his then-normative views, but also 
as a scientist of great historical note. Lynn, whose work is used extensively as a scholarly 
source in the pivotal APA statement (1996), and actually by Rutherford himself, is 
presented not as a scientist but a “pseudoscientist”. Plomin, the single most interviewed 
scholar in the BBC documentary series on the subject (2013) and with Lynn a fellow 
hereditation and signatory of the Mainstream Science on Intelligence statement (1995), is 
never questioned once about the matter and is thanked for his advice in the preface of 
Rutherford (2020).   
 
SR2.0 is characterised by, amongst other things, the calculated avoidance of peer-reviewed 
submissions. Social media is granted a powerful role.  
 
For example, as with Birney et al (2019) the scientist status of its four authors is exploited 
in the form of blogpost and support is generated through social media (Twitter, 2020). 
Although the blogpost involves a simple untested hypothesis and calls the notion of a 
genetic link simply “unlikely”, it includes plenty of personalised attacks on publishing 
scholars and equivocates over the central question at issue. It is lauded on social media 
(Colquhoun, 2020; Shattuck-Heidorn, 2020; Key, 2019), including by science journalists 
(Nichols, 2019) and politicians (Lammy, 2019) as a sterling example of anti-racism in 
science. The authors provide extensive comment in dozens of systematic, follow-on tweets 
(Birney, 2019c); some are personalised attacks on others, others follow a core line of 
intellectual reasoning. They ask for influential Tweeters to amplify their views and are 
obliged (Birney, 2019d).  
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Finally, other scholars actually use the blogpost approvingly as a scholarly source in a 
peer-reviewed journal (Booth, 2020). In this way, a well-informed piece of polemic posted 
on social media enters the scholarly mainstream unburdened by the scrutiny implied by 
peer review or, indeed by any scholarly standards at all.  
 
In the same vein, Rutherford (2020) receives extensive support across social media and in 
the UK receives starring reviews from journalists including arguably England’s most 
famous vicar (Fraser, 2020). A racist mass murderer is singled out by a US scientist who 
literally suggests that if he had read this book; “that could save lives”, he may have 
changed his mind. (Harden, 2020). The enthusiastic endorsements upon its sleeve are from 
a famous rabbi (“succinct genetics”); a famous travel writer (“essential reading in an age 
of false science”), famous campaigning and media figures (“a master storyteller”, “the 
ultimate anti-racism guide”) and a hotelier-historian (“far reaching, insightful and 
brilliant”). All are white.  
 
In this way, SR2.0 bypasses scholarly engagement and accumulates popular anti-racist and 
scientific credibility through social media and mass media. It should be noted that this is 
quite unlike the common phenomenon of well-known scholars writing popular science 
books or articles and engaging in media debate. There, scholars use published research, 
their own and that of others, as a foundation of more speculative arguments for public 
interest (Pinker, 2011; Plomin, 2018). If the speculation is laid on thick with a trowel and 
the scholar moves far from his area of competence in search of high readership, then the 
book is judged more as a novelty than a serious scholarly work (Wilson, 1998; Dawkins, 
2006).  With SR2.0, there is no scholarly work at all; authors simply use social and popular 
media to go from reasonable informal hypothesis to damning all opponents and claiming 
victory; all without actually seeking to rebut the ostensible cause of their outrage. What 
lies behind this deception? 
 
Here, edugenics may help provide an answer.  
 
 
5.3.2 The purpose of SR2.0 
 
 113 
As noted above, SR2.0 authors hold to almost all the same positions about race as those 
hereditarian scholars whose scholarship they describe as pseudoscientific. Notably, they 
agree that much racial equality can be explained by black people having lower IQs than 
white, although this is always expressed in veiled language. They create a battle-line with 
hereditarians in respect of whether or not inter-racial IQ variation has a part-genetic 
causation. While this may look solid on their media of because of the rhetoric of 
“pseudoscience” and “darker currents” (Birney, 2019), it is in fact a dotted line. They 
simply say it is unlikely rather than likely. They lay out a plausible and highly qualified 
hypothesis, but do not research it or test it. They attack those who do seek to do so in 
personalised terms, although this is done selectively. Plomin is frequently commended and 
thanked; he is never criticised for his hereditarian views but is criticised for his style.  
 
Some younger geneticists laud Plomin’s scientific work but question his outright evasion 
of race. Defending a Plomin scientific argument against a critic, Birney (2019e) 
nevertheless complains;  
 
“I have to admit I find a lot of his (Plomin’s) more recent stuff unnuanced and there are 
better and more sophisticated ways to use genetics in studies of intelligence/ educational 
attainment”  
 
Harden (2018), reviewing Plomin (2018), argues that Plomin’s avoidance of race; “will 
strike many readers, particularly in America where racial divisions loom large, as 
irresponsible”.  
 
There is uneasiness amongst younger geneticists that edugenics colourblindness, avoiding 
mention of race and racism as Plomin has done since the Mainstream Science on 
Intelligence statement (Gottfredson, 1995), is no longer viable in the context of advancing 
genetics research. The “nuance” is wrong in this day and age, Birney suggests. The 
stylistic nature of this criticism from authors who often speak publicly in support Plomin’s 
science is important.  
 
An additional argument put by SR2.0 is that historical biological racial categories are 
invalid; they give what appear to be plausible reasons for this. These are built around the 
Lewontin’s observation (Lewontin, 1976) that all humans have most DNA in common, 
leaving little room for variation between perceived biological races and much room within 
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them. There is an often-put counter-argument to this (Edwards, 2003), but this thesis does 
not intend to judge the science.  Instead, attention is drawn to the primary research interests 
of SR2.0 geneticists.  
 
Birney is described (The Royal Society, 2020) as;  
 
“a bioinformatician who has made significant contributions to the analysis of genomes. 
Through his development of innovative bioinformatics and computational biology tools, 
researchers around the world are able to predict and annotate regions of interest in DNA 
with speed and confidence”.  
 
A key area of interest listed at the same source is; “population genetics”. He is a former 
supervisee of geneticist Professor James Watson (Wikipedia, 2020). In a recent extensive 
scholarly contribution (Grose, 2020) and on Twitter (Birney, 2020), Birney suggests a 
possible genetic link between Covid 19 and the population of dark-skinned, BAME people.  
 
Elsewhere (Birney et al, 2019) it is argued with plausibility that it is incorrect to conflate 
populations with race but does not make it clear if he thinks the two things will indeed 
sometimes amount to the same thing. The field of study here is the identifying population 
groups through the computational and statistical analysis of DNA. He seeks practical 
applications in the field of health and is a consultant and adviser to a number of private 
sector companies in this respect (ERMB, 2020; Birney, 2019f). The notion that such 
populations may help biologically underpin racial categories is naturally an unwelcome 
risk to this field. 
 
Rutherford (2018) agrees with Plomin’s idea that all children should be DNA tested for 
subsequent policy use and, like other SR2.0 authors, lower IQs have explanatory power in 
respect of explain social and racial disparities.  
 
Scally is a co-author of Birney (2019). Another computational geneticist, his most recent 
listed co-authored peer-reviewed paper (Skov et al, 2018; University of Cambridge, 2020) 
detects, in modern populations, archaic introgression between homosapiens, neanderthals 
and denisovan populations. The abstract includes: 
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“(We) detect archaic introgression in 89 Papuans and show how the identified segments 
can be assigned to likely Neanderthal or Denisovan origin. We report more Denisovan 
admixture than previous studies and find a shift in size distribution of fragments of 
Neanderthal and Denisovan origin that is compatible with a difference in admixture time. 
Furthermore, we identify small amounts of Denisovan ancestry in South East Asians and 
South Asians”.  
 
In the Summary, the authors note:  
 
“there are advantages in having methods independent of reference sequences, both to 
reduce bias and to detect possible introgression from groups for which we currently lack a 
reference genome. In this paper we describe such an approach, in a statistical framework 
which exploits the fact that introgressed regions will contain a high density of genetic 
variants that are private to the group receiving the divergent material. We apply this 
method to 89 Papuan genome sequences”. 
 
Scally, a computational biologist, and his colleagues are therefore engaged in research 
aimed at finding identifiable groupings, or populations, of human beings through analysis 
of human DNA. There are no doubt legitimate potential applications for scholarly work in 
this area, but such scholars have an interest in attacking any notion of a link between their 
work and the shoring up of a biological argument for inter-racial IQ variation.  
 
In an article reporting on the American Association of Physical Anthropologists (AAPA, 
2019) updating of the 1998 AAA statement, Raff (2019) quotes one genetics doctoral 
student;  
 
“We aren’t denying that patterns of genetic variation exist, in fact that’s precisely what 
most of us study. We are, however, saying that race is not a useful framework for 
discussing or investigating human biological variation and continuing to use it stalls 
science more than advances it”.     
 
Birney is quoted too;  
 
“It is sadly all too easy to think race is somehow the everyday manifestation of human 
genetics but the truth is far more complex and interesting. Our collective genetic history is 
messier, richer and more complex than concepts of race”.  
 
The thrust of this argument is, then, that there is much human diversity and it is fine for 
geneticists to look for patterns and variation and indeed to create categories, but it is 
unsophisticated and inaccurate to assume that these patterns “clearly” (AAPA, 2019) map 
over racial categories in common usage. The AAPA (2019) statement incudes;  
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“Genome/environment interactions, local and regional biological changes through time, 
and genetic exchange among populations have produced the biological diversity we see in 
humans today. Notably, variants are not distributed across our species in a manner that 
maps clearly onto socially-recognized racial groups (author’s bold)”.  
 
“Clearly” here, combined with the stress upon of complexity and expression of unknowns, 
implies the possibility that there may indeed be mapping in some form but that it is not 
‘clear’. It has precisely the same function as “perfectly” in Birney et al (2019) and Raff 
(2019) below;  
 
“Research in the 20th century found that the crude categorisations used colloquially 
(black, white, East Asian etc.) were not reflected in actual patterns of genetic variation, 
meaning that differences and similarities in DNA between people did not perfectly match 
the traditional racial terms” (author’s bold).  
 
Rutherford (Raff, 2019) argues: the colloquial and traditional descriptions of race that are 
commonly used in the West are not accurately reflected by underlying genetics.  
 
Anti-hereditarians here wish to draw a line between racist old categories informed by 
empire and conquest, and their new biological categories which they say may not be called 
races but may be called populations or groups. They wish to control when it is legitimate to 
use the word ‘race’. In this way, they seek to exorcise the charge of racism from genetics 
and anthropology. But this will not do at all since although they make passing and often 
reluctant reference to race as social construction, there is no evidence at all in the literature 
that they have considered the implications social constructions have for discourse around 
race and racism.  
 
“Race doesn’t exist; racism does. But we can now confine it to the domain of opinions” 
(Rutherford, 2013) 
 
“It isn’t good enough to say that race doesn’t exist, tempting though that might be. Race 
certainly does exist, because we perceive it and racism exists because we enact it. 
(Rutherford in Raff, 2019).  
 
Here, “tempting though that might be” signs the reluctance with which social construction 
is addressed and hints at why is not developed in any SR2.0 literature and media work. 
This is a fundamental weakness not simply of SR2.0, however, but of the core anti-racist 
argument made by the APA, AAA and AAPA in their various statements.  
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A CRT perspective illuminates the fact that pervasive racism in wider society does not rely 
on the “accurate” or “perfect”, or otherwise, mapping of DNA populations to racial folk 
categories. SR2.0 creates an Aunt Sally of racists who quote bad science as if this accounts 
for most racism faced by non-white people. Yet even at the biological level, the claimed 
science is not as clear-cut as SR2.0 and the relevant professional bodies wish to make it. 
This creates a hazard for any anti-racist argument based upon genetics.  
 
To juxtapose Skov et al (2018) and the AAPA (2019) statement, for example:  
 
“introgressed regions will contain a high density of genetic variants that are private to the 
group receiving the divergent material. We apply this method to 89 Papuan genome 
sequences” (Skov).   
 
“variants are not distributed across our species in a manner that maps clearly onto 
socially-recognized racial groups (author’s bold)” (AAPA).  
 
Papuans are highly heterogenous, with relatively high denisovan and neanderthal genetic 
presence and thousands of very small ethic groups today. Can we be sure to any level of 
scientific provenance that some indigenous Papuans the subjects of Skov et al do not 
constitute a socially-recognised racial group? There is no reference to this in the paper one 
way or the other, likely because it did not occur to the researchers to mention it or perhaps 
to even study it since this would have required a different epistemology and a different 
field of research altogether.  
 
Meanwhile, well-reported racism in West Papua, where indigenous people are routinely 
described as “monkeys” (Martinkus, 2020), may turn around the very; “private grouping(s) 
receiving the divergent material”, Skov et al describe.  
 
It is therefore misleading and likely simply empirically wrong to argue that that such 
“private variants” will never map onto a recognised racial group. Perhaps this seems far-
fetched in the context of the census-like categories still used even by these very geneticists, 
but around the world much racism reflects majority attitudes to minority ethnic groups at 
varying tiers of localisation; Chagossians in Mauritius, Chan in Cambodia, ethnic Nepalis 
in Bhutan, Rohingya in Myanmar.  
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And how do we determine what degree of accuracy or clarity, to use the adjectives 
provided by SR2.0 and the AAPA statement, of gene-to-race mapping would be required 
to validate the notion of a biological dimension of race?  What similarities at what points 
on the genome would amount to a racially discrete group? These parameters would be as 
much a function of language and communication as of science. In other words, the 
problem of race even at this empirical level demands a combination of scientific and non-
scientific epistemologies. Instead, SR2.0 wishes to impose meaning through science alone. 
Even there, they provide no criteria; one suspects because they have not thought about it.  
 
Just as edugenics scholarship is, in effect, forced to shoulder the responsibility for 
scholarly assumptions made much more widely in psychology and genetics, SR2.0 bears 
the burden of questions evaded by other scholars elsewhere in the relevant disciplines. 
Genetics has a terrible history intertwined with eugenics and genocide; august 
anthropological bodies still find it necessary to put out statements today insisting that 
unlike their practice throughout modern history their scientific assumptions today do not 
amount to racism. Without addressing other epistemologies as equal partners on the subject 
of race, as Habermas would suggest, their protestations are not scholarly but are instead 
political; their purpose is to defend their respective fields of inquiry from damaging attacks 
and not to confront pervasive racism.  
 
5.3.3 Anti-hereditarians and hereditarians meet at the back 
 
As a final feature of this political phenomenon, it can be shown how some anti-
hereditarians and hereditarians in the end come together to find a common position in 
order to remove race from genetics by linguistic means. Here, the dichotomy is forgotten 
and edugenic colourblindness fuses with SR2.0.  
 
Ritchie (Kings, 2020) is an intelligence researcher, a member of Plomin’s lab at Kings and 
a Plomin co-author (Malanchini et al, 2020; Selzam et al, 2019). He is the author of; 
“Intelligence; all that matters” (Ritchie, 2015; Birney, 2019). He was supervised at 
Edinburgh University by Plomin co-author Professor Ian Deary (Plomin and Deary, 2015). 
In a controversial (Weinberg, J; 2020) paper arguing for free inquiry into reported inter-
racial IQ difference, Cofnas identifies co-authors Ritchie and Deary (Ritchie et al, 2015) as 
hereditarians (Cofnas, 2020, p.136).  
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Ritchie et al (2018) studies the difference in brain size and function between men and 
women. He is co-author with Deary and others (Hill et al, 2019) of a paper which identifies 
149 genetic loci which appear to impact upon social status. In common with edugenics 
papers, the introduction begins;“An understanding of the causes underlying the association 
between socioeconomic position (SEP) and health is likely to be helpful to minimize social 
disparities in health and well-being”. It is not explained how showing that society is 
structured around lines of genetic inheritance might help minimise social disparities. This 
is typical of the magical thinking contained with otherwise scientific edugenics papers 
mentioned above.  
 
In respect of variation between and across groups, Ritchie is co-author with Plomin and 
others (Selzam, 2019) of a paper which argues that correlations between family groups are 
stronger than within groups;  
 
“GPS prediction estimates for cognitive traits (intelligence and educational achievement) 
were on average 60% greater between families than within families….. SES [social and 
economic status] is a major source of between-family prediction through rGE [genotype 
enrivonment-related correlation] mechanisms. These results provide insights into the 
patterns by which rGE contributes to GPS [genome-wide polygenic score] prediction, 
while ruling out confounding due to population stratification and assortative mating 
(Abstract). 
 
If socioeconomic position reflects genetic inheritance and correlations between family 
groups are in evidence, this may be considered to at least have possible implications for the 
hereditarian notion that applying a similar study to inter-racial groups may also yield 
relevant loci points. Moreover, if society is structured along lines of heritable IQ and black 
people are typically less well-off than white, this too might suggest a hereditarian framing 
worth examining for its potential racial implications. This is where edugenics employs its 
own brand of colour blindness by being silent on the subject of race.  
 
Ritchie, however, as a young scholar has none of Plomin’s baggage. He avoids difficulties 
with scientific racism by adopting a new style. When mention of race is unavoidable and 
colour blindness will no longer suffice, Ritchie uses social media to attack what he 
describes weak arguments which fail to support hereditarianism, but does not reply when 
asked if he thinks there are stronger ones  which succeed (Ritchie, 2017).  
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To recap, ‘hereditarian’ is used here as it is commonly employed within discourse around 
intelligence, education and genetics. While of course genetics is the study of heredity and 
human variation, the term specifically refers to the notion that inter-group racial variation 
of IQ is in part heritable. For scholars who accept the strong predictive validity of the 
dominant measure of intelligence, psychometric intelligence as measured by IQ testing, 
this boils down to a disagreement over whether the black-white IQ difference they both 
accept exists is caused by the environment alone or by both the environment and genetic 
inheritance. The latter are hereditarians, the former ostensibly anti-hereditarians.  
 
This means that the anti-hereditarian argument revolves around intelligence theory and 
accepts the IQ conception of the hereditarians. On that note, leading anti-hereditarian 
geneticist Ewan Birney explains on social media, as ever; 
 
“it is amusing to me that some people claim we don't understand genetics and human 
population history. I am aware of my intellectual limitations - which is why I always enjoy 
hanging out with people who know more than me in all sorts of topics…in terms of IQ 
genetics, it’s @stuartjritchie and KCL/Edinburgh crew(s)”. 
 
Here, a leading anti-hereditarian geneticist explains that he is not an expert on the crux 
matter of “IQ genetics” and so consults a single favoured source. That source is a member 
of Plomin’s lab who researches hereditary group IQ difference, argues that society (with 
black people typically less well-off than white) is structured along heritable IQ lines, and 
argues for latter notion to be applied as a general principle to social policy.  
 
Rutherford, too, cites Ritchie as; “one of the people from whom I’ve learnt the most”, 
about genetics and intelligence (Rutherford, 2019b).  
 
Social media is of course an unscholarly source, yet it can be analysed in a scholarly 
fashion and their use by scholars to make extensive arguments as a proxy for scholarly 
publications is of note. Where scholars choose to live by social media, they also risk dying 
by it. That is to say, anti-hereditarians as referred to in this paper often dismiss social 




There is social media material written by other scholars, for example, which draws 
attention to the close relationships between, and views of, ostensibly anti-hereditarian 
geneticists and their hereditarian colleagues (Schneider, 2020). These have no scholarly 
value but illustrate one risk of attempting to move discourse about scholarship out of peer-
reviewed publications and into social and popular media.  
 
There is considerable peer-reviewed discourse around the subject whether or not there is a 
genetic effect upon what many scholars in both hereditarian and ostensibly anti-
hereditarian camps agree is a measurable and consistent IQ difference between self-
identified racial groups. There has been no scholarly resolution between those who think it 
likely and that this will be revelated as part-genetic by molecular level research, and those 
who say it is unlikely.  
 
Scholarly bodies such as the AAA, APA and AAPA have sought to lay out the 
fundamentals of the science while protecting the reputations of these fields of study; they 
have not confirmed about racial group IQ heredity one way or the other. This leaves all 
these fields, but perhaps most notably genetic research, open to the charge of latent 
scientific racism if this single variable is left, as SR2.0 does, as the single determinant. 
There is no logical reason an empirical truth cannot also be racist, in any case, since the 
latter is agreed by such scholars to be a social construction. This is problematic for 
geneticists, particularly in view of that field’s history.  
 
Edugenic colourblindness, so effective for scholars such as Plomin since 1994, is no longer 
sufficiently plausible. The issue of race cannot be ignored, in large part because of 
movements such as Black Lives Matter. In this context, SR2.0 agrees that black people on 
average have lower IQs than white but inserts a wedge between it and hereditarianism on 
the fine point of whether it is likely or unlikely that this intelligence variation is partly 
heritable. There is no research to demonstrate the point either way, and the hereditarians do 
not dispute this, but off the back of this carefully nuanced distinction, SR2.0 attempts to 
create a chasm with some (good, anti-racist) geneticists on one side, other (bad) pseudo-
scientists, on the other.  This is then amplified through social media and finally sold as 
agreed science through popular media.  
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SR2.0 epitomises Habermas’ strategic communication. It seeks to frame a discourse which 
requires multiple epistemologies using its own alone, to evade channels which may expose 
it as incorrect or invalid, and to stress channels of influence which will impact upon public 
opinion. In this way, it both stresses its own importance and reduces the risk of harmful 
charge of scientific racism. All while in reality jettisoning none of the positions which have 
characterised scientific racism for decades.  
 
The chief hazard presented by SR2.0 is that it accepts a framing of racism which society 
has moved beyond. The notion of arguing with extremist racists about genetics seems both 
absurd and intellectually regressive.  
 
Anti-racist discourse, as CRT observes, must instead engage with racism which pervades 
institutions, people’s unconscious beliefs and with structural racism across society. 
Institutions, governments and policymakers today routinely express agreement with this, at 
least. Why risk, in any case, the possibility that some geneticist will discover cases where 
folk categories and heredity do indeed map, or where some genetic component is found in 
the reported black-white average IQ difference? In a discourse where genetics is reified, 
such notions would give more power to the elbow of said extremists and racists.  
 
It is suggested here, to put it no more strongly, that many geneticists are conscious that 
there are remarkable new technological innovations in the pipeline as a consequences of 
genome mapping and vast computational power made available in the last few years. But 
also that there are large ethical question makes over many of them. In some fields, such as 
CRISPR and health applications, this is openly accepted and there is meaningful public 
discourse. In other areas, notably where intelligence theory, genetic research about 
populations, and public policy some together things are very much muddier.  SR2.0 seeks 
to mitigate risk around issues of race and social determinism by keeping it muddy through 
denial of the uncertainty of science on matters of race. An ostensibly anti-racist argument 







5.4 Genetic Determinism 
 
This paper has examined scientific racism as an example of the risk presented edugenics 
scholarship. The paper will not extend to a similar critique of genetic determinism, but 
there is much overlap and so one point is mentioned in brief here.  
 
Edugenics scholars often stress that linking, for example, IQ heritability and social and 
economic position is not deterministic; “It is worth reiterating the mantra that polygenic 
scores are inherently probabilistic, not deterministic” (Plomin, 2018, p.151). This is 
because their tools are probabilistic. Heredity provides propensities and not certainties, 
notably in the face of environmental conditions. If scientific determinism requires 100% 
predictive validity at the level of the individual, it is certainly true that edugenics and 
related scholarship is not deterministic. It is offered here, but no more than that for reasons 
of space, that when it comes to matters such as race, determinism can be understood in a 
quite different way.  
 
Imagine a group of 1000 randomly-chosen people being given a heavy pail of water to 
carry then paired off with unencumbered people and required to race them over 100 
metres. We may expect that some cases pail carries would win – fast sprinters might be 
paired with people of much lower mobility and thereby overcome the pail handicap. 
Overall, though, the pail carriers’ team would always lose.  As Gillborn (2015) points out, 
this individualisation and authorial gamesmanship accompanies what he calls “educational 
gene-ism”. It enables the two following statements to co-exist in the same book (Plomin, 
2018);  
 
“What would you think if you heard about a new fortune-telling device that is touted to 
predict psychological traits like depression, schizophrenia and school achievement? 
What’s more, it can tell your fortune from the moment of your birth, it is completely 
reliable and unbiased – and it costs only £100. This might sound like yet another pop-
psychology claim about gimmicks that will change your life, but this one is in fact based on 
the best science of our times. The fortune teller is DNA” (Prologue). 
 
“as emphasized repeatedly in this book, genes are not destiny and heritability describes 
what is, not what could be (P.154)”. 
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Public policy is invariably applied at the collective level, whether local or national. There 
is at the very least a case to be made that determinism can realistically function at this 
level. If some pail carriers, or black people, do well in spite of the conditions ranged 
against them, this does not reduce the deterministic assumptions which the whole group 
faces collectively. In this way, edugenics appears deterministic in terms of its use in 




The UK Medical Research Council’s; “Good research practice: Principles and guidelines” 
(UKMRC, 2020) includes:  
“Researchers supported by the MRC should consider at an early stage of the design of the 
project how they will adhere to the principles and standards of Good Research Practice 
over the course of their research and aim to anticipate any issues or challenges that might 
arise” (para A.1).  
Under “research misuse” para 2.e, the same document runs;  
“The risks of research outcomes being misused for harmful purposes… must be considered 
throughout the whole life-cycle of an MRC-funded study. Mechanisms must be in place to 
ensure that a thorough risk assessment is undertaken, any risks of misuse are identified 
and actively managed”.  
Shulman and Bostrum (2014) cite Plomin (2013) to note that sub-gene genetic material 
which affects human cognitive function is highly dispersed, so analysis which could lead 
to predictive validity useful in embryo selection for that purpose requires the vast scale 
provided by Genome Wide Association Surveys (GWASs). The UK Biobank is referred to 
as a relevant source of data in this respect. The paper notes:  
“In the longer term, as DNA testing becomes a routine part of medical care, data sets of 
tens of millions of individuals may be assembled from data produced for medical reasons. 
Such databases could be matched against standardized test scores, educational data, and 
income to produce extraordinary sample sizes at low marginal cost. Thus, while our 
understanding of the genetic correlates of cognitive ability is very limited today, it is set to 
increase dramatically in the coming years”. 
 
The authors note how the derivation of human sperm and eggs from human stem cells, or 
stem-cell gamete derivation, could compress the effect of multiple generational change 
through embryo selection into a single generation (via iterated embryo selection, or IES). 
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Advances in cognitive function, small over one generation, could therefore be greatly 
increased in effect in short order. Even so, because of cost, the authors suggest the effect 
embryo selection for cognitive performance upon human capital in the coming years will 
be limited by cost and uptake. Subsidy would be one policy solution to this constraint, they 
say.  
 
At his blog (Cummings, 2019), the UK prime minister’s chief adviser, Dominic 
Cummings, has given embryo selection much thought over the years. Reporting 
assumptions of a 2014 meeting organised by Larry Page, Google and Alphabet co-founder, 
which Cummings attended, he notes; “there is a reasonable chance we will have found 
many of the genes for IQ within a decade via BGI’s project, and the rich may use this 
information for embryo selection” (19 Aug, 2014 post). Cummings argues for the state to 
fund embryo selection in future in order to avoid a genetic overclass emerging from a 
situation where only the wealthy can afford the new technology.  
 
In a 2019 post (21 Feb) Cummings writes extensively of the embryo selection work of 
Professor Steve Hsu, who founded BGI, mentioned above; “What seemed sci-fi in 2010-13 
is now reality”, he notes in reference to his earlier post. Plomin, who is listed by BGI as an 
adviser (BGI, 2020), is described as; “the world’s leading expert on the subject”. The core 
of the long post is the work of Hsu and Plomin. Cummings describes his long relationship 
with the two, including inviting Plomin to deliver talks at the department of education 
(Merrick, 2013).  Cummings urges the present UK government, of which he is often 
referred to as one of the most powerful members (Shipman, 2019), to take expert advice 
from Plomin and Hsu.  Parens et al (2019) cite Hsu and begin a cautionary paper; “Embryo 
editing for higher IQ is a fantasy. Embryo profiling for it is almost here”.   
 
This paper is unable to explore the intellectual underpinning of the ethical policies of UK 
funding bodies and scholarly institutions. It does, however, suggest that even at the simple 
level of a requirement for researcher to consider the uses or misuses of funded research, 
there may be an ethical or procedural lacuna present in respect of edugenics.  
 
There is ample evidence to at least suggest that edugenics research funded by bodies such 
as the MRC may have, as a primary end purpose, the development of a technology for 
embryo selection on the basis of cognitive traits. The MRC and other bodies do of course 
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fund research around embryo selection, but the author has not been able to establish 
whether this is overtly the case with edugenics research. However, whether the end-use 
intention is embryo selection or education, what is clear is that such scholarship employs a 
stylistic device described in this paper as edugenics colourblindness. This is a mechanism 
designed to evade the implications such research may have in respect of race. At the very 
least, it seems an inappropriate approach for leading research which advocates for its own 
application as public policy.  
 
Elsewhere, The Lexinome Project is reportedly a $20m Yale University research project 
led by behavioural geneticist Professor Jeffery Gruen (Yale, 2020a). Much of the 
expenditure is upon the salaries of six full-time specialist teachers employed over a number 
of years to deliver support to children with early reading difficulties. Participants do not 
receive a dyslexia diagnosis. The three “aims” of the project are given as providing high 
grade reading intervention to struggling students, providing appropriate assessments and 
spreading best practice (Yale, 2020b, para 2). In fact, the “goals” of the research are very 
different. These are:  
 
“to create a pre-symptomatic, genetic screener for dyslexia, examine genetic and 
environmental connections to reading and learning disability, examine language and 
attention connections to reading ability, and investigate the possibility of genetics 
enhanced intervention selection…. the long-term goal of the study is to test the hypothesis 
that in the future information about genetic variation can inform a precision educational 
plan or reading intervention for students with dyslexia. 
” (Yale, 2020a). 
 
Of course such a screener would apply equally to embryos as to children. Meanwhile, only 
children whose parents have agreed to their DNA testing may access this much-needed 
resource. A criterion for school selection is that researchers wish to collect the DNA of 
children of non-European ancestry (Yale, 2009; Yale, 2020, paras 35-6). It is clear from 
reportage that parents are torn between accessing a much-needed resource and facilitating 
an approach to education which stresses the genetic inheritance of struggling black pupils:   
 
“one of the study's most powerful benefits for parents or the district itself—the opportunity 
for free, intensive, one-on-one reading support for the district's most struggling young 
students—also may make it difficult for potential participants to refuse” (Spearman, 2018). 
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“I don’t have the comfort in the research history, on the backs of black and brown people, 
to rely on it. We know that the history of research in our community has been void of 
communication, void of humanity: doing experiments on black women because we don’t 
have ‘pain receptors’…, knowingly giving diseases to black and brown people then 
sending them out to continue to be sick…, radiation research. What they’re doing for the 
children doesn’t bother me. What bothers me is that we got to this point. I’m hoping that 
that in the future any protocol brought to the New Haven Public School system — whether 
I’m sitting at this table or not — is vetted, not just by an outside [institutional review 
board] but by a New Haven school committee,” she went on. “I am going to vote for this 
protocol. But it’s not because I’m 100 percent backing how it was put forth. It’s because I 
know that there are minority children definitively benefiting from this and I know the 
struggles of a dyslexic” (Peak, 2018). 
 
The parent of a child with early learning difficulties quoted above is reported to be a 
paediatrican and local school board member. Her words questioning the research review 
processes, including those of funders and universities, seem apposite.   
 
In a statement supporting Black Lives Matter, United Kingdom Research and Innovation 
(UKRI), the UK non-governmental body which channels government funding into research 
insists;  
 
“We have begun work to address our structures, our work environments and the ways that 
we may be perpetuating problems – in terms of who we represent, who we invite to the 
table, who we partner with and fund. This is something that we will be focusing our 
energies on as we do the work that is needed to right the systemic wrongs that racism 
creates” (UKRI, 2020). 
 
UKRI, UKMRC, other funding bodies and scholarly institutions such as Kings College 
London may find it timely and fruitful to examine what may be an ethical lacuna on the 




At Chapter Two it was noted that Lauder (2020) argues that the intellectual neoliberal 
perspective upon education has been hollowed out by the decline of Human Capital Theory 
and the failure of school market reform. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the 
basis upon which pre and post-war economists such as Keynes, Hayek and Friedman 
influenced what might be described as rival but coherent practical policy ideas about how a 
good society might be developed and sustained. But it is tacitly suggested that a pattern of 
influence exists today which is worthy of further study, notably in the context of education.  
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Dominic Cummings is the chief policy adviser to a UK prime minister highly successful as 
a campaigner arguably because his approach to policy appears extremely flexible. 
Cummings himself, arguably the most pivotal single individual in the UK’s departure from 
the EU, has laid out the intellectual underpinning to his ongoing policy ideas with unusual 
candour and detail.  
 
Cummings’ blog (2019) is an ongoing piece of work which consists so far of many 
thousands of words over a number of years. It has been published at great length by The 
Guardian newspaper as an insight into the thinking of a policy adviser with what may be 
unprecedented influence over the direction of UK public policy.  The blog is an intellectual 
endeavour but is studiously not written in scholarly terms.  It is sometimes flippant and 
contains some unsupported arguments, but it is wide-ranging and conveys detailed and 
powerful imperatives for political action.  
 
In philosophical terms, Cummings’ writing is rooted in conceptions of human nature as 
much as assumptions about economics.  His aim seems to be to build effective policy upon 
transparent intellectual foundations. Cummings discusses with enthusiasm EO Wilson’s 
notion of consiliation, the edugenics of Plomin, the embryo selection work of Hsu, the 
centrality DNA testing to future health policy and much else besides. Their science is at 
the core of Cumming’s thinking.  
 
This work red-lines scholarly objections to such ideas, some of which are contained within 
this thesis, and proceeds to calls for action. Cummings was previously the Special Adviser 
(SpAd) to then-England Education Secretary Michael Gove and his work then gives strong 
indications of he may see edugenics progressing now.  
 
A key early feature of what is often described as a neo-liberal approach to education was, 
under the UK’s then Blair government, to encourage Education scholars to buy-in to new 
managerialist and marketized structures in state education. New institutions, such as the 
National College for School Leadership (NCSL), had the ostensible purpose of placing 
teaching onto a more professional footing. In practice, these new structures sought to 
change the intellectual underpinning of the organising and delivery of education to fit neo-
liberal imperatives.  In due course, the UK’s Cameron administration, from 2010 to 2015, 
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closed institutions such as the NCSL and The General Teaching Council for England. 
Under Michael Gove, resigned to what he and Cummings saw as the unreconstructed 
attitudes of Education Scholars, their functions were re-absorbed into the Department for 
Education and Skills. Dominic Cummings set about creating a new Educational 
nomenklatura.  
 
New organisations, such as Teach First (Teach First, 2020), were imported from the US to 
provide access to Teaching in ways which by-passed the influence of education scholars. 
New organisations, such as ResearchEd (2020), were encouraged as alternatives to 
conventional educational scholarship; now quasi-independent schools and academy chains 
helped fund it through in-service training fees. A common theme was the development in 
schools of ‘evidence-based’ practices founded ostensibly on the experience of teachers.  A 
feature was the fast-development of ambitious young professionals through quick 
promotion in newly-created school structures and, notably, through the trend for some to 
spend a short time training as teachers then move directly on to stand as representatives of 
a new class of educational thinker steadily displacing formerly influential university-based 
scholars.   
 
For example, Daisy Christodolou first laid out her educational theory in a popular book 
entitled: “Seven Myths About Teaching” (Christolodou, 2014) after a 2 year career in 
education spent qualifying as a teacher through Teach First. Shortly afterwards, she was 
described by the conservative educationalist Anthony Seldon as one of; “the 20 most 
influential figures in British Education” (Seldon, 2017). Former teacher Tom Bennett, now 
the UK government’s educational Behaviour Tsar, assembled the high-profile educational 
conference and publishing platform ResearchEd. Andrew Sabisky, a ResearchEd 
contributor, was recruited to the prime minister’s policy unit by Cummings. David Didau 
moved from teaching and ResearchEd talks writing educational books consumed by trainee 
teachers. Alex Beard (Beard, 2020), who also spent two years in education qualifying as a 
teacher through Teach First, now works to spread the private business sector ethos of 
Teach First to the developing world via Teach for All. Teach for All has a board dominated 
by public-spirited private sector investors who specialise in the developing world.  
 
Beard used his “expert insight” to write the popular educational book Natural Born 
Leaders (Beard, 2018). He exploits the same expertise and experience in presenting BBC 
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Radio 4’s “The Learning Revolution” where he interviews other experts such as Daily 
Christodolou about the future of education (BBC, 2020c). That future, it turns out, will be 
dominated across the world by new technology and complex algorithms.  Children may 
have chips inserted into them at birth to assist their learning. There is no social 
contextualising of education in this confidently expressed, and arguably nightmarish, view 
of how education will be; no discussion of values or power or the kind of societies 
sovereign peoples may wish to create.  
 
Meanwhile, Sabisky has made widely reported remarks to the effect that black Americans 
have on average lower IQs than white (BBC, 2020). Supporting this notion, Didau (2017) 
writes; perhaps it’s more reasonable to describe the position of those who deny the 
existence of these issues (racial IQ gap) as racist? Citing Gottfredson et al (1995) at 
length, he explains that science has spoken and the case is closed; “The IQ gap between 
different groups is a matter of fact. To deny that this is the case does no one any favours”.  
 
This use of a new nomenklatura is intentionally ideological. It astro-turfs the field of 
education scholarship with innovative ideas mainly not (yet) rooted in much scholarship. 
Much of the media’s reportage fails to reflect this (Green (2020). It also fails to grasp the 
wide support the notion of racial IQ variation has within the fields of psychology and 
genetics as discussed in this thesis in the context of Scientific Racism 2.0. Instead, by 
means of social media, popular publications and now BBC productions, the principles of 
edugenics are, alongside hollowed-out neoliberal ideas, amplified and increasingly 
presented as orthodoxy through trusted channels to millions of people.  It is at least 
plausible that some of them will endure and thereby inform policy.  
 
The Plomin Dilemma may, however, be the sticking point for edugenics in education. The 
public momentum which appears to favour edugenics seems considerable. But the issues of 
racism and wider racial injustice are prominent in public discourse and likely a higher 
priority for politicians and governments of all stripes than the imperatives placed upon 
perceived ‘science’ and ‘evidence’ in policy. This may be why the ideas of Jensen then 
Herrnstein and Murray have not found purchase in the United States. Plomin’s; “I don’t 
need to research race” in the face of the racial implications of his theory looks 
unsustainable. The scientistic claims of Scientific Racism 2.0, evidently supported by 
many of England’s new educational nomenklatura, may when examined prove similarly 
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insufficient to the task of defending the assumptions about race it appears to exist to 
protect.  
 
It is worth noting, perhaps for the purpose of future research, that a conventional 
conservative narrative is that of people overcoming the environmental difficulties they 
face, ‘pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps’, to take their place in a meritocracy. 
Today’s UK government has ensured the promotion to the highest level of non-white and 
working class politicians in part to emphasise this theme. As Plomin points out, edugenics 
in theory acts precisely counter to this conventional narrative. Edugenics may therefore 
realistically be seen by conservatives as anti-conservative.  
 
Embryo selection, however, for which Cummings has received considerable criticism for 
supporting, may plausibly have a sufficiently strong basis in discourse around Health 
policy to survive the closer scrutiny the new eugenics implicit within edugenics. This 
might in the end be Plomin’s larger scientific purpose.   
 
5.7 Conclusion  
 
This thesis has explored the literature of behavioural genetics research aimed ostensibly at 
improving the delivery of education; edugenics. The history and lineage of relevant fields 
of scholarship have been developed. Critical Theory (CT) and Critical Race Theory (CRT) 
have contextualised and informed the study, given perspective and provided a prism 
through which to view the problem of race as an example of unexplored risk within 
edugenics scholarship.  
 
The paper has not sought to challenge the science of edugenics as there is already 
considerable literature in place in that respect. Instead, the paper responds to what appears 
to be a gap in the literature; it assumes the broad scientific validity of edugenics 
scholarship and considers its lineage, coherence and wider implications. The science is 
described, but most attention is given to the internal logic and implications of a number of 
things asserted explicitly within the relevant literature of edugenics, in addition to a 
number of other things purposefully left unsaid.  
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Edugenics, it is proposed to the modest limits of this short thesis, emerges as a fast-moving 
area of scientific research pursued by leading behavioural geneticists. A, or perhaps The, 
leading authority in the field is Professor Robert Plomin of Kings College, London. Plomin 
is a psychologist, behavioural geneticist and scientist of historical note.  
 
The literature is characterised by its preparedness to advocate for the use of personal 
genetic information in the delivery of education. Scientific method provides the sole 
epistemological framing. This leads to the strong impression of scientism, a term 
popularised by the economist Friedrich Hayek to refer to the inappropriate application of a 
scientific epistemology to non-scientific subjects.  A number of authorial devices are 
employed to evade the risk sometimes present when a field of scientific scholarship raises 
issues which may be socially or philosophically contentious. In this respect, this paper 
follows on from Gillborn (2016), who observed the presence of “scholarly brinkmanship” 
(Gardener, 1994) where scholars squirrel away in the text generalised statements which 
appear counter to their central line of reasoning, then dig them up when seeking to parry 
accusations of controversy.  
 
Edugenic scholarship is also characterised by what this paper has called “edugenic 
colourblindness”, where the risky issue of race is not mentioned because of its possible 
implications for policy extending the scholarship.  The paper suggests this device is 
reaching the end of its sell-by date and is steadily being replaced, although not by Plomin 
himself, by what is described here as Scientific Racism 2.0.  
 
Edugenics takes on a burden of risk from the fields of psychology and genetics, where it is 
rooted. These fields contain considerable ambiguity towards socially contentious matters 
such as what are sometimes called scientific racism and genetic determinism. While 
scholars elsewhere in these fields may keep over a bargepole’s length away from these 
inherent problems, Edugenics’ policy advocacy means they must either confront them or 
evade them. Confrontation, by means for example of an acceptance of ambiguity around 
scientific racism, could lead to irreparable harm to the area of study. Evasion is the 
preferred route. Duster’s notion of excluding potentially contentious assumptions from 




This paper does not challenge the science of edugenics. Scientific Racism 2.0 (SR2.0), 
however, emerges as an unscientific creature of Habermas’ “strategic communication” as 
a new generation of geneticists, some in the field of edugenics, whose wider profession is 
historically mired in horror seek to protect their field from renewed charges of scientific 
racism. They do this by creating a faux anti-hereditarian/hereditarian dichotomy then 
redefining scientific racism in a way which excludes their views and research. It is 
characterised by personalised attacks, literary evasion and the presentation of hypothesis as 
agreed and orthodox science. SR2.0 is employed by some geneticists but only as amplified 
through social and popular media; not in scholarly form.  
 
Indeed, although SR2.0 attacks the arguments of scholars such as Reich (2018, 2018b) the 
author has been unable to find a single peer-reviewed paper on any subject by its key 
proponents. Still, Rutherford has written a book about genetics richly praised by Birney; 
“Adam Rutherford does an excellent job, explaining genetics, not shying away from 
controversy” (Birney, 2018). It is a Ladybird book (Rutherford, 2018b). Since then, 
Rutherford’s 2020 book has become one of the UK’s best-selling popular science books of 
2020 and is an exemplar of the genre.  
 
Geneticists today use vast computational power to examine huge DNA databases to study 
human variation and categorise human populations. SR2.0 is essentially an evasion of the 
fact that because race and racism are social constructions they cannot control their 
meanings in respect of human variation and population. It is not possible for scientists to 
define what racism is without reference to other epistemologies; that is Hayek’s 
“scientism”. Ostensibly anti-hereditarian scientists may not unilaterally exclude from the 
domain of racism, for example, their belief that black people are on average socially, 
economically and educationally successful than white because they on average have lower 
IQs. This is a problem for wider genetics, psychology and anthropology steeped as their 
histories are in overt racism.  
 
Edugenics scholarship makes proposals for education, but typically extend well beyond the 
competence of the scholars and the authority of the literature. Public policy and education 
literature is rarely, if ever, mentioned. The edugenics notion of grounding education, and 
wider public policy, in a principle that the purpose of state expenditure is to level up 
genetic unfairness as opposed to environmental unfairness is profound, yet its scale and 
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implications go unremarked upon in the literature. There is no attempt to justify the 
upending of the entire education system through developed ideas about education. This 
points towards the likelihood that edugenics is not aimed primarily at education but is 
instead intended as a technology of human embryo selection. Research funding bodies and 
institutions do not appear to recognise this.  
 
In the end, it may be that the science of edugenics has scientific application which brings 
benefit to society at large. But any future application will require a full and honest analysis 
of its possible implications and side-effects, notably in respect of subjective issues it 
presently ignores such as race and determinism.  
 
Meanwhile, society must not, I suggest, concede the framing of discourse around race and 
racism to those who still argue about genetics as a basis for racial inferiority or superiority. 
That is not; “How to argue with a Racist”; it is precisely How not to Argue with a Racist. 
As Reich has suggested, the aggrandised and scientistic use of genetics to fight racism is 
miscast as anti-racism. Instead, it risks bolstering racists by reifying the role of uncertain 
and ambiguous science.  
 
Racism is widely recognised today as a pervasive social ill which people and institutions 
can only truly combat it by placing it above other conceptions of social progress, such as 
economic growth and new technologies. This is a status it still lacks today, after half a 
century of relevant legislation. The notion that black people have on average lower IQs 
than white is a deeply destructive one in policy terms. Perhaps at some point in future 
epigenetics or some other science will show more clearly how environment works on gene 
expression to create claimed group performance variation, if indeed it exists. Perhaps we 
will discover racist assumptions within the algorithms employed by computational 
geneticists. Until then, the idea has nothing to offer anyone except despair.   
 
Genetics, and epigenetics for that matter, likely have profoundly important roles to play in 
human progress. But, as history shows, disaster only lurks where their application does not 





5.8:  Reflections 
 
My purpose in addressing the coalescing of current behavioural research and education, 
particularly in respect of possible ethical and policy implications I mention, is to help 
strengthen the area of scholarship by critiquing what I see as fundamental flaws and 
evasions in some present scholarship. My intention was from the outset not to judge the 
science of scholars like Robert Plomin, but instead to accept the scholarly quality, 
plausibility and relative orthodoxy of their work and to show some of its potential ethical 
hazards. My view is that the work of such behavioural scientists will quickly take on 
considerable public and political importance from now on. If policymakers and the wider 
public are to take informed positions on which applications of such research may or may 
not represent human progress, it will be necessary to do so with a clear view of the true 
implicit risks and opportunities.  
 
My focus has not therefore been upon the science itself, but about the underlying 
epistemology of the literature and about the presentational intentions of some authors. This 
led me to my primary methodology of literary analysis and criticism. A more complete 
treatment may have involved empirical research into what people and scholars mean when 
they use or hear words like “racism”, “race” and “determinism”.  More analysis, too, of the 
scientific case presented by Plomin and others, and indeed its contestability, is still clearly 
in order and had this thesis been longer would have strengthened the basic arguments 
contained in the thesis.  
 
My approach takes a liberal framework which does not, for example, reject enlightenment 
thinking nor explore a postmodernist approach to the application of behavioural genetics to 
education and embryo research. My limited use of the later Critical Theory of Habermas, 
notably his ideas about human communication and intent, takes the liberal conception of 
such work and reflects my wish to reflect Habermas’ own desire to be of practical use in 
the world. This in turn implicitly reflects my own rejection of many of the tenets of 
contemporary post-modernism. My view is that contemporary post-modernist approaches 
often suffer from internal intellectual and political problems which lead them to be of little 
practical use in society at large and, indeed, that this often specifically undermines the 
original intent of Critical Race Theory (CRT). These underlying views are not tested or 
explored in the thesis, but they do flavour it; they may therefore be considered biases. 
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While this may be a weakness, the points I raise may be of value in each specific case. I 
hope, of course, that the thesis holds together in terms of the broad themes it seeks to deal 
with, including often unstated phenomena such as authorial gamesmanship and small ‘p’ 
science politics. I began my research with opinions, notably about race, and I have a desire 
to use the research to make a (very small) difference in the world. This is consistent with 
the spirit of Critical Theory and Critical Race Theory, even if I reject many of the ideas 
associated with them. Again, these preconceived notions may represent less desirable traits 
in a doctoral candidate; or they may be considered compatible with my axiomatic rejection 
of a broad postmodernist approach. In any case, my intention has been to expose some 
ideas to the light and I believe that even with these weaknesses the thesis may be of modest 
value to readers from both scientific and non-scientific backgrounds.  
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